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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTION OF LASSWELL'S 
DECISION-MAKING MODEL AND APPLICATION 
TO CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION 
BUSING DECISION 
This dissertation is a study of the Chicago Board of Edu-
cation decision to bus children from two predominantly black 
schools to eight entirely white schools. This study is significant 
for at least three reasons: It clarifies the factors involved in 
the decision-making process as practiced by the Chicago Board of 
Education. It examines the policies employed by the Board as 
alternatives to busing programs. Finally, the study of this busing 
controversy, while considering only the local problems, is of use 
for further inquiries into the similarities and differences among 
the attempts in conununities throughout the nation to solve the 
problems of integration. These decisions on integration will have 
an undoubtedly critical influence upon the future of our democratic 
society. 
The scheme of analysis which this dissertation will employ 
has been suggested by Harold Lasswell. The hypothesis of this 
1 
2 
dissertation is that the seven categories of functional analysis 
suggested by Lasswell will yield a comprehensive and exceptionally 
intelligible view of the decision-making process when related to 
the Chicago busing decision. The analytic questions suggested by 
the seven functions will direct research to pertinent and valuable 
observations. Lasswell remains a controversial figure among social 
scientists. His attempts to develop propositions governing the 
uses of power have been attacked as tending to "end in mechanical 
laws which, correctly formulated, would be irrelevant to human 
problems, and perhaps quite meaningless." 1 The dissertation 
offered here is not so ambitious as1 to test the validity of this 
criticism of Lasswell. No attempt will be made to apply all of 
Lasswell's formulation of the basic concepts and hypothesis of 
political science as offered in his work, Power and Society. 2 
1rhomas I. Cook, review of Power and Society: A Framework 
for Political Inquiry, by Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, 
in the Journal of Philosophy, XVI, February, 1951, p. 697. 
2Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: 
A Framework for Political Inquir.z (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1950). Lasswell presented his seven functions in a smaller 
work based upon the earlier study. His concern in the latter 
study was to develop classifications which would be "serviceable 
when they are tentative and undogmatic, and when they guide schol-
arly activity in directions that are presently accepted as valuable." 
Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of 
Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: ·Bureau of Govern-
mental Research, University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2. 
3 
Use of Lasswell's model will help avoid, but not dismiss, 
the narrowed frame of reference adopted in numerous studies of the 
decision-making process. Some of these studies have concentrated 
on the formal process which considers the status quo to represent 
a tension between interest groups. The status quo is disturbed 
when some of these organized interest groups combine to bring about 
a change. Other studies deprecate the role of organizations and 
argue that an informal and non-public group of powerful leaders in 
a community account for the important decisions which are made.3 
The Lasswell model lends itself to an administrative as well 
( 
as politico-sociological analysis of the decision being considered. 
Its seven categories examine the stages in the decision-making 
process from the initial information gathering stage through a 
termination stage when the decision has been applied, appraised, 
and has become an apparent part of the operation of the system 
involved. These seven functions are listed below with analytic 
3Ralph B. Kimbrough, Political Power and Education Decision-
Making (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964). Stephan P. Hencley, 
"The Study of Community Politics and Power," and Nelson W. Polsby, 
"How to Study Cornmunity Power: The Pluralist Alternative," and 
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Nee-Elitist Critique of Community 
Power," in The Politics of Urban Education, ed. by Marilyn Gittell 
and Alvan Hevasi (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 21-
59. 
4 
questions paraphrased from Lasswell.4 
The first category is the intelligence function. It con-
siders information, prediction, and planning, and implies such 
questions as: How is information that comes to the attention of 
the decision-makers gathered and processed? What studies, reports, 
laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known or avail-
able to the decision-makers? What formal or informal channels 
were being utilized in reaching the decision-makers? To what 
extent did the decision-making body control the source of its 
information? 
( 
The second category is the recommendation function. It 
considers promotion of policy alternatives and implies such 
questions as: How are recommendations made and promoted? What 
alternative decisions were considered? Who advocated these 
alternatives? Why were they rejected, accepted, or compromised? 
What audiences were reached by the recommendations? Whose 
function was it to recommend? What values were considered in per-
forming the function? To what extent did the information made 
available disclose threats or opportun~ties pertinent to the 
pr_esent. or potential value position of the decision-makers? Did 
4Lasswell, The Decision Process, pp. 2-19, passim. 
5 
information made available to those concerned with the decision 
alter their views? Did pressure groups demand a greater partici-
pation in the recommending function as a result of the decision 
being considered? 
The third category is the prescription function. It con-
siders the enactment of the general rules and implies such questions 
as: How are rules prescribed? What was the final decision? What 
group really made the final prescription? Did any groups involved 
in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order to redress 
their grievances as they saw them? 
( 
The fourth category is the invocation function. It considers 
provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions 
and implies such questions as: In reference to whom is the pres-
cription invoked? Who was responsible for administering the 
decision? Was the prescription invoked for all cases possible or 
only for selected cases? Was the decision challenged? How was 
the decision challenged? 
The fifth category is the application function. It considers 
final characterization of conduct according to prescripti~ns and 
implies such questions as: How was the prescription applied? How 
were those affected reached and informed? Did any groups turn to 
other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the prescription? 
6 
was the prescription violated by any individuals or by the agency 
responsible for the application of the prescription? Did the 
prescribed policy lead to changes i~ values? 
The sixth category is the appraisal function. It considers 
assessment of the success and £allure of policy and implies such 
questions as: How is the working of prescriptions appraised? 
Whose activities were appraised? Who did the appraising? How 
effectively and efficiently was the prescription executed? Did 
the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or indifferent 
administration of the prescription? Did the administration of the 
( 
prescription lead to significant changes in the administrative 
agency? 
The seventh category is the termination 'function. It 
considers the final arrangements entered into within the framework 
of the prescription and implies such questions as: How was the 
prescription integrated into the framework of the organization? 
Did expectations change? What aspects of the prescription, if 
any, were abandoned or revised? 
This dissertation will use numerous so~rces to gather the 
informatioq necessary to answer these analytical questions. Local 
histories and community studies will be consulted. Federal and 
state laws, commission studies, and court decisions will be cited. 
7 
Personal interviews with concerned citizens, teachers, and admin-
istrators will help to clarify the meaning and operation of various 
policies. The records of the proceedings of the Board of Education 
meetings will be introduced whenever pertinent. Numerous reports 
and studies conunissioned by the Board will be examined. Local 
and city-wide newspapers, a major source of information, will fill 
in the flesh and blood missing from public documents. 
The role newspapers play in Board matters has been recognized 
by a scholar who sat on the Chicago Board of Education. Joseph 
Pois has observed that newspaper reporters often become quite 
( 
expert on school matters. Indeed, he discloses, it was not unusual 
for a reporter to direct a Board member's attention to details that 
might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The scrutiny of the press 
influences Board members to be mindful of their inconsistencies. 
Observant reporters are quick to detect the influence of conunit-
ments or cliques upon a member's vote. Pois observes some short-
comings of the press but states that "the press is by far the prin-
cipal medium for publicizing the member's position on school issues 
as well as for mobilizing support."5 
However, for numerous reasons, a newspaper account may be 
5Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case Study 
(Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), pp. 141-42, 143 (Quote). 
8 
inaccurate. This is one reason that multiple citations will be 
given in footnotes in order to establish that more than one source 
was in agreement on the accuracy of a statement. When disagree-
ment is found, an analysis will be made in the footnote. Another 
reason for multiple citations rests in the fact that often the 
information incorporated in a single sentence or paragraph may be 
drawn from more than one source. As this occurs with considerable 
frequency, the multitude of footnotes and explanations would be a 
greater irritation to the reader than checking a multiple citation. 
\ 
The basic chronological approach of this study should result 
' in minimal distortion of the Lasswell decision-making model. 
Indeed, a chronological sequence demonstrates that the use of the 
seven functions does not affect the free form a researcher may 
follow. The functions are useful because they direct attention 
to pertinent information when it is encountered. The classifi-
cations established by the functions are sufficiently broad to 
allow for their application to any decision-making body. An inter-
play does exist between the functions in that it may be necessary 
to consider two or more·functions in tpeir relation to a specific 
issue. For example, the intelligence function often requires 
consideration of prior decision-making situations so ·that numerous 
aspects of the entire seven functions are involved in developing 
9 
the study of the one function. 
Indeed, Lasswell considers the functions as semi-autonomous, 
and a study could begin with any one of the functions being con-
sidered first. Thus, the "reform waves" experienced by cities 
usually begin with the appraisal function. Citizens become crit-
ical of past decisions and present activities. The intelligence 
function continues to focus attention on some form of corruption 
or mismanagement. Intelligence agencies, such as the public media, 
study the problem and suggest how it has been solved in other 
areas. The reconnnending function develops naturally from the prior 
( 
process as civic organizations and other clubs begin to espouse 
methods of reform. The prescriptive function may appear in the 
form of legislation which alters the public policy. Indictments 
of corrupt officials and challenges to the legislation are aspects 
of the invocation function. The application function encompasses 
the various changes and reforms necessary to carry out the pre-
scription. As time passes, the appraisal function is enforced less 
strictly and the cycle terminates with the development of a new 
. h 6 corruption p ase. 
The cardinal benefit of Lasswell's model is the systematic 
6Lasswell, The Decision Process, pp. 9-10. 
10 
organization of concepts concerning the decision-making process. 
These concepts help develop a series of analytic questions which 
expedite the research of a topic. Of course, caution is exercised 
that the concepts and questions do not serve to exclude other ave-
nues of investigation that emerge during research. However, there 
is no model which should be employed without observing this warning. 
Finally, this student concurs with Lasswell's admonition that those 
developing a study should be "willing to adopt the goal values of 
human dignity as working postulates. 117 This admonition is inter-
preted in this study as a warning against considering the demands 
. or pleas of any group encountered ls expressions of prejudice or 
bias. The goal to be desired is understanding, not judgment. 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the seven cate-
gories of functional analysis suggesced by Harold Lasswell will 
yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the 
decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing decision. 
The analytic questions suggested by the seven functions will direct 
research to pertinent and valuable observations. It will now be 
shown how the seven functions have been utilized within the frame-
work of the chapters of this dissertation. 
7rbid., pp. 15-21. 
11 
Lasswell's first step, the intelligence function, has been 
expanded in this study in order to consider the Chicago Board of 
Education as a decision-making body _and to develop the complex 
background of data which served to inform the Board and helped 
shape its decision. Thus,, in chapter ii of this dissertation, the 
political influences on the Chicago Board of Education are consid-
ered along with the individual perspectives of each Board member 
regarding integration. The changing relationship of the Board 
and its Superintendent of Schools is examined as they seek a redef-
inition of "quality education" when pressure mounts for school 
( 
desegregation. The dependence of the Board for information from 
the superintendent and his staff is also scrutinized. The recom-
mendation function appears in this chapter as various factions 
develop in the communities demanding that the policies of the 
superintendent or his opponents be prescribed. The demands of 
pressure groups contribute to the removal of the superintendent 
although the conflict publicly revolves around a conflict over 
the separation of intelligence, recommendation, and prescription 
functions between the Board and its Superintendent. 
Chapter iii expands the intellige·nce function by examining 
some legal and judicial incentives for desegregating the· school 
system. The recommendation function is introduced in this chapter 
12 
as alternatives are offered by a Superintendent of Schools. The 
Hauser and Havighurst reports further develop the recommendation 
function as the Superintendent of Schools challenges the right of 
individuals outside the school system to usurp his power of 
recommending. Reactions of developing pressure groups to the 
reports are investigated as are signs of growing demands for 
greater participation in the recommending function. Alternative 
policies for implementing desegregation are considered. 
Chapter iv continues to expand the intelligence function as 
it considers numerous reports and studies of the demography of 
( 
'Chicago which were available to the Board when it made its decision. 
The recommendation function emerges in this chapter when stabili-
zation is considered as an alternative policy to busing. Problems 
encountered in the use of this alternative are examined in detail. 
Policy statements expressing values subscribed to by the Board as 
a body are reviewed. Socio-economic factors in racially changing 
communities which helped solidify factions are recognized. The 
chapter continues to develop the recommendation function as it 
investigates the developing community organizations and attempts 
to establish who speaks for the community. 
Chapter v concentrates on the recommendation function. A 
growing t.endency of the Board to challenge the recommendations of 
13 
the superintendent is noted. The dissertation continues to trace 
the pressures exerted by pro-desegregation groups upon the Board. 
A general prescription in the form ~f a master plan offered by the 
new superintendent is analyzed. The acceptance of the plan by the 
Board, however, was not a commitment to implement its specifics. 
The full force of the superintendent's recommendation power is 
recognized when he submits a set of specific recommendations 
calling for busing programs to the Board for its approval. Again, 
the intelligence function of gathering and processing is considered 
in its relation to arriving at· the final recommendation. Finally, 
( 
the reaction of various pressure groups to the announced plan is 
noted. 
Chapter vi concentrates on the prescription function. Use 
of political representatives by pressure groups is observed. The 
decision of the Board to hold hearings in the communities is exam-
ined in light of the debate on its propriety. The possibility of 
of changing points of view as a result of making information avail-
able is noted. Motives are sought for the positions of various 
groups. Apparent reasons for the decisions not to initiate one 
-
plan while accepting another compromise plan are considered. The 
role of the superintendent in defining his reconimending function 
and the Board's prescriptive function is examined. 
14 
Chapter vii encompasses aspects of the invocation, appli-
cation, appraisal, and termination functions. Administrative prob-
lems involved in implementing the plan are noted. Challenges to 
the decision are enumerated and their disposition considered. A 
later decision by the Board not to continue a temporary busing 
program indicates that busing as an expandable policy is not con-
sidered within the framework of present alternatives. An examin-
ation is made of the continuation of some alternatives and the 
development of new prescriptions. The busing program is appraised 
in light of the fate of the area for which the plan was not ulti-
1 
mately prescribed. Finally, the decision of the Board to open 
direct lines of intelligence between itself and the community is 
examined. 
Chapter viii concentrates on the appraisal function. The 
busing policy is assessed in light of the four goals stated by the 
Board of Education. The evaluations made by the school adminis-
tration are utilized for the data they contain, but the failures 
and successes of the operating plan represent the judgments of this 
author rather than those of the school administration. A~pects of 
the termination function are developed as the study reviews those 
parts of the busing plan which were abandoned or revised. The 
integration of the prescription into the framework of the school 
15 
structure is studied. Finally, changing expectations, both of the 
Board and various interest groups, are considered in relation to 
the busing prescription. 
Chapter ix returns directly to the analytic questions pre-
sented in the seven functions described by Lasswell. This chapter 
serves to summarize the significant findings of the dissertation. 
However, its prime purpose is to establish the utility of Lasswell's 
scheme in studying the decision-making process. Each function is 
restated, and the analytic questions indicated in this introduction 
are serially listed. Brief summaries of the investigation presented 
( 
in this dissertation are given as answers to the questions. Chapter 
ix, then, demonstrates how the Lasswell model serves to guide 
research without prohibiting the development of a chronological 
presentation. The analytic questions function as guides in research 
but do not limit the investigation of relevant data as it appears 
to shed light on a developing aspect of the problem being studied. 
This introduction has, therefore, presented the purpose, 
significance and hypothesis of this dissertation. It has demon-
strated the application of the seven functions within the body of 
the work. A table of contents gives the pagination of each of the 
chapters for specific study. A relevant bibliography is presented. 
The Lasswell model is appiied with chapters which are basically 
16 
chronologically arranged. The final chapter considers the analytic 
questions suggested by the seven functions in light of the entire 
study. 
I 
CHAPTER II 
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS: 
THE CHICAGO BOARD.OF EDUCATION AS 
A POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING BODY 
The Chicago Board of Education is a political body. While 
its members are appointed rather than elected, the Board's 
decisions reflect the numerous pressures which are exerted upon 
it. Over the years the direct influence of politicians on Board 
decisions has been well-documented. In 1917 the Illinois General 
Assembly established the Board as q.n autonomous unit in Chicago, 
and the State Supreme Court had even backed Board members who 
challenged the mayor's right to require undated resignations from 
1 nominees to the Board before appointing them. 
Despite the letter of the law and its interpretation, Board 
members did not remain independent of political influence. 
During the terms of Mayor William H. Thompson, charges of corrupt 
1John Albert Vieg, The Government of Education in Metro-
£Olitan Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 
pp. 107-21. Joel Havemann,"Discrepancies in School Land Use as 
Early as 1833," Chicago Sun-Times, September 22, 1971, p. 46. 
17 
18 
political influences were common. True bills were voted against 
a Board president, vice-president, and an attorney, along with 
numerous other political job-holders in the school system. None 
of the indicted were convicted, and, while Thompson lost the next 
election to William E. Dever, his return to power in 1927 brought 
with him another Board controlled by men of questionable in-
. 2 tention. 
By the close of World War II political encroachments and 
Board mismanagement brought about strong demands for a thorough 
investigation of the public school system. The Commission for 
( 
the Defense of Democracy Through Education, a part of the National 
Education Association, was induced to begin a study of the Chicago 
system. This body, operating independently of city control, 
found numerous violations of the NEA code of ethics. It was 
pointed out that the president of the Chicago Board of Education 
dominated not only the other members of the Board, but the 
Superintendent of Schools as well. Relatives of Board members 
2John Howatt, Notes on the First One Hundred Years of 
£.~icago Schoo~ History (Chicago: John Howatt, 1946), pp. 51-56. 
Vieg, The Government of Education in Metropolitan Chicago; 
pp. 118-21, 167-69. The corruption of the Board under Thompson 
became a concern of George S. Counts, in School and Society in 
Chicago (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928), pp. 159-63. 
19 
had been appointed to school positions. Politicians were found 
to be influencing appointments and contracts. Teachers and 
administrators rose in position on the basis of political con-
tacts, and those who were opposed to this system of favoritism 
were threatened or punished with transfers. The public was kept 
ignorant of Board policy through the secretive conduct of Board 
meetings.3 
Attempts by city officials to obscure the findings of the 
commission finally proved futile in the face of an aroused public 
indignation supported and abetted by such educational institutions 
( 
as the National Education Association and the North Central 
Association. On April 2, 1946, Mayor Kelly appointed a Mayor's 
Advisory Committee consisting of five college presidents and the 
president of the North Central Association. Two reforms suggested 
by this group are of particular significance to this present 
study. First, a Conunission on School Board Nominations was 
reconunended and established. Second, the position of the super-
intendent relative to the Board was strengthened by requiring 
that all school officials report to the Board through the Office 
3Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case 
~tudy (Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), pp. 10-13. 
Hereinafter referred to as Crisis. 
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of the Superintendent. With the exception of the Board attorney, 
who may advise the Board directly, this reconunendation became 
law in 1947. 4 
The Conunission on School Board Nominations is commonly 
credited with upgrading the caliber of Board members. Represen-
tation on the conunission has been expanded and contracted peri-
odically from its original membership of eleven organizations and 
four universities. The University of Chicago, Northwestern and 
Roosevelt Universities were soon included along with the Citizens 
Schools Conunittee and the Cook County Physicians Association. In 
( 
1966 the Urban League was asked to name a representative. By 1968 
representatives on one of the most controversial nominating com-
missions came from seven universities, two law groups, two labor 
groups, two business groups, two school groups, one Negro organ-
ization and one patriotic legion. Despite this broad array of 
interest, the nominating conunittees have been accused of repre-
senting top social groups rather than the white working class and 
Negro citizens whose children are attending the public schools. 5 
4 . 
Ibid., pp. 13-16. 
5Pois, Crisis, pp. 60-63. Chicago Sun-Times, March 13, 1964, 
p. 4; March 21, 1966, p. 1. Chicago Daily News, May 4, 1968, p. 6. 
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The relative independence of the members of the nominating 
committee has been questioned by critics who suggest that numerous 
considerations may act to limit their discretion. Joseph Pois, 
who served on the Chicago Board of Education between 1956 and 
1961, points out that such expedient desires as fear of jeop-
ardizing progress already made, a propensity for compromise, a 
concern to protect their own interest, and even the uncertainty 
of the public response may influence committee members. Certainly, 
group pressures and the influence of City Hall are factors in the 
choice of nominees. Mrs. Louise Malis, in 1961 a member of the 
( 
Nominating Commission, criticized the mayor for suggesting that 
a name be added to the list of nominees after the commission had 
already completed its deliberations and submitted its choices. 
The mayor's nomination, however, was added to the list on this 
and other occasions.6 
That the Mayor of Chicago is the ultimate power in deciding 
upon and appointing Board of Education members is most evident 
in the fact that he need not heed the recommendation of the 
Nominating Commission. The commission itself has no statutory 
sanction, and the mayor is not bound to the list it submits. 
6p i . c . . 62 65 o s, risis, pp. - . 
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This point is well illustrated in an incident which followed the 
busing controversy of 1967-1968. 
The conservative position taken by the President and 
Vice-president of the Board of Education regarding busing and 
other innovations suggested by the new superintendent, James 
Redmond, led a large faction of the Nominating Commission to 
oppose the reappointment of Whiston and Murray. While some 
members argued that the commission should not "act in any way 
as a superboard or take the mayor's prerogatives away from him 
virtually," the commission by a nine to eight vote failed to 
( 
renominate these men among the sixteen suggested individuals sub-
mitted to the mayor for the five vacancies on the Board. The 
mayor's response was to appoint three members to the Board who 
were not on the commission's list. He balanced the reappointment 
of the Board 1 s president and vice-president by appointing the 
Negro secretary of the Urban League. The two other Board members 
he chose were considered to be liberals, so that a balance was 
retained between factions in the city.7 
That this balance still remained conservative was evident 
7chicago Daily News, April 8, 1968, p. 14; April 30, 1968, 
pp. 1, 5; May 4, 1968, p. 6. Chicago Sun-Times,· May 3, 1968, p. 3. 
fhicago Tribune, May 1, 1968, p. 1 (Quote). 
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in that Frank Whiston and Thomas J. Murray were immediately 
re-elected as President and Vice-president of the Board. When 
it was evident two years later that Jack Witkowsky, newly ap-
pointed in 1968, would not vote for Whiston again, Mayor Daley 
passed over his reappointment and chose a candidate who did vote 
for Whiston. While Board members often deny that the mayor has 
any influence on their decisions, Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a Board 
member between 1966 and 1969, claims he saw signs that Daley 
'.'put pressure on the board not to try experiments with integration 
that would be opposed in certain white neighborhoods." A Chicago 
( 
·sun-Times reporter has stated that "Insiders believe Daley is 
interested in three important areas of school board concern: 
labor negotiations; integration; and real estate. 118 
This is not to suggest that Board members are pawns of the 
mayor. But they have accepted past political practices and have 
challeng·ed these. Thus, Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, when questioned about 
a recent ·controversy regarding wages paid to custodial staff, 
8Jack Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," 
..§__aturday Review, LIV (November 20, 1971), 90. Chicago Daily 
News, May 29, 1965, p. 2. Joel Havemann and Douglas P. wo·odlock, 
T'Schools Must Be Changed--But Nobody Knows How," Chicago Sun-
Times, March 22, 1971. p. 4 (Quote). 
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replied, 
We've been paying prevailing wage rates for sixty years. It 
is nothing this Board of Education made the decision about. 
It is nothing the superintendent made the decision about ... 
Now do you take a practice of sixty years and all of a sudden 
close up a school system because the BGA [Better Government 
Association] thinks it's a great idea?9 
There has been no move by. the Board to end such practices 
as paying top wages to custodial staff, rental of land to the city 
at rates lower than one might expect, and making decisions which 
are in accord with established real estate approaches to Negro 
expansion~ Those members who might be likely to question these 
practices have not gained control of the Board. Denials by cer-
tain Board members that the mayor influences their decisions are 
probably irrelevant. It seems to be the case that a majority of 
the members of the Board are sympathetic to the mayor's political 
position and are likely to react in a manner similar to his. If 
they do not, and their vote is crucial, they should not expect 
to be reappointed. 
Legally, to be eligible for a seat on the Board, one must 
be thirty years old and a resident of Chicago for five years prior 
to appointment. The five year terms are staggered so that two 
9Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, "At Issue" WBBM News Radio broadcast 
interview by Bob Sanders, Bob Crawford, and John Madigan, Chicago, 
Illinois, July 18, 1971. (taped). 
,... 
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members are appointed every year and three on every fifth year. 
No compensation is given for service and members are forbidden 
to hold any other public office. 10 _Thus, Board membership is 
limited to those who can afford to devote the considerable time 
and effort required for ~he often thankless job. 
Appointees to the Board in 1968 certainly did not represent 
a geographical distribution over the city. Nine of the eleven 
members lived near the lake shore, and none of the members lived 
on the northwest or southwest sides of the city where much of the 
anti-busing protest was centered. All the members were of upper 
( 
or upper-middle class status. Only three members had children in 
the public schools. The number of Catholics on the Board had 
fallen from a previous six to four members. As this Church has 
a parallel school system in Chicago representing over one-fourth 
of the total city school enrollment, talk of "escape" into this 
semi-private system was an important factor in the busing crisis. 
Four members of the Board were septuagenarians--all these four 
fell into the conservative block.11 
While representation of interest groups obviously varies 
lOillinois, Revised Statutes (1965), c. 122, sec. 34--3, 4. 
11 Chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. 
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with the appointment of some particular individual, the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
have always accounted for two of the seats. Since the early 
1960's, two Negroes had been appointed to represent the growing 
majority of Negro students in the system. A candidate of the 
Parent-Teachers Association has occupied a Board seat for many 
years. The growing representation of women on the Board had 
reached three by 1968. 12 In matters concerning integration the 
organizational background of any Board member appears to be quite 
secondary to the individual's personal convictions. Generally, 
( 
the Board members split into a conservative and liberal faction 
with two other members who could be considered as swing voters. 
In the conservative block could be found Frank M. Whiston, 
Thomas J. Murray, Edward S. Scheffler, and Mrs. Wendell E. Green. 
The liberal element consisted of Warren H. Bacon, Harry M. 
Oliver, Jr., Bernard S. Friedman, Mrs. Louise A. Malis, and John 
D. Carey. The swing vote often depended upon Mrs. W. Lydon Wild 
and Cyrus Adams III. 
Frank Whiston had -served on the Board since 1948. The head 
of a real estate management firm, he had handled mainly commercial 
12Chicago Daily News, March 27, 1966, p. 4; April 6, 1966, 
PP. 1, 8. 
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properties such as the elder Marshall Field's estate before his 
death and the city's Civic Center. Whiston had opposed such 
desegregation moves as the Hauser school transfer plan and had 
been a major supporter of Superintendent of Schools Benjamin 
Willis, whose policies were often criticized by civil rights 
leaders. Whiston became President of the Board when Claire 
Roddewig resigned after being picketed by the civil rights groups 
in early 1964. Opposition, even at that time, to Whiston's 
leadership of the Board was apparent when he had to vote for 
himself in order to win the position. Murray, who became vice-
' 
·president, also found it necessary to vote for himself. 13 
Thomas J. Murray at seventy-six was still president of the 
Building Trades Council and a powerful influence in the American 
Federation of Labor. A staunch supporter of the neighborhood 
school policy, he opposed any form of paid transportation which 
would increase the likelihood of successful pupil transfer pro-
grams. His opposition was based on what he felt would be the 
13chicago's American, May 26, 1966, p. 3. Chicago Daily News, 
June 25, 1964, p. 12. Witkowsky, "Education of a School Bpard 'l-fem-
l>er,,"_ pp. 90-91. B_oard of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, 
fu>ard of Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, 
May 27, 1964), pp. 2360-64. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings, 
date of meeting, page number. 
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prohibitive cost of such a program. Despite the fact that he was 
a Catholic, he also protested that paying transportation costs 
would lead to having to pay the costs of transporting parochial 
school students as well as public school pupils. Murray felt that 
public opinion was opposed to any breach of the neighborhood 
school policy. When organized resistance to the busing plan of 
1967 arose, Murray stated, "The recent weeks prove the extent to 
which the public can be aroused over this question, so it becomes 
apparent to me that the great majority of the citizens of Chicago 
hate to see the neighborhood school policy disappear also. 11 14 
( 
Edward S. Scheffler, at seventy-one, was a retired judge 
in ill health who was frequently absent from meetings. He left 
the Board soon after the busing crisis. In 1964, protests were 
lodged against Superintendent of Schools Benjamin Willis which 
demanded, in part, that communities be allowed greater partici-
pation in the decision-making process. Scheffler, supporting the 
opinion ~f Murray, stated, "The thing I object to is everybody 
trying to run the school system. The main trouble is that every 
group, whether they have been organized for two weeks or a month 
l4chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-
Times, July 12, 1964, p. 30. Witkowsky, "Education of a School 
Board Member," pp. 90, 92. Proceedings, February 28, 1968, 
P. 1533 (Quote) ; March 4, -1968, p. 1538. 
29 
and whether they have a background in education, is trying to run 
the system." In refusing to support the Redmond Report, which 
suggested methods of integration, Scheffler contended, 
At present in our large cities in the field of school inte-
gration many impractical promises have been made, and the 
fulfillment of these promises has been discouraging. The 
Chicago Board of Education should not be compelled to make 
commitments as suggested in the report until such a time as 
we have good reason to believe that we can fulfill them.15 
Mrs. Wendell Green, the widow of Chicago's first Negro judge, 
at seventy-eight had moved somewhat from the position of her youth 
in which she wrote a master's thesis on the pltght of Negroes . 
. By 1964 Negro politicians attacked 1-ier reappointment to the Board 
as she was considered "totally alienated from the Negro community." 
In 1968 a leading Chicago Negro paper characterized her as 
"unswervingly consistent in her anti-Hegro attitude." Much of 
Mrs. Green's .difficulty came from her opposition to devices such 
as racial head counts and the use of quota systems to plan and 
implement desegregation. She certainly pinpointed a serious 
problem for desegregation plans when she noted, 
We already have an elementary Negro preponderance. If we 
bused in all directions right now, we would end up th~s 
evening with every elementary school in Chicago having more 
15Chicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First quote). 
Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534 (Second quote). Chicago 
Daily Defender, May 5, 1965, p. 15. 
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Negro children, or black or Afro-Americans, than white chil-
dren. So this means that we are setting up a system, a quota 
system, which not only discriminates against these Negro[e$] 
. . . but also imposes segr.egation because of a 15% quota. 16 
Warren H. Bacon was a product"of the Chicago school system 
and his children were also attending the public schools. He was 
vice-president of a life'~nsurance company and then of a major 
steel corporation before being appointed at.the age of forty-one 
to the Board of Education in May, 1963. The second Negro on the 
Board, he was committed to integration and openly hostile to the 
leadership of Whiston. His major criticism of community partici-
pation in the decision-making process was that at public hearings 
"atl we do is listen and that's the end of it." Regarding inte-
gration, in 1967 he stated, "There are areas where we can bring 
about integration by changing the school boundaries. We could 
have done this years ago, but we failed. Instead, the board 
worked ver·y hard at maintaining seg.regation by ge.rrymandering 
schoQl districts. 1117 
16chicago Daily News, April 29, 1964, pp. 1, 10 (First quote). 
Chicago Daily Defender, March 5, 1968, p. 13 (Second quote). 
Proceedings, March 4, 1968, p. 1539 (Third quote). Witkowsky, 
"Education of a School Board Me~ber," p. 91. 
17 Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1964, p. 12; January 12., .1968, 
pp, 1, 12. Chicago Sun-Times, January 17, 1967', p. 14. Chicago 
Qaily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First quote); February 20, 
1967, p. 3 (Second quote)~ 
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Bernard S. Friedman, a research chemist for a major oil 
firm, was a resident of the South Shore in Chicago--an area 
directly involved in the busing plan (although Friedman lived on 
the lake shore and was somewhat geographically removed from the 
area involved). Friedman actively supported the busing plan but 
felt that 
Good reasons rationally put by organizations could make me 
skeptical about the success of the proposed busing program 
. . . if we reduce the percentage of Negro students at a 
South Shore school from sixty-seven percent to sixty-two 
percent, I don't see that we're accomplishing anything. 
Friedman shared Bacon's view that the Board was always behind the 
times in acting and made its decisions always to respond and never 
to initiate.18 
Mrs. Louise A. Malis was the wife of a furniture manufac-
turing representative, a past president of the Illinois Parent-
Teacher Associat_ion Congress and had served as a member of the 
Mayor's Commission of School Board Nominations. Her children 
were, during her tenure with the Board until 1968, students in the 
public school system in the northeast area of Chicago. As a new 
Board member in 1964, Mrs. Malis announced that she favored 
18witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," p. 90. 
fhicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Southeast Economist 
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, pt. 1, p. l; February 15, 1968, 
. pt. 1, p. ·l {Quote). 
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adjusting school boundaries to desegregate. She supported the 
Redmond Report, arguing that if the funds to implement it were 
not immediately available, the Board should work without delay to 
obtain the means to put the plan into effect. Believing that 
integration is beneficial for all concerned, she recognized that 
busing was not the answer but saw it as part of the overall 
1 . 19 so ution. 
John D. Carey was a steelworkers union organizer. A gradu-
ate of Bowen High School on the south side of the city, he con-
tinued to live in South Chicago and his daughter attended the 
public schools. Carey supported both the Redmond Plan and the 
busing plan suggested in late 1967. In one statement he reminded 
his fellow Board members that in 1964 the Board had adopted a 
resolution stating it would continue "to search for ways to in-
crease the interracial association of students" and accepting "a 
) 
responsibility to help preserve- as far as possible such associ-
ations in areas where they now exist.'' Carey expressed the belief 
that the Redmond Plan "contains the essential elements that are 
necessary if Chicago is going to solve the massive educational 
problem" it faces. He saw the busing proposal as the first short 
19chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-
Times, June 25, 1964, p. 44. Proceedings_, August 27, 1967, 
p. 534 .. Northwest Times,- (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 6. 
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term recommendation evolving from the plan. Regarding public 
hearings he stated, "During these past several weeks I have 
attempted to listen to many voices on this proposal, vehement 
voices against, moral voices that cry for justice and equality 
and muted voices that represent the silent and inarticulate." 
Regarding the role that elected figures played in supporting and 
attacking the plan, he stated, "I view with regret those political 
voices that lack the courage of leadership and I applaud those 
political voices who would lean in the face of adversity." For 
Carey, "Racial isolation in the schools cannot produce quality 
education. 1120 
.( 
Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a bachelor and socialite, was vice-
president of an insurance brokerage firm. While Oliver served 
only a little over two years between 1966 and 1969, he became one 
of the most outspoken critics of the Chicago Board of Education. 
Envisioning the schools' role as interacting with the community, 
he introduced a resolution backing fair housing and supported a 
resolution in which the Board promoted Project Good Neighbor, an 
attempt of the Leadership Council for Open Housing to educate 
20chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, pp. 1, 8; March 16, 
1968, p. 2. Proceedings, February 28, 1968, pp; 1533-34 (Quotes). 
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residents of Metropolitan Chicago regarding matters of inte-
. 21 gration. 
Despite the unanimous approval by the Board of numerous res-
olutions opposing segregation, Oliver became frustrated at what he 
felt was a failure of the Board to take any concerted action to 
implement desegregation. He was especially critical of the fact 
that the Board had 
as its vice-president a powerful labor union president whose 
members are employed by the school system and as its president 
a man who in every instance supports tha position of organized 
labor although doing so has often meant taking away from edu-
cation for our children and throwing us into a budget deficit. 
( 
'Oliver felt that salary concessions made to the Chicago Teachers 
Union were especially responsible for failure to implement edu-
cation and desegregation plans which would require large expend-
itures. 22 
The failure of Board members to respond to various community 
organizations was another source of aggravation to Oliver. He 
felt a credibility gap had developed between the Board and commu-
nities as Board members were telling organizations "one thing and 
21Chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, p. 1, 8; March 16, 
1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-Times, May 25, 1967, p. 3. 
22chicago Daily News, April 1, 1969, p. 3; June 12, 1969, 
p. 6 (Quote). Chicago Sun-Times, March 31, 1969, p. 3. 
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then doing another or nothing ... related to building sites, 
construction plans, building completion dates, boundary changes, 
new programs, integration and others." Oliver felt the Board 
should organize district councils of parents in which "The citi-
zens will be heard and f~lt. If the school system doesn't listen, 
the citizens will blow us right out of the water. There isn't 
much time left. 1123 How to determine which voices were to be lis-
tened to was more clear to Oliver than to other Board members. 
Oliver's attacks on fellow Board members resulted in pre-
pared defenses of union affiliations being read into the Pro-
1 
ceedings of the Board meetings and shouted responses during the 
sessions. At the last meeting Oliver was to attend, a concili-
atory farewell wish from Whiston evoked some poignant statements 
regarding the decision-making structure of the Board. Oliver 
responded to the president's farewell by observing that "no two 
of us ever seem to agree consistently." In reflecting on this 
statement Mrs. Malis agreed and stated, "we have all voted with 
different people on different issues, depending on the issues . 
I would like to state clearly that I know of no block voting on 
this Board or lobbying done by members of this Board in order to 
23
chicago Daily News, June 12, 1969, p. 6 (First quote). 
Chicago Sun-Times, June 12, 1969, p. 10 (Second quote). 
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get other members of this Board to vote with them." Oliver had 
already expressed his view that the Board President and Superin-
tendent Redmond had repeatedly blocked efforts of individual Board 
members to become involved in the Board's legislative and financial 
programs. 24 Thus, certain decisions might have been left in the 
hands of a few who were knowledgeable in that area, and, for lack 
of information, other members would be hesitant to protest. 
Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, the wife of an executive of the Great 
Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, had been a Chicago school teacher. 
She was active in numerous Catholic organizations and her child 
( 
had attended the parochial schools in the South Shore area. A 
personal friend of Mayor Daley, she had been active in his cam-
paigns. At the time of her appointment in 1963, she had stated 
that she would be willing to scrap the Board's neighborhood policy 
in order to achieve integration. Regarding conununity participation 
in the Board's decision process she conunented in he~ usually lucid 
style, "To have everybody putting their two cents into a system 
is difficult. All you might get is utter confusion.'' In response 
to suggestions that the .Board be elected from various areas of 
24Proceedings, June 25, 1969, pp. 3079-80; July 23, 1969 
p. 11 (Quotes). Chicago Daily News, May 29, 1969, p. 3; June 12, 
1969, pp. 6, 10. 
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the city Mrs. Wild stated, "If we sat there as elected represen-
tatives, just think of what would happen if we all represented a 
different area. No decision would ever be reached." In July, 
1967, Mrs. Wild took over the chairmanship of the South Side 
Boundary Committee from Murray. This committee, by adjusting 
school boundaries, can play a crucial role in desegregating 
schools. Mrs. Wild had already been accused of continually 
opposing desegregation by City Alderman Leon Despres. In August, 
1967, she qualified her vote of approval of the Redmond Report by 
stating "we must not mislead the people involved that by accepting 
I 
· this in principle that we insure its immediate implementation, 
since we have . no funds available." In January, 1968, 
Whiston chose Mrs. Wild to sit on the busing hearings committee 
because, in his opinion, she was in the middle on the busing 
proposal. 25 
Cyrus Adams III was a descendant of a famous family and an 
executive of a leading Chicago department store. A graduate of 
Princeton, his own children had attended the Chicago.Latin School. 
25
chicago Daily News, December 27, 1963, p. l; December 31, 
1963, Society Section, p. l; November 13, 1964, p. 5 (First wuote); 
June 6, 1967, p. 3; March 16, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Sun-Times, 
December 28, 1963, p. 3. Southeast Economist (Chicago), January 
14, 1968, p. l; February 29, 1968, p. 7 (Second quote). Pro-
ceedings, July 12, 1967, p. 251; August 27, 1967, p. 534 (Third 
quote). 
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He believed desegregation could be achieved within the neighbor-
hood school concept. He supported the controversial Benjamin 
Willis in 1963, asking the Board to.refuse his resignation. Re-
garding desegregation he stated, "The board has said they are 
against segregation; I would be too. When you get into inte-
gration--the word means different things to different people. •.•26 
It was this middle-of-the-road attitude which had led Alder-
man Leon Despres of the City Council to oppose the reappointment 
of Adams. The alderman claimed Adams was a member of a "swing 
group which sides with the administration on crucial issues on the 
( 
Board and Daley is always in the background pulling strings." But 
few agreed with the alderman's appraisal. The Chicago Daily News 
applauded Adams as being "a conscientious contributor to the 
board's discussions and decisions from a thoroughly developed 
knowledge of the problems of Chicago's schools. 1127 
Adams' middle position did not stop him from taking stands. 
In 1966 he issued a statement in which he openly favored extra pay 
for teachers working in inner-city situations. He favored pub-
. lishing the achievement test results of Chicago students, but he 
26Chicago Daily News, December 28, 1963, C.ity Page (Quote); 
December 23~ 1963, Society Section, pp. 1, 9. 
27
chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966; p. 11 (First quote); 
editorial, May 7, 1966 (Second quote). 
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wanted the results published by school dis'tricts rather than 
individual schools in order to avoid any stigma on a particular 
school. He felt the cluster plan had mixed results and permissive 
transfers "make people move out in some cases." (The cluster 
plan had been suggested in 1964 by the Hauser Report to expand 
attendance areas so that students might choose between a few 
"clustered" high schools.) Adams favored the neighborhood school 
plan for small children because of the hazards of traveling. He 
thought open enrollment for high schools would be desirable but 
not during the current period of overcrowding. 28 
Perhaps most typical of Adams' attitude was his comment on 
community participation. He stated it was "appropriate to a point. 
You have to find a compromise between community participation in 
l 
your affairs and the problem of too many cooks spoiling the broth." 
When controversy arose over a motion to grant extra support to 
integrated elementary schools, it was Adams who sponsored a com-
promise which led to its adoption. He was to play this role again 
in the final busing decision in 1968. 29 
The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent of 
28chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 15. 
29fhicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (Quote). 
froceedings, April 28, 1966, p. 3079; May 11, 1966, p. 3092. 
Northwest Times (Chicago); March 7, 1968, p. 1. 
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schools has played a dramatic role in Chicago Public School his-
tory. The weakened position of the superintendent under corrupt 
Boards was a major concern of the Commission for the Defense of 
Democracy Through Education when it reported on the scandals which 
culminated during World War II. Herold Hunt began the reforms in 
Chicago. When he passed the reins to Benjamin C. Willis in 1953, 
a very strong leader entered the Office of the Superintendent of 
Schools. Dr. Willis built not only new schools but a school 
·system which was renowned for its emphasis on "quality education." 
Dr. Bernard Friedman, often a critic of Dr. Willis, has summarized 
one view of the controversial Superintendent when he stated, 
Willis was here in an extremely difficult period. He was 
excellent in the development of schools--design and selecting 
locations was his forte. If only providing facilities, 
teachers, funds and programs was all that was needed, then 
there wouldn't have been nearly as many problems. But the 
problem was inte3ration and desegregation. He just wasn't 
flexible enough. 0 · 
Dr. Willis obviously wished the Chicago Public School System 
to operate autonomously of the other institutions of the city. He 
often withdrew cooperation from those agencies which he could not 
control and set out to establish a strongly centralized p~ofes-
sional body in the superintendent's offices. This policy would 
30James Kerr, "Ben,Willis After Chicago," Chicago Tribune, 
Section IA, October 31, 1971,, p. 1. · 
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not only allow the Superintendent to purge corrupting influences 
from his teaching staffs--it also reflected a personality which 
would brook no challenges to authority. 
By 1963 leaders of the developing civil rights movement were 
questioning Chicago school policies. Minority representatives 
claimed Dr. Willis was committed to de facto segregation. In 
August, 1963, a legal action resulted in the appointment of a 
committee chaired by Philip M. Hauser of the Sociology Department 
at the University of Chicago. The Hauser Panel was 
to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to 
schools attended entirely or p~edominantly by Negroes, define 
any problems that result therefrom, and formulate the report 
to this Board [of Chicago] . . . a plan by which any educa-
tional, psychological, and emotional problems or inequities 31 in the school system that prevail may best be eliminated ... 
Four months before the commissioning of the Hauser panel the 
Board Survey Committee had contacted Professor Havighurst of t'.1e 
Education Department at the University of Chicago to begin an 
exhaustive study of the entire school system. The Survey Committee 
31Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report 
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Inte-
gration of the Public Schools--Chicagor Philip M. Hauser, Chairman 
(Chicago, Chicago Board of Education, 1964), pp. vii, 2. Herein-
after referred to as Hauser Report. The report is examined in 
greater detail in chapter iv of this study. 
r 
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had spent over eighteen months determining the scope of the report 
and choosing the director. Despite his prior approval of the 
commissioning of a study, Dr. Willis strongly objected to the 
Board's action, claiming he "had not been adequately consulted con-
cerning the choice of a director and the design of the Survey. 11 32 
Actually, the superintendent had been frank in his off-the-
record opposition to the survey. He was just as blunt in his 
opposition to the choice of Dr. Havighurst, who advocated over-
lapping and expanded school districts. At the May 22, 1963, Board 
meeting Willis said: 
( 
I can only surmise that the [survey] committee of the Board 
of Education, without asking for data from the administration, 
or its analysis, and without deliberative action of the Board 
of Education, has made a decision to change the direction of 
the policy away from the neighborhood school.33 
The Board was able to assuage the superintendent's misgivings 
by establishing a committee of three to plan and direct the survey. 
As Willis was to sit as one of the committee, both he and the Board 
were able to save face. But definite problems could be identified 
32Robert J. Havighurst, The Public Schools of Chicago: A 
§urvey for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago. (Chicago: 
Chicago Board of Education, 1964), pp. 3-5 (Quote, p. 3). ·Herein-
after referred to as Havighurst Survey. The report is examined in 
greater detail in chapter iv. 
33Pois, Crisis, pp. 106-07. 
r 
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in the relationship of the Board with its superintendent. The 
growing pressures of the civil rights groups regarding de facto 
segregation were likely to increase tensions and further test the 
hazy border between the policy-making powers of the Board and the 
administrative powers of the superintendent. By giving in on 
numerous issues the Board had failed to establish any clear cut 
line as to when it would take a stand. When it did move to reverse 
the superintendent, the Board precipitated a crisis.34 
When the school year began in September, 1963, two issues 
confronted the Board. As populations shifted in Chicago, school 
( 
enrollments rose or fell. In order to meet the extra demands put 
on school facilities mobile class units were brought to some 
schools on a temporary basis. Most of the 625 mobile units had 
been placed on playgrounds of predominantly Negro schools. Civil 
rights groups argued this practice was meant to contain them and 
demanded the units be placed on playgrounds of predominantly white 
schools thus opening them to desegregation. Demonstrations were 
initiated demanding the resignation of Willis. Predominantly 
34
rbid., pp. 103-09. Pois cites a case where Dr. Willis 
accepted and worked on a survey of the Massachusetts schools for 
a large fee. This commitment, which would require the Superin-
tendent to devote much time to another school system was finally 
approved by the Board. 
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white groups organized and responded with demands to keep the 
5uperintendent.35 
The second and precipitating issue centered upon the opening 
of schools to pupils who did not live in the district. Under 
pressure to initiate some plan of desegregation, the school staff 
developed a selective permissive transfer plan in which students 
of outstanding ability would be permitted to transfer out of 
schools with limited numbers of such students into schools with a 
greater number of such students. The initial plan listed twenty-
four receiving high schools. A month later Willis reduced this 
number to nine and went to great lemgths pointing out that most 
of the eligible students were not interested in leaving their home 
schools as special programs had provided for their needs. At the 
next Board meeting, it was pointed out by Board members that n·pre-
sentatives of the connnunities of the Hyde Park and South Shore High 
Schools had expressed a willingness to accept talented Negro stu-
dents into their honors programs. The Board overruled Willis by 
authorizing the transfer of twenty-four students between these two 
35Kerr, "Ben Willis After Chicago_," p. 1. This problem will 
be developed further in chapters iii and iv of this study. 
r 
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high schools which had been removed from the initial list.36 
At first Willis refused to implement the decision, and then 
he resigned on October 4, 1963. Forces had already been mobilized 
on both sides of the issue. Civil rights groups hailed his resig-
nation which they had helped to precipitate. The parents of stu-
dents he had refused to transfe.r had immediately begun court 
proceedings which had resulted in a legal order to implement the 
transfers. The South East Community Organization had sent a 
letter to Board President Roddewig demanding the twenty-four 
students be transferred from Hyde Park to South Shore High School. 
When Willis resigned, in protest of what he considered a violation 
of his professional integrity, all the major newspapers, except 
the Chicago Tribune, ran editorials accepting his departure. 37 
But Willis was not without friends. Business leaders tele-
graphed thei·e support for the man who had modernized the massive 
school system at a minimal cost. Administrators within the 
school system expressed their admiration for an effective and 
36Proceedings, June 26, 1963, p. 2371; August 14, 1963, pp. 
274-76; September 11, 1963, pp. 378-79; September 25, 1963, pp. 
445-46. 
37chicago's American, October 8, 1963, pp. 4, 6. Chi·c~g~ 
Q.§.ily Defender, October 1, 1963, p. 3; October .10, 1963, p. 15; 
editorial, October 12, 1963. Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, 
October 6, 1963. Chicago Daily News, October 8, 1963, p. 10; 
October 9, 1963, pp. 1, 8~ 
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tough leader. The chairman of the Illinois State Committee of the 
North Central Association, referring to the days of political 
domination, defended the powers of the superintendent. Indeed, 
the implication that Chicago schools might lose accreditation led 
Bernard Friedman to comment, "From the timing of it, it looked 
like a threat, a threat designed to influence the board when it 
meets Monday [October 7]. It was premature and certainly not 
appropriate. 11 38 And on the fringes there were those uncounted 
numbers of citizens who supported Willis because his decision had, 
in effect, helped to keep some schools segregated. 
( 
The response of the Board to the resignation was affected 
by many factors. Some members undoubtedly supported the superin-
tendent from the onset. President Roddewig took the position 
that the superintendent should run the schools. Already a month 
into the new year and with a deputy superintendent who was ill, 
there seemed little chance of finding another person to run the 
highly centralized structure Willis had been so influential in 
creating. At a special meeting on October 7, the Board refused 
to accept the Willis resignation by a six to two vote; Friedman 
and Bacon opposing the move. At the regular meeting on October 9, 
38chicago's American, October 8, 1963, p. 4 (Quote). Pois, 
Crisis, pp. 110-14. 
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the Board reversed itself on the transfer decision and also can-
celled hearings on public school issues. Board President Roddewig 
had conferred with Willis regarding the establishment of a set of 
rules to determine the relationship of the Board to its Superin-
tendent. Willis promised to draw up a set of guidelines. When 
the superintendent reported to work on October 16, only Bacon, 
newly appointed that May, refused to accept his return.39 
The Board itself certainly had not been accepting the role 
of leadership in the decision-making function. It was usually 
enmeshed in petty details which preempted more important decisions. 
( 
Board members had tended to avoid controversial issues and to be 
thankful that the s:uperintendent would absorb the brunt of public 
disdain. It might have appeared that the lack of a clear cut 
statement of the relationship between the Superintendent and the 
Board was at the base of the difficulties between the two com-
ponents of the school structure. Thus Willis had promised to 
present a set of guidelines to distinguish the functions of the 
39Proceedings, October 7, 1963, pp. 447-49; October 9, 1963, 
pp. 451-52; October 16, ·1963, p. 497. Chicago Daily News, October 
9, 1963, pp. 1, 8. Chicago Sun-Times, October 10, 1963, pp. 5, 
32. Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political 
~istory (Benerly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971), 
pp. 316-17. 
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Board and its Superintendent.40 
It was not until April, 1964, that the "Statement of Prin-
. 
ciples and Procedures for Effective Cooperation Between the Board 
of Education and the General Superintendent of Schools" was con-
sidered by the Board. The Board was recognized to have powers of 
general supervision and management of the affairs of the schools. 
While policy-making was recognized as the prerogative of the Board, 
it was to exercise it on major issues, and access to information-
gathering departments was controlled by the superintendent. The 
.~uperintendent held the responsibil1.ty to present proposals and 
recommendations on major school issues. He was expected to support 
and clarify his suggestions with information gathered by his staff 
as well as to supply information to Board members upon their 
request.41 
The superintendent was expected to execute Board policy, and 
departure from a program.was to be approved first by the Board. 
In return the Board was expected to support administrative acts 
performed in carrying out the decision. While the Board was 
40Pois, Crisis, pp. 43-50, considers the numerous factors 
Which led the Board to procrastinate in the dec~sion-making 
process. 
41Proceedings, April 23, 1964, pp. 2212-14 
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recognized as the final authority on any issue, the guideline was 
so worded that those issues were to "be resolved through the regu-
larly constituted administrative channels" if at all possible. 
Members were cautioned to support policies once the Board as a 
whole had accepted them, and individual members were reminded that 
their private intercessions had no binding power over the superin-
tendent. Members of the Board were to make contact with the staff 
only through the superintendent.42 
Ways and means of communicating with and serving the commu-
nity were recognized as the function of the Board, but the General 
( 
· Superintendent was to supply advice and cooperate in all such 
endeavors. The superintendent was expected to keep the public 
informed of what the schools were doing. Appeals, complaints and 
applications made to Board members regarding administration of the 
schools were ·to be made known to the superintendent for investi-
gation and report. The right of the Board to sit in closed . 
sessions·for purposes of informal discussion was upheld although 
meetings were expected to be open to the public.43 
That these guidelines would not clarify the hazy line which 
~xists between policy-making and administration is clear in a 
42Ibid. 431bid. 
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perusal of the statement. By keeping tight control over the in-
formation gathering machinery, the superintendent would effec-
tively limit the abilities of the lay Board to prognosticate needs 
or establish any policy in advance of a clamor from without or 
the suggestions of the superintendent from within. Thus Bacon 
could observe, "One of the board's characteristics is its failure 
to get pertinent information often needed to allow members to make 
decisions independent of the superintendent instead of ratifying 
action already decided by him.'' Furthermore, the superintendent 
could also refuse to collect data on request by arguing that his 
( 
staff was overburdened with other duties.44 
The guidelines reflected the opinion of most educational 
administration texts which discouraged standing committees o'f the 
lay Board. But it can also be argued that the operation of these 
committees would lead to independent sources of information and a 
more detailed study by some Board members of special problems. One 
ex-Board member has pointed out that on those committees which did 
exist, there may have been a tendency to appoint Board members to 
chairmanships who were not as adamant in suggesting innovations.45 
44Pois, Crisis, p. 121. Chicago_Tribune, June 25, 1964, 
p. 12 (Quote). 
45witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," p. 91. 
r 
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Furthermore, the size and complexity of the large city system · 
placed immense demands upon the time of Board members who were not 
paid for their efforts. Board members often spent a good portion 
of their working days meeting other demands in their lives. The 
fact that they devoted so much time to Board matters is indicative 
of the dedication of most of the members, but that they would 
often welcome the easing of their tasks by a strong superintendent 
would be quite understandable. 
The Board members are lay people in education. That Willis 
wished to limit their penetration into the operations of the school 
( 
system would be logical. To be sure, such a position was always 
in accordance with the superintendent's philosophy while in the 
Chicago school system. In 1954, a few months after he came to 
head the city's schools, Willis wrote that professional educators 
should be leaders, not errand boys. He stated, "Much of what is 
wrong with education today can be attributed to the fact that edu-
cators . . . have abdicated from positions of educational leader-
ship, and have permitted themselves and their schools to be swayed 
by the winds of uninformed public opinion. 11 46 
46Benjamin C. Willis, "The Need For Professionalism in 
Education Today," Chicago Schools Journal, XXXV '(March, 1954), 
273-80. 
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Public opinion is an elusive specter; indeed, it is many 
specters. Undoubtedly, the crucial factor in most issues on the 
division of power is that there is disagreement on what goals must 
be achieved. Sometimes the goal is elusive because the name 
attached to it has different meanings for different publics. Thus, 
"quality education" meant one thing to Benjamin Willis, another to 
Warren Bacon and yet another to an element of the population of 
Chicago. 
Willis described quality education in terms of neighborhood 
schools with good facilities, competent faculties, small class 
sizes, more programs, and the extension of programs the year round. 
It was the task of the public school.system to offer children, 
youth, and adults "the best of all educational opportunities. 1147 
To Warren Bacon quality education was described in the 1954 Supreme 
Court decision--there could be no quality.education without inte-
gration. And for another nebulous but vocal group there could be 
no quality education for their children if another racial group 
was attending school in the same building. Each of these opinions 
was held by a public and each public had different demands to make 
upon the Board. The Board's problem was not a lack of goals but 
47Proceedings, February 13, 1964, pp. 1945-46. 
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the lack of a goal. 
The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent 
continued to degenerate as the various publics brought pressure 
to bear to achieve their often conflicting goals. The return of 
Willis brought renewed attacks by civil rights groups. Edwin 
Berry of the Urban League had stated that if Willis stayed on, 
members of the corrnnunity "will take their battle into the courts 
and into the streets."48 The Coordinating Council of Corrnnunity 
Organizations (CCCO) organized a boycott of the schools in which 
over one-half of the student body was absent. Finally, Board Pres-
' ident Roddewig met with the CCCO organizer, Albert Raby, but com-· 
plained that nothing was discussed. Nevertheless, he decided a 
statement of policy regarding integration ~:rould be necessary to 
stem the boycott. The final statement read in part: 
... this country would be healthier economically, education-
ally, and morally if Chicago, Illinois, and all sections of 
the County, reflected the kind of racial and ethnic diversity 
characteristic of the nation as a whole .... [Board members 
have] already made clear our opposition to segregation or 
discrimination in planning attendance areas and educational 
programs. . . . However, we see no overall step or action by 
which such diversity can be brought irrnnediately to all schools 
by the Board of Education alone.49_ 
48chicago Daily News, October 9, 1963, pp. 1, 8. 
49Proceedings, January 27, 1964, pp. 1856-57; February 13, 
1964, pp. 1943-45 (Quote on p. 1945). 
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Despite the relative ambiguity and apparent lack of new 
direction in this Board statement, the superintendent could not 
bring himself to openly endorse it. Instead, he spoke of "quality 
education" and pointed out that: 
America has a unique history in the world: a history of 
assimilation of peoples of diverse backgrounds; a history 
of upward mobility. The public schools of America have made 
the assimilation possible. It is education, that makes 
mobility upward possible.so 
In the fight for integration Negroes did not have to be re-
minded of the melting pot theory--what they desired was an imple-
mentation of the credo. If the Board promised little in its 
( 
policy statement, the superintendent appeared even more intran-
sigent. It was evident that the Negro communities would continue 
to protest as long as the uncompromising superintendent remained 
in office. 
A middle group was also slipping away from supporting Willis. 
The Citizen Schools Committee had criticized the lack of cooper-
, 
ation and information that its representatives, Board members, and 
the Hauser- and Havighurst committees had received from the school 
administration. Willis responded by severing relations with this 
group. The business community, which had been favorably impressed 
50 Ibid., pp. 1945-46 (Quote on p. 1946). 
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with the superintendent's efficient and economical administration, 
was also becoming more critical of his ability to deal with the 
changing scene. One businessman is quoted as saying, 11 I thought 
him an extremely able fellow, but he stuck his foot in his mouth. 
He was too arrogant." Another estimated that by the time he left 
the support of the business community had dropped from about 90 
percent to only about half. 51 Havighurst and Hauser were reported 
to have stated in a WIND radio interview that Willis had done 
little to implement their reports and that he was hiding problems 
and deficiencies in the school system. 52 
( 
Support for the superintendent on the Board also began to 
dwindle. In June, 1964, Cyrus Adams III, newly appointed that 
January, commented, "When we need help I will put my money on our 
own inside experts against hiring or inviting outside experts." 
But a year later Adams joined Mrs. Malis and Mrs. Wild, also newly 
appointed, in looking for a way to ease Willis out of the Superin-
tendency. 53 Warren Bacon remained a most outspoken critic of the 
51Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political 
History, pp. 319, 426-27. 
52f~icago Daily Defender, January 25, 1965, p. 5. 
53Proceedings, January 27, 1964, pp. 1823~24. Chicago Sun-
Times, June 23, 1964, pp. 3, 24 (Quote); May 14, 1965, pp. 1, 28. 
Chicago Daily News, May 28, 1965, pp. 1, 4; May 29, 1965, pp. 1, 2. 
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school administration, arguing "Education like war, is too impor-
tant to leave to the professionals." Bacon continued to hammer 
away at administrative policies, questioning the effectiveness of 
the student transfer plan, the lack of implementation of the Hauser 
and Havigfwrst Reports, and the unwillingness to discuss any topics 
but the ones the superintendent introduced. 54 
Raymond Pasnick, about to resign in 196S, found Willis to be 
insulting when he opposed the Board's demands that he offer the 
names of more than one candidate for appointment to a staff po-
sition. The superintendent argued that his responsibility required 
( 
him to have control over personnel matters, and he went on to state 
that staff members feared a return to the days when appointments 
were made on a political basis.SS 
As the time for renewal of the contract of Willis approached, 
the administrative staff did support the superintendent. The head 
of the Chicago Principals' Club wrote an open letter attacking the 
Board for not supporting the principals. The letter went on to 
defend the position of a resigning associate superintendent who 
54
chicago Sun-Times, March 12, 1964, p. 3; June 4, 1964, p. 
104; June 21, 196S, p. S2 {Quote). Chicago Daily News, January 20, 
1964' p. 7. 
55chicago Sun-Times, February 11, 1965, p. 3. 
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criticized the Board for requiring the staff to prove everything. 
conununity organizations distributed buttons, collected signatures 
on petitions, and organized demonstrations at Board meetings in 
support of the superintendent. 56 
But Willis' position had deteriorated since his stand 
against the encroachments of his powers by the Board in 1963. 
On May 14, 1965, a compromise porposal to renew the superintendent's 
contract, with the understanding that he would retire on his sixty-
fifth birthday, was defeated by a seven to four vote. Whiston, 
who had made the proposal, was joined only by Murray, Scheffler, 
( 
and Mrs. Green. Bacon, Clement, Friedman, and Pasnick were joined 
by Mrs.Malis, Mrs. Wild and Adams in defeating the contract 
agreement.57 
Emotions ran high in the connnunities. A threat on Bacon's 
life was reported. The Citizen Schools Committee entered the fray 
by issuing a letter criticizing the support of the superintendent 
from within the schools and asking Willis to issue a directive 
pointing out that such a campaign was not "sound professional 
56ch.icago. Su~1-Times, January 14; 1965, pp. 1, 6; April 3, 
1965, p. 8. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political 
History, pp. 333-39. 
57chicago Sun-Times, May 14, 1965, pp. 1, 28. Proceedings, 
May 14, 1965, p. 2582. 
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practice." While these divisions in the communities continued, 
Board members Mrs. Wild, Mrs. Malis, and Adams agreed to switch 
their votes. They were reported as expressing their opposition 
to the superintendent but felt that compromise was necessary. 
Willis accepted the new contract but refused to commit himself to 
the understanding that he would retire on his birthday in 
December, 1966. 58 
The decision was met with renewed protest in the Negro com-
munity. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People threatened to organize a boycott of Loop stores and other 
( 
protests if Willis was not removed. The organization had already 
brought suit against the Board, challenging the mayor's method of 
appointing members. Continued pressure on City Hall led Mayor 
Daley to suggest a meeting between civil rights leaders and the 
Board. 59 
Pasnick resigned from the Board in 1965 with an attack upon 
Willis and the Board itself. He expressed frustration at "the 
58
chicago Tribune, May 17, 1965, p. 12. Chic~o Sun-Times, 
May 21, 1965, p. 52; May 28, 1965, pp. _3, 72. Chicago Daily News, 
May 28, 1965, pp. 1, 4. Proceedings, May 28, 1965, pp. 2592-600. 
59chicago Daily News, May 29, 1965, p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times, 
June 24, 1965, pp. 3, 26. Editorial, Chicago Tribune, April 23, 
1964. 
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do-nothing attitude in this whole area of integration that has 
existed too long in the City of Chicago," and at the 
lack of action when we have opportunities to do something 
concrete, our reluctance to take specific positive action 
dealing with the questions so that we can make clear to the 
public generally where we stand insofar as integrating our 
schools and providing every child with an equal educational 
opportunity. 11 60 ' 
Less than a year later Clement resigned in an open conflict 
with Willis. In a letter to Mayor Daley he listed factors of 
"personality, character and basic attitudes [as] an issue here." 
The superintendent was cited for his defensive and dictatorial 
positions and his "contempt for the¥ judgment of any board member 
who has the temerity to disagree with him." Clement attacked the 
administrator's "refusal to accept the official board policy 
adopted over two years ago to continue to seek and promptly take 
any practicable steps [to increase] racial and ethnic diversity 
in the schools," and his lack of respect for parent organizations, 
neighborhood groups, employee organizations, and other citizens 
who are interested in the schools.61 
Even if one questioned the possibility of identifying a 
60 . Proceedings, August 11, 1965, p. 232. 
61 . Chicago Daily News, March 2, 1966, pp. 1, 5; March 3, 
1966, p. 8. 
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common factor in all these organizations on which to obtain a 
consensus to act, it was clear that too many elements had been 
alienated or embarrassed by the continuing controversy which had 
come to center on the superintendent. Mrs. Malis, addressing an 
educational seminar, could complain of "a perpetual tug-of-war in 
which all decision-making is hampered" that had grown during her 
tenure. She saw a somewhat new role for the Board in which the 
public expected it to be more responsive to needs and to assert 
itself as a body. "As a result," she stated, "boards are no longer 
willing to sit back and let the superintendent wave the baton a.nd 
the orchestra will play. 11 62 
( 
In May, 1966, the leader announced he 
would leave his office in August in order to allow a new superin-
tendent to take over at the beginning of the academic year. 
It is indicative of the breakdown of the relationship 
between Willis and his Board that the search for a new superin-
tendent was begun almost immediately after his contract was renewed. 
President Whiston appointed Board members, Scheffler, Bacon, 
Friedman, Mrs. Malis, and Mrs. Wild to a special corrunittee to seek 
a successor. Whiston stated, "In sele~ting the committee, I tried 
.to prove the committee is not stacked for or against the 
62
chicago Sun-Times, February 4, 1966, p. 18. Reporting on 
an address at Northwestern University. 
61 
superintendent." Whiston appointed himself as an "ex-officio 
member" without a vote, but it became apparent that he would have 
a dominant voice in the selection of a new administrator. 63 
An early attempt to recruit leaders from the local univer-
sities to aid in the search failed when dissension occurred among 
the Board members and some university presidents protested that 
they had not consented to serve before the offer was made public. 
Business leaders supporting the Urban League issued a letter 
listing what they felt to be essential qualifications among which 
was "equal access to our public schools by all races, with a pos-
.1 
· itive policy and program to eliminate segregation." Cyrus Adams 
commented that "equal access" was not realistic and said, "Segre-
gation will be eliminated when segregation is eliminated in 
housing. The whole thing is utopian. 1164 
By March, 1966, the search for a new superintendent was 
still continuing, and Whiston was reported as leading the committee. 
Indeed, the illness and eventual death of his son was offered as a 
reason for the lack of progress. When the search eventually 
63 . Chicago Daily News, June 2, 1965, p. 65. 
64
chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1965, pp. 1, 4. Chicago 
!!._aily News, July 13, 1965, p. 5 (Quotes). 
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boiled down to two men, it was Whiston who made the final choice. 
The fact that this choice was accepted by a vote of ten to one, 
only Mrs. Green dissenting, indicates the general willingness to 
accept the new administrator on the basis of his qualifications.65 
James F. Redmond, fifty years old in 1966, had an almost 
ideal background to bring to his new challenge. He came to Chicago 
in 1948 with his master's degree and doctorate in education from 
Columbia University. He had served under Harold Hunt as Assistant 
Sµperintendent and then Director of Purchasing, leaving the system 
in 1953 when Dr. Hunt left. He served as Superintendent of Schools 
( 
in New Orleans from 1953 until 1961. There he made the acquaint-
ance of Bishop Cody, who later came to Chicago as archbishop of 
the Catholic diocese. Both had been in key positions when the 
Federal Court ordered the desegregation of New Orleans. Redmond 
had at least some familiarity with the current Chicago School 
System as he had served as a consultant with Boaz, Allen and 
Hamilton, a management firm-which had studied Chicago schools. At 
the time he was considered for the Chicago Superintendency, he was 
p. 5. 
pp. 3, 
65chicago. Daily News, January 5, ·1966, p. 19; March 22, 1966, 
Chicago Sun-Times, May 11, 1966, pp. 3, 26; May 26, 1966, 
38. 
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chief administrator of the Syosset, New York schools. 66 
The position which Redmond was to fill was wrought with 
pitfalls. He no longer needed to fear the obvious corruption of 
past Boards, but the mayor's influence was still real, if more 
benign. Indeed, in its final composition the Board may be said 
to have reflected the wishes of the mayor--and the mayor obviously 
did not actively favor integration. 
The city already divided over the issues of segregation, and 
organizations had formed ready to take action at the signs of any 
issue. The superintendent's position would depend upon his abilty 
I 
· to balance the various publics. He could never allow one group 
to become so alienated that its protests would seriously disturb 
the equilibrium upon which the city's political structure and 
his effectiveness depended. 
The composition of the Board abstractly represented factions 
within the city. It is natural for any political body to hesitate 
to make controversial decisions. During Willis' tenure the Board 
had never taken a clear stand, other than verbal, on integration. 
The guidelines for Board and Superintendent recognized that the 
W~Y$. and. means of communicating with and serving the public were 
66Chicago Daily News, May 10, 1966, pp. l; May 12, 1966, 
p. 3. Chicago Sun-Times, _May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 3, 26. 
r 
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the functions of the Board, but the superintendent was responsible 
for information gathering. While it would be the function of the 
Board to set policy, if Redmond did not defend the functions of 
of his staff, he would leave the way open for the destruction of 
the mechanism built up by the prior two superintendents. Redmond 
was well aware that much would depend upon his personality and 
temperament in advising the Board. As he stated at the first 
Board of Education meeting he attended, "Please don't forget that 
you have a superintendent and staff who are your advisers. 1167 
I 
67chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966, pp. 1, 10, 13. Chicago 
Sun-Times, October 14, 1966, p. 21 (Quote). 
CHAPTER III 
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS: 
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION: 
PRESSURES AND RESPONSES 
The famous Brown v Board of Education decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in 1954 had established the principle that 
segregated schools were "inherently unequal," but by the early 
' 
1960's the ramifications of this decision were still not clear. 
While de jure segregation was undoubtedly unconstitutional, there 
were many questions regarding the ~xtent of responsibility of 
school boards to correct de facto segregation in the schools. 
Obviously, all children were entitled to "quality education." It 
was not, however, clear to what extent desegregation would im1.)rove 
learning experiences or promote racial harmony and empathy. if 
some children were not achieving levels of performance as expected 
by academic norms, what guidelines could be established to help 
compensate for these deficiencies? 1 
Early critics of Chicago Board of Education policies tended 
1John E. Coons, "Chicago," Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public 
Schools Cities in the North and West, 1962, A Report to the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 189. 
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to concentrate on physical characteristics of the school system. 
They argued that the Board and its Superintendent had fostered 
segregation in decisions regarding school district boundaries, 
construction sites and the use of mobiles to relieve overcrowding." 
They criticized the aspect of the neighborhood school policy which 
forbade students to transfer to schools beyond their neighborhood 
school boundaries when their own schools were overcrowded. They 
questioned the policy which allowed teachers in these overcrowded 
schools to transfer with the result that large numbers of inex-
perienced teachers were to be found in inner-city schools. They 
( 
pointed to inequities in per-pupil expenditures between segregated 
white and Negro schools. When, in their opinion, suggestions for 
change went unheeded, they resorted to forms of picketing and 
boycotting and also sought remedy in the courts.2 
In defense against these charges it was argued that many of 
these policies were inh~rited from past practice, and that the 
school Board had little power to alter factors in the community 
which fostered segregation and tended to concentrate large numbers 
of Negro children into confined areas .. Furthermore, Illinois law 
was interpreted to forbid the taking of ra~ial counts on which 
2Ibid. 
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decisions could be made regarding desegregation. Inherent in the 
Board's policy, although often unspoken, was the fear that an 
active desegregation policy would drive white pupils from the 
schools and white residents from the city. 3 
Groups demanding changes regarding the Board's policies on 
desegregation did not become adamant until the 1960's. While 
Edwin C. Berry of the Chicago Urban League was active in criti-
cizing Chicago as the most segregated large city in the United 
States during the 19SO's, emphasis in his organization had been 
upon open housing and better job opportunities. 4 In reports to 
( 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1962 vigorous 
protests against de facto segregation in the North were based on 
a New York Federal district court decision of January, 1961. In 
this case the Board of Education of New Rochelle was found to have 
denied Negroes equal protection under the .law as granted under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining policies which ih effect 
3Ibid. 
4 Chicago Daily Defender, September 10, 1957, p. 11. Arvarh 
E. Strickland, History of the Chicago Urban League (Urbana, 
Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 216-18, 232. 
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created and maintained racial segregation in one of its schools.5 
In September, 196i, Negro parents in Chicago filed suit 
against the Board of Education seeking injunctions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the school system from compelling 
their children to attend segregated schools. The complaint 
charged that the Chicago Board deliberately fostered segregation 
by use·of the neighborhood school policy, gerrymandering attendance 
districts, selecting school sites, and refusing to utilize empty 
space in white schools. The plaintiffs alleged that their children 
were enrolled in overcrowded and inferior schools as a result of 
( 
these Board policies.6 
Litigation regarding these charges dragged on into 1963 when 
the Board agreed t:) an out-of-court settlement which initiated a 
panel to analyze and study the school system in particular 
regard to schools attended entirEly or predominantly by Negroes, 
define any problems that result therefrom, and formulate and 
report to this Board as soon as may be conveniently possible 
a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional 
5united States Commission on Civil Rights, Staff Reports of 
Commission, Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public Schools Cities in the 
North and West, 1962 (Washington D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Governme11t Printing Office, 1962), p. 1. Citing Taylor v 
Board of Education of New Rochelle, 191F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.~. 1961), 
6 Race Rel. L. Rep 90 (1961). 
6webb v Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Civ. No. 
61Cl569 D.C., N.D. Ill. (1961). 
r 
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problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may 
best be eliminated.7 
This panel, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Philip 
Hauser, would receive a lukewarm reception to its report in March, 
1964, as will be discerned later in this chapter. 
Protests in Chicago during 1961 tended to concentrate on 
empty classrooms which were found in predominantly white schools. 
The growing Negro population of Chicago, contained within two 
corridors in the south and west sides of the city, placed a great 
strain on school facilities in black neighborhoods. To alleviate 
this problem a great deal of the ne~ school construction in the 
city was located in Negro neighborhoods. Despite this building 
program, Negro schools averaged about forty pupils per class, and 
almost all the schools in black neighborhoods were on split stifts.8 
Critics of Board policy argued that new construction was con-
centrated in Negro areas in order to contain black students within 
a ghetto. Advocates of integration pointed out that it also would 
7Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report 
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Inte-
.B_!:'ation of the Public Schools--Chicagoy Philip M. Hauser, chairman 
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), pp. v, vii (Quote), 2, 7-9. 
Hereinafter referred to as Hauser Report. 
8coons, "Chicago," pp. 189-90, 223, 230, 235-36. Hauser 
!eport, pp. 6, 15. 
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less expensive to allow Negro parents to enroll their children 
segregated white schools with empty seats. A major obstacle to 
utilizing empty seats lay in the fact that the school administration 
no longer reported empty classrooms. In September, 1961, the Board 
ordered a study on vacant classrooms. A series of reports given 
by Dr. Willis in October avoided any listings of vacant classrooms. 
A November report was confused by the introduction of plans to 
utilize elementary school classrooms for high school branches and 
a recommendation to redistrict eighty elementary attendance a.re.as 
to balance class loads.9 
( 
In December the Chicago Urban League challenged the classroom 
figures reported and claimed that Dr. Willis had not counted 382 
empty rooms. The existence of empty classrooms and the refusal 
of the school system to allow Negro students in overcrowded schools 
to utilize empty seats, if they existed, could be taken as evidence 
that Board policy did operate to segregate Negroes from whites. 
Proof of the existence of the empty classrooms became muddled in 
an array of statistics and new programs. High school branches 
9Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of 
Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, September 
13, 1961), pp. 403-04; (October 11, 1961), pp. 551-58; (October 24, 
1961), pp. 602-05; (November 8, 1961), pp. 690-99. Hereinafter 
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number. 
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were established in numerous elementary schools. This utilized 
about 2000 desks which might have remained empty. The superinten-
dent announced plans to end double shifts and relieve overcrowding 
by continuing new construction and utilizing mobile classrooms at 
schools which lacked facilities for reducing classroom sizes 
without double shifts.lo 
The introduction of these plans was met with rising resist-
ance from the Negro community. The Chicago Urban League, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the 
Congress of Racial Equality joined to call for a halt to any con-
' 'struction until facilities already existi1;1g were "accounted for 
and properly utilized. 1111 The Board's building program was chal-
lenged by litigation in January, 1962, with the initiation of 
Burroughs v Board of Education. In September, 1961, the McDade 
School had been opened to relieve overcrowding at the Burnside 
School, which was located in the South Side of the city. An 
addition ·to the nearby Gillespie School was also completed later 
that fall. Students from areas of the Burnside School district 
were transferred to the other two schools, but all three schools 
10Proceedings, November 22, 1961, pp. 779-94, passim; Decem-
ber 23, 1961, pp. 886-87. 
11Chicago's American, December 20, 1961, p. 3. 
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remained overcrowded. Negro parents of children at the Burnside 
School demonstrated within the building against the boundary 
decision and sought an injunction against maintaining the nearby 
perry School as an almost all-white facility. The Burrough suit 
charged that deliberate segregation was evident in the Board 
decision to assign Negro students to overcrowded schools while it 
maintained special classes for the handicapped to fill rooms in 
the Perry School. It is to be noted that the suit also charged 
that the Board discriminated against Negro children by forcing 
them to travel a greater distance than would be necessary. The 
I 
suit further questioned the adequacy of lunchroom facilities. 12 
In 1963 the Illinois legislature passed the Armstrong Amend-
ment which stated, "In erecting, purchasing or otherwise acquiring 
buildings for school purposes, the board shall not do so in such 
a manner as to promote segregation and separation of children in 
public schools because of color, race or nationality. 13 In 1965 
the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO)', an 
integrated civil rights group on Chicago's South Side, complained 
12 Burroughs v Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Civ. 
No. 62C206, D.C.N.D. Ill. (1962). Coons, "Chicago," pp. 212-15. 
1~Illinois, The School Code of Illinois (1965), sec. 34-22. 
73 
to the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
that the Chicago Board had actively lobbied against legislation 
which would require school boards to redistrict periodically to 
. 14 reduce segregation. 
Members of the civil rights groups were not the only critics 
of Board policy who observed that its decisions may have been 
deliberately segregative. The Hauser Report, published in 1964, 
observed that of the seventy schools built since 1955 only six were 
desegregated in 1963.15 The 196 7 Civil Rights Report observed that 
the Board apparently did not heed the mandate of the Armstrong Act. 
( 
It cited the opening of the Paderewski School on the West Side of 
Chicago as an example of gerrymandering of school attendance areas. 
When the Paderewski School was opened, the nearby Burns School 
sent almost all of its Negro students to the new school. The 
result was that the Burns School, which was about 60 percent Negro 
in 1963 was 98 percent white in 1964. The Paderewski School 
opened with a 98 percent black student body. Furthermore, while 
1411The Chicago Title VI Complaint to H.E.W.: The July 27, 
1965, Document," in Integrated Education: A Reader, ed. by Meyer 
Weinberg (Beverly Hills, California: The Glencoe Press, 1968), 
p. 103. Hereinafter referred to as July 27, 1965 HEW Complaint. 
R.!"oceedings, March 25, 1959, p. 1646. 
15Hauser Report, p. 62. 
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the class sizes in both schools increased, the average size at the 
paderewski was 3.6 students greater than at the Burns.16 
The Hauser Report had cited a common practice which led to 
segregation in some schools when it noted: 
The principal reason why segregated residential areas are 
usually served by segregated schools is that major natural 
boundaries, such as main streets or elevated railroads, become 
school attendance boundaries for reasons of safety, as well 
as-being likely residential racial barriers.17 
However, the Civil Rights Commission Report noted that: 
The railroad tracks, which are the common boundary between 
Burns and Paderewski, are not impassable to elementary 
children. Children crossed these track before 1964 to attend 
Burns and crossed them in 1965-66 in other attendance areas 
on the West Side. There are numerous underpasses in the area.18 
Community pressures and the Board's desire to stabilize 
neighborhoods by offering concessions to white residents played 
an overt role in Board decisions. While the Board may have found 
it convenient to concede to pressures to utilize building programs 
to separate the races in the 19SO's, this was certainly not the 
case during the 1960's. The CCCO complaint in 1965 listed over 
16u.s. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the 
!_ublic Schooh:, Vol I (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Public 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 47.:.49_ 
Hereinafter referred to as Civil Rights Report, 1967. 
17 Hauser Report., p. 63. 
l8civil Rights Report, 1967, p. 48. 
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twenty cases in which, it was argued, Board decisions or lack of 
decisions had led to unnecessary segregation. 19 
This growing demand of the Negro community to participate in 
decisions regarding school construct.ion often resulted in long 
delays in building. One pf these delays has been seen to have had 
a direct effect on the busing plan of 1968. As Negroes moved into 
the Austin community, the administration planned to build a new 
facility for 1500 children in grades six through eight to relieve 
overcrowding in the May, Spencer, and Emmet Schools. In reflecting 
on the difficulty of achieving community consensus regarding 
( 
location, one administrator stated: 
Had we had that building ready at the time when the adjustment 
and change were very clearly discerned . . . we would not have 
had to go to this kind of means [busing] .... we could not 
get the ~ommunity to agree, first of all, on where the new 
school should be placed, and secondly, on the type of school 
that should be placed there. Five years we belabored that 
[1966-1971], five years, meeting after meeting after meeting, 
rehashing the same things. Nobody breaking down until finally, 
one day at a meeting down here at the Board Room, the Negro 
element in this community said they were sick and tired of 
fighting with the whites over where this school should be. 
Whites insisting it should be south of Lake Street [Negro 
community]. The blacks insisting it should be north of Lake 
Street .... This is the thing; we have to work with people. 
They all have feelings--pronounced feelings. There were very 
few people who were in between on this thing. They're either 
out there in left field or right out there along the right 
19July 4, 1965 HEW Complaint, pp. 88-103. Not all the 
cases involved new building. 
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field foul line . . . and to get them to come together and 
reach down the middle was an enormous task ... but it's at 
least five years too late.20 
It is difficult to speculate on what effect the new school 
would have had if it had been built in 1967. Often, these facil- · 
ities were overcrowded on the first day they were opened. Fur-
thermore, building plans originally designed under Superintendent 
Willis were under attack in 1967 as "needing to reflect the Board 
of Education philosophy rather than that of a few Redmond assist-
ants." The biracial Citizens School Committee complained that 
building plans would result in segregation that could be avoided. 21 
( 
Pressures for action which would reflect new integration policies 
under Dr. Redmond were evident, and a continuation of the old 
building program was certain to have met with much resistance. 
The use of mobile classrooms was a less expensive approach 
to relieving temporary overcrowding. In March, 1962, twenty-six 
of these air conditioned, thirty seat mobiles were introduced into 
overcrowded Negro districts. A boycott against them was begun 
almost immediately. Complaints were directed at their location 
2
°Francis McKeag, Assistant Superintendent, Chicago Public 
Schools, private taped interview held in his office, Chicago, 
Illinois, August 30, 1971. Proceedings, June 28, 1967, p. 3339. 
21chicago Daily News, April 17, 1967, p. 9. 
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on a busy street, lack of playground facilities, the inadequate 
notice given parents, and the fact that children had to walk past 
a new school on the way to the mobiles. The Woodlawn Organization, 
a militant Saul Alinsky confederation of South Side residents, led 
the protests against the "Willis Wagons. 11 22 
Underlying the objections was the conviction expressed in a 
National Association of Colored People complaint that the mobiles 
were being used to avoid sending blacks into underutilized white 
schools. Prior to the installation of the units the Chicago Urban 
League had requested the Board not to use the trailers until empty 
I 
classrooms were filled. Board member Raymand Pasnick stated that 
the use of mobiles was a segregationist policy. The Negro commu-
nity organized "truch squads" to enter schools and photograph 
empty classrooms. Sit-in and walk-in demonstrations resulted in 
arrests which served to strengthen Negro militancy.23 
22cpons, "Chicago," pp. 196-97. Strickland, History of 
Chicago Urban League, pp. 239-40. 
23
coons, "Chicago," p. 197. Strickland, History of Chicago 
Urban League, p. 240. These objections to these mobiles was not 
directed toward their interior facilities which were often, supe-
rior to those in the main school building. Some complaints were 
directed at the lack of security for staff members who were more 
subject to attack from intruders off the street, but in many 
neighborhoods the structures were not found to be objectionable. 
In a modified form they were still in use in the early 1970's. 
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Board policy regarding the empty classrooms and mobiles did 
not change in the following years. In late 1964 eighty-five 
mobiles were ordered purchased at a cost of $806,990. Board member 
warren Bacon voted against the purchase complaining that the admin-
istration should investigate the use of empty classrooms which were 
estimated to number over 700 in the system. Board member Cyrus 
Adams III argued that over a period of years the mobiles would 
cost less than transporting pupils from crowded schools to the 
vacant rooms. He pointed out that mobiles would be used to 
stabilize desegregating neighborhoods. 24 
( 
In 1966 the Board purchased 463 mobiles at a cost of 
$4,630,000 while the Chicago Daily Defender claimed there were 
453 vacant classrooms. Superintendent Willis rejected busing 
pupils to underutilized schools as simply a means of moving stu-
dents just for the sake of moving people. 25 The empty classroom 
imbroglio was never resolved under Willis. When he left, it 
remained one of the major problems facing James Redmond. The use 
of mobiles to stabilize desegregating neighborhoods was not gen-
erally successful. Mrs. Wild would later reminisce that the Board 
24chicago Daily News, November 19, 1964. Chicago Sun-Times, 
November 20, 1964. 
25Chicago Daily Defender, March _16, 1966, p. 3. 
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had provided mobile classrooms and other demands to white parents 
who were threatening to leave the area around O'Keeffe School in 
south Shore. She observed that the parents moved anyway and 
o 'Keeffe became a black segregated school. 26 
The establishing of boundary lines between schools in 
racially changing areas came under attack by civil rights groups 
in the early 1960's. Until 1948 evidence indicated that "neutral 
zones" had been used to allow white students to choose between 
attending an integrated school in their own area or transferring 
to a neighboring all white school. In 1948 Superintendent Hunt 
( 
ended this practice in all but eighteen areas. In 1962 the Board 
ended the practice almost entirely. However, complaints still 
remained that the administration was not redrafting attendance 
districts in fringe areas in order to create desegregated schools 
and relieve. overcrowding. 27 
In the spring of 1964 Willis suggested a boundary change 
between Marshall and Austin High Schools in order to alleviate 
overcrowding in the predominantly Negro Marshall High School. 
Within a year disturbances with racial overtones were reported 
26chicago Sun-Times, July 14, 1968, p. 11. 
27strickland, History of Chicago Urban League, P. 236. Coons, 
"Chicago," pp. 194-196, 231. 
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at Austin High School. Some groups contended that the boundary 
decision would lead to an exodus of white pupils in the Austin 
area. Willis felt that the problem had changed from a school to 
a community problem. Civil rights leader, Al Raby, argued that 
the flight of whites was caused by gerrymandering of school bound-
aries and not by the presence of Negro students. He contended that 
Austin-High School was being held to a 14 percent Negro quota by 
d d . 28 Boar gerryman ering. 
In a complaint to federal authorities Raby's civil rights 
group listed numerous cases of gerrymandering in an attack upon 
I' 
·the Board's neighborhood school policy. One example dealt with 
the Altgeld Gardens, an all-Negro public housing project built 
during World War II. New schools were built to serve the project 
children, and the nearby all-white Riverdale School district was 
gerrymandered.to exclude black students while Riverdale graduates 
were allowed to choose to attend the all-white Fenger High School. 
A plan to· end the gerrymander was suggested in July, 1964, but was 
deferred, and a new proposal was adopted in October, 1964, which 
allowed Riverdale graduates to continue attending Fenger.29 
28
chicago Daily News, May 26, 1964, p. 3. Chicago Sun-Ti~es, 
December 8, 1965, pp. 1, 48 (Quotes); December 9, 1965, pp. 1, ~-8. 
29July 27, 1965 HEW Complaint, pp. 93-103, esp. pp. 93-96. 
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Thus, white students were traveling about three miles to an 
all-white high school while living about five blocks from a predom-
inantly black high school. Class sizes in the Riverdale School 
were considerably smaller, 16.8 students per room as compared to 
over 32 per room, than in neighboring schools serving black children. 
But very few observers would have contended that boundary adjust-
ments could be used to integrate'many of Chicago's public schools. 
T.he Hauser Report observed that because of the highly defined 
boundaries in the housing patterns of the city, even extreme 
manipulations of school district boundaries could not achieve 
I 
integration of the city schools. 30 Any plan for total integration 
would require the movement of large numbers of students over 
considerable distances. 
Late in 1961, apparently in response to complaints about 
empty classrooms in white schools, Willis introduced a plan to 
create high school branches in various elementary schools to accept 
about 2000 students. The Chicago Urban League protested that these 
branches were being established to insure that schools would remain 
segregated. John E. Coons, professor of law at Northwestern 
University, in a report to the United States Commission on Civil 
30
rbid., citing Proceedings, October 27, 1964. Hauser Report, 
- p. 62. --
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Rights in 1962, concluded that the Willis plans, "suggested uses 
which either would fill up space primarily with white students or 
leave the space unused. 11 31 
There appears to be some room to suspect the purpose of the 
plan. Two branches were created for Schurz High School on the 
northwest side. At the time, the administration of the school had 
not found it necessary to go into an extended day to relieve over-
crowding in the main building. The two branches, Beaubien and 
Irving Park Schools, were within two blocks of the Northwest 
(Kennedy) Expressway. Four branches were created for the Steinmetz 
( 
High School which then went on a nine period day program while most 
high schools were functioning on schedules of ten periods or more. 32 
If students ~ere to be transferred from overcrowded schools 
into empty classrooms the branches would have to be closed. It was 
not until Willis retired that this action was taken. In the fall 
31Proceedings, November 8, 
"Chicago," pp. 199-200 (Quote). 
Urban League, p. 235. 
1961, pp. 690-91. Coons, 
Strickland, History of Chicago 
32schurz and Steinmetz High Schools, Chicago, Illinois, pri-
vate interviews with selected teachers and assistant principals, 
May, 1973. Havighurst pointed out that a ten period day was so 
common in Chicago High Schools that it was considered normal. 
Schedules ran as high as fourteen periods. Robert J. Havighurst, 
The Public Schools of Chicago: A Survey for the Board of Education 
S!._f the City of Chicago. (Chicago: Board of Education,- 1964), pp. 
237-38. Hereinafter referred to as Havighurst Survey. 
r ' 
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of 1966, Adams, one of the swing voters on the Board suggested 
that high school branches in elementary buildings should be aban-
doned. Complaints had been raised qgainst the high school permis-
sive transfer program on the grounds that high schools with branches 
should not be receiving ~chools. In the spring of 1967, Redmond, 
in office only one-half a year, first suggested the closing of six 
branches, only one of which would later become a receiving school 
, in the busing program. By the end of April the Board had approved 
the closing of all the branches of Steinmetz High School for the 
33 following September. While the busing plan was not yet developed, 
I 
classrooms were being made available for a future transfer of 
students in a plan for the northwest community. 
ln the South Shore area the situation was more complex. The 
community was integrating, and the Board was enmeshed in plans to 
stabilize the schools. The South East Community Organization was 
requesting that branches of South Shore High School be created at 
O'Keeffe, Bryn Mawr and Bradwell Elementary Schools. The high 
school had a Negro enrollment over forty percent, and it was pro-
jected that the ratio of white and black students in the main 
33Chicago Daily News, October 18, 1966, pp. 1, 7, 37; October 
20, 1966, p. 25. Proceedings, March 22, 1967, p. 2673; April 12, 
1967, p. 2737, 2744-45; April 26, 1967, p. 2838-40. 
/ 
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building would be approximately maintained in 1967 by establishing 
the branches to serve the ninth grade. As the report read, "The 
maintaining of the 10, 11 and 12 grade students only in the main 
building will improve the educational climate." When South Shore 
High School opened in September, 1967, it was served by the Black, 
Bradwell, and O'Keeffe branches, but the Negro enrollment in the 
main building was over fifty percent. In September, 1968, when 
· all the branches were closed, almost three-fourths of the students 
were Negroes. 34 Stabilization in Southeast Chicago appeared to be 
an insurmountable problem. In face of the proximity of the Negro 
( 
belt, white people had apparently chosen to run. 
In March, 1964, the Panel on Integration of the Public 
Schools submitted its report to the Board. The premises of the 
study may serve as a reminder of the philosophy which demanded in-
tegration as a part of quality education. The report stated: 
1. Racially segregated education, regardless of its causes, 
is incompatible with the ideals of a free society and its 
commitment to equal educational opportunity for all. 
2. The quality of education for any child in a racially plu-
ralistic community is improved when teaching and learning 
34Proceedings, June 28, 1967, p. 3338 (Quote). Chicago Public 
Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (hand tabulated Xeroxed 
copies, Chicago, 1966, 1967, 1968, District Twenty-two). Herein-
after referred to as Headcounts. The Black branch had formerly 
been an annex of the Bryn_Mawr School. 
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are conducted in racially integrated schools. 
3. There is no necessary conflict between the improvement of 
teaching and learning and racial integration in schools. 
4. Neither potential administrative difficulties nor limitations 
of existing educational policy is a morally, socially or 
professionally defensible reason for failure to pursue the 
aims of quality education and racial integration simulta-
neously and with vigor, using all resources and methods 
presently available or which reasonably can be devised 
for their attainment.35 
In a demographic study the Hauser Report noted the historical 
segregation of Negroes in Chicago, the impetus in black immigration, 
and the exodus of the white middle class from the city. Drawing 
parallels between white ethnic enclaves of immigrants and the prej-
udice against newly arrived groups~ the study observed that the 
Negro had been unable to assimilate due in particular to his visi-
bility. The schools alone could not overcome the forces of segre-
gation. It would "require the active participation of religious 
institutions, business and labor organizations, civic and community 
groups, and social and fraternal societies as well as of all agen-
cies of governme.nt." Finally, its readers were warned that, 
"unless the exodus of white population from the public schools and 
from the city is brought to a halt or reversed, the question of 
school integration may become simply a theoretical matter. 11 36 
The Hauser Report found few differences .in the costs per 
35Hauser Report, p-. 2 7. 36rbid., pp. 4-7, 12 (Quotes). 
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pupil for supplies and facilities offered students in white, inte-
grated, or Negro schools. The major discrepancies between white 
and nonwhite schools were found to be in the overcrowded schools 
with less experienced teachers which Negroes attended.37 The iden-
tification of quality education with expenditures per pupil, 
library resources, textbooks, and supplies was the result of a 
Chicago Urban League study presented to the Board in December, 1961, 
which had concluded that discrimination against Negroes existed not 
only in lower salaries reflecting less experienced teachers in 
Negro schools but also in lower costs for other operating expend-
I 
itures. However, the lower operating costs per pupil in crowded 
Negro schools was apparently a reflection of the spreading of 
fixed operating costs over a larger number of students.38 
To reduce overcrowding the Hauser Report suggested that mobile 
classrooms be continued, but not "as a means for effecting or 
perpetuating segregation." A plan was suggested which would permit 
"any child to transfer to an underutilized school of his choice, 
provided that each transferee assume the cost of his own transpor-
tat ion." A crucial recommendation sugg-es ted that "free transpor-
tation should be provided to convey students from overcrowded to 
37Ibid., pp. 69-78. 
38 Coons, "Chicago," pp. 216-17, 224-25. 
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under-utilized schools when the distances are in excess of one 
·te 1139 mi · 
The Report located areas on a map indicating vacant seats and 
excess pupils. The coincidence of crowded schools with segregated 
Negro schools was manifest. The map also clearly indicated the 
proximity of areas with an excess of students to areas with an 
39ttauser Report, p. 30. All of the thirteen recommendations 
made in the Report are not pertinent to this study. For the 
. reader's convenience they are summarized here. Hauser Report, 
pp. 27-38. 
1. Create open enrollment patterns in which two or more schools 
are clustered to accept students from larger attendance 
areas. / 
2. Use of transfer plans, free transportation and mobiles to 
relieve overcrowding. 
3. Location of schools and school boundaries to foster 
integration. 
4. Integrate faculties. 
5. Assign teachers to create a fair distribution of experience 
and credentials. 
6. Encourage teacher schools to develop more effective 
programs for teaching in schools with problems. 
7. Create an in-service program emphasizing minority histories, 
teaching children of different cultural heritages, and 
emphasizing human relations practices. 
8. Allocate greater learning resources to schools with special 
problems. 
9. Intensify educational programs in basic skills in schools 
with a high student turnover. 
10. Increase guidance and counseling services. 
11. Develop pilot programs of educational saturation in one or 
more districts serving children with educational problems. 
12. Seek additional revenues from city, state, and federal 
governments. 
13. Develop effective school-community relationships. 
r 
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excess of seats. An illustrative case was cited in which two 
schools were found, "only two miles apart, one of which was L~7 
percent over capacity, while the other was 40 percent vacant." 
While it was recommended that boundary lines be redrawn, it was 
concluded that even "if the most extreme procedures of redis-
tricting school attendance areas to increase integration were to 
be used, there would still be all-Negro and all-white schools in 
the city. 1140 
The analysis noted that, under the neighborhood school policy, 
integrated schools were found only in integrated or racially 
I. 
changing neighborhoods. Where rigid boundaries divided areas of 
Negro and white residences, the schools serving these students Nere 
usually segregated. Hauser suggested that the basic values of the 
traditional neighborhood school policy could be retained by modi-
fying the enrollment boundaries of clusters of schools. It wa.s 
proposed that the attendance areas of two or more elementary and 
three or more high schools serving contiguous areas be combined 
to allow pupils within the greater district to attend a. school of 
their choice. Integration, education.al-advantage to the child, and 
proximity of residence were to be the criteria for admission to an 
40 Hauser Report, pp. 30, 56-60, 62-63. 
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over-enrolled school. Vocational and special high schools were to 
be opened to city-wide enrollment.41 
The Report emphasized the necessity for preparing a neighbor-
hood for integration. Top leadership in Chicago was advised to 
"actively exert its influence and authority to elicit the co-oper-
ation of local community groups." It was cautioned that inte-
gration "cannot be achieved solely through pressu!."e tactics or 
through brute force and compulsion." Leaders of both the civil 
rights movement and white citizens groups were chided for tq.king 
extreme positions which abetted confusion and suspicion. The Board 
( 
'was warned that the "extremists on either side of the desegregation 
issue must not be permitted to determine policy." On the other 
hand it was morally and legally imperative that the Board make a 
firm commitment to the policy of integration. 42 
A lack of communication within the school system and with 
the community was seen as one cause for difficulties in school 
integration. It was suggested that school officials adopt an open 
door policy with the public. The Board was advised to regularly 
publish statistical data regarding pupil achievement and enrollment, 
4libid., pp. 27-30, 62. 
. 43 
. - . 
42Ibid., pp. 40 (First quote), 41, 42, (Second, third quote), 
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faculty distribution, use of facilities, and action taken or con-
templated by the Board regarding the Report recommendations. The 
absence of any single administrator within the system was noted 
whose function was to coordinate and communicate policy with 
respect to integration. The resolution of this problem was left 
to the Board, but two committees were suggested.43 
A biracial "Friends of the Chicago Schools" committee con-
sisting of community leaders was recommended to work with the Board 
and Superintendent on integration problems. This committee would 
also serve to gain public support for integration programs and, in 
( 
particular, work with religious leaders to help pave the way for 
school integration. A Schools Committee on Integration was sug-
gested to be comprised of representatives from all staff levels. 
The purpose of this committee would have been to develop programs 
to implement the Report recommendations.44 
The necessity of federal and state financial aid to implement 
programs -of quality education was noted. The Report recommended 
a pilot educational saturation program in one or more administrative 
districts where high student turnover and low achievement were rife. 
Pre-school programs, extended days, enriched learning resources, 
43rbid., PP· 36-38. 44 Ibid., p. 38. 
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school aides, expanded counseling services, and varied instruc-
tional techniques were some of the recommended innovations. The 
high cost of this program was recognized, but it was stated that 
the cost of unemployment, welfare, crime, and high morbidity 
would undoubtedly "far exceed the required expenditures for the 
program recommended by the Panel. 1145 
In initiating the Hauser Report to effect an out-of-court 
settlement in the Webb Case, the Board had promised on receipt of 
the Panel's study to "promptly take such action as it may determine 
is appropriate or required to work toward a resolution of any 
I 
problems involved and any inequities found to exist." The reaction 
of Board members after the presentation of the Report was as ambig-
uous as their promise. Adams observed that while goals were stated, 
funds were lacking. Murray asserted that the Panel "didn't 
entirely abandon the neighborhood school policy. They chopped it 
up a little but it's still there." Scheffler declared, "You can't 
have integration without white students." Mrs. Green considered 
the Report "one of the great documents of our time," while Bacon 
noted that the recommendations were not particularly new but were 
45rbid., pp. 33-35, 36 (Quote), 41. 
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''pulled together and given a sense of urgency. u46 
Reactions in the communities were much more pronounced. The 
president of the Wrightwood Improve~ent Association, on Chicago's 
southwest side promised to fight any breaches in the neighborhood 
school policy and threat~ned to bring court action against any 
Board programs which deviated from the policy. Al Raby of the 
Co-ordinating Council of Community Organizations led a demonstration 
at an elementary school to force implementation of the Hauser 
Report. Mail for and against the Report poured into the Board. 
During the summer of 1964 an advertisement appeared in the four 
( 
leading Chicago papers in which 140 business, church, and civic 
leaders urged the Board to begin implementing the recommendations. 
A few weeks later a Chicago Daily News editorial, discussing a 
disorder at Bogan High School on the city's southwest side when 
Hauser appeared to explain the Report, concluded, "if leaders were 
to wait for complete community acceptance before acting, nothing 
would ever get done except by violence. 11 47 
46
rbid., p. 2 (Quote). Proceedings, March 31, 1964, pp. 
2119; April 23, 1964, p. 2215; June 10, 1964, pp. 2449-55. Chicago 
Sun-Times, April 1, 1964, p. 28 (Second through fifth quotes). 
47chicago Sun-Times, April 1, 1964, p. 22; April 4, 1964, 
pp. 2, 30; August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 30. Editorial, Chicago Daily 
~'August 28, 1964 (Quote). 
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Board action seemed limited to commissioning further studies. 
A part of the thirteenth recommendation, calling for the estab-
lishment of the Friends of the Chicago Schools Committee_, was the 
only suggestion immediately implemented. The first three recom-
mendations, dealing with methods of student integration, were 
assigned to a Board committee. Recommendations four through eleven, 
dealing with teacher integration and teaching programs and services, 
were assigned to the superintendent and his staff for response. 
The staff report, made in July, 1964, was largely a defense of 
previous school policies and a listing of various programs which 
( 
had already been initiated. It cited an Illinois law which forbade 
requiring information regarding color, rac~ nationality, and 
religious affiliation or assigning anyone on such a basis as an 
obstacle to integrating faculties. While it noted the use of 
state and federal financial assistance in developing programs, the 
response generally decried the lack of funds to implement 
projects.48 
48Proceedings, April 8, 1964, pp. 2152-57. Response to 
Recommendations 4 through 10 of the Report to the Board of Edu-
£ation, City of Chicago, by the Advisory Panel on Integration of 
~Public Schools, A report prepared under the direction of 
Benjamin C. Willis, General Superintendent of Schools (Chicago: 
Board of Education, July 8, 1964). Above, chapter iii, footnote 
39 for the general topics discussed by the Response. 
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A year after the Hauser Report was accepted a Chicago Urban 
League report observed that segregation in the schools was actually 
increasing. Al Raby, in a complaint to the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, noted that the Friends of the Chicago Schools 
committee was the only Hauser Report recommendation implemented 
and four members of this connnittee had resigned in protest against 
the misleading role of the group. During the controversy regarding 
the rehiring of Willis, Hauser had declared that his Report would 
not be implemented during the superintendent's tenure but the 
Board rehired Willis.49 
I 
Early in 1966 Board member Clement introduced a resolution 
concerning the urgent necessity to give support to integrated 
elementary schools. He cited the Hauser Report, the Armstrong 
Law, and the policy of stabilization in support of a compensatory 
education policy. His detailed plan was aimed at upgrading 
physical facilities, teaching resources and programs while in-
creasing the types and numbers of personnel administrators, and 
community programs in integrated schools. The resolution was 
deferred three times in ·two months with no public discussion. It 
49
chicago Urban League, Research Report of the League, May 
12, 1965, Public School Segregation: City of Chicago 1963-196L~ and 
1964-1965 (Chicago: Urban League, 1965), p. 3. July 4, 1965 
!!_.E.W. Complaint, p. 87. 
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was finally voted down late in April. Scheffler expressed the 
opinion that the resolution was illegal as it would be "placing 
integration before education." Mrs. Wild considered it a "paper 
plan [which] would get everyone stirred up when we know we don't 
have enough money to carr~ through." In supporting the plan Mrs. 
Malis noted "I don't know how anyone can vote against this motion 
in good conscience. Even those against integration would probably 
welcome such an effort to help stabilize neighborhoods." Bacon 
conjectured, "I don't think this Board has yet demonstrated that 
it wants to do what is stated in this motion. You can find all 
( 
the spurious reasonable-sounding objections you want."so 
A more comprehensive survey of the Chicago School System, 
under the direction of Dr. Robert J. Havighurst, was presented in 
November, 1964. A study by an outside agency had been requested 
in the spring of 1961 by the Chicago Parent-Teacher Association. 
The Association had conducted its own survey seven years before 
but complained that none of the problems it identified had been 
corrected. After the Citizen Schools Committee endorsed the 
request, the Board authorized the study in November, 1961. A 
Board committee was appointed, but no action was taken during 1962. 
50Proceedings, February 23, 1966, pp. 2777-79; March 23, 
1966, p. 2793; April 13, 1966, p. 2915; April 28, 1966, p. 3004. 
Chicago Sun-Times, April 29, 1966, pp. 3, 10 (Quotes). 
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In 1963, Willis named Eldridge T. Mcswain, a dean of Northwestern 
University, to direct a curriculum study which was an apparent 
substitute for the comprehensive study. Mcswain stated he saw no 
need to appraise all aspects of the Chicago System. Soon after, 
Willis accepted a contract to conduct a survey of the Massachusett's 
schools, and the Board faced renewed pressure from dozens of civic 
organizations that a comprehensive study be made of the Chicago 
School System. 51 
In April, 1963, the Board Committee named Havighurst to 
direct the Survey. Willis threatened to resign, claiming he had 
( 
'not been adequately consulted concerning the choice of a director 
or design of the study. As a compromise, Willis was appointed to 
the study team and a third member, Dr. Alonzo Grace, Dean of the 
School of Education at the University of Illinois, was chosen by 
Havighurst and Willis. During the course of the survey, Willis 
did little to aid in the research~ The final report observes that, 
while the original design was to use outside consultants and self-
studies by school staff groups, the actual procedure soon developed 
51Havighurs t Survey, pp. 1-13. Proceedings, Novembe'r 22, 
1961, p. 779. Chicago Daily News, June 28, 1961, p. 24; November 
12, 1964, p. 9. 
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into a survey independent of school staff studies. 52 
The Survey characterized the Chicago Public School System 
under Willis as adhering to a "four walls" philosophy of education. 
In this school of thought educators were considered as profes~ 
sionals committed to doing the best possible job of educating each 
child. In order to accomplish their complex task educators were 
to make it clear that they were running the schools. Schools were 
to be kept out of local politics, and cooperation between schools 
and other institutions was to be kept at a minimum. The outside 
connnunity was seen as a source of tension which could interfere 
( 
with the efficient operation of the school system. While outside 
agencies were to be utilized, the relationship between them and 
the school was not to be allowed to overlap so that the educator's 
authority and expertise would be compromised. This philosqphy was 
reported to be efficient and economical. 53 
In contrast to the four walls philosophy a concept of an 
"urban community" school was advocated by Havighurst. In this 
point of view the anxiety of urban parents was seen to be increased 
by the rigid rules and aloof attitudes of school administrators. 
52Havighurst Survey, pp. 3-8. Chicago Daily News, November 
11, 1964, p. 4. Proceedings, June 12, 1963, p. 2299. 
53Havighurst Survey, pp. 28-29. 
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This difficulty would be alleviated only when educators became 
involved in the affairs of the community and in a quest for 
solutions to local problems. The active participation of educators 
in the social and urban renewal of the city was seen as a vital 
role for the school system. It was pointed out that school commu-
nities in Chicago could be kept integrated only if the Board of 
Education developed policies suited to the particular needs of an 
area rather than applying rules blindly to all situations. The 
schools were to be considered as a vital factor in the stabili-
zation of a community. 54 
(. 
The Havighurst Survey emphasized the role of the school as 
an agent of social change. It surmised that ''if Negroes were not 
present as a large minority there would still be an urgent need 
for social urban renewal." The major problem facing the nations 
was seen as the necessity for "developing a pattern of social 
relations and of cultural life which makes the city attractive" 
and "a desirable place for all kinds of people, rich and poor, 
white and Negro, to live a.nd raise their children." This renewal 
process was not simply a physical reha.~ilitation plan but depended 
heavily upon the development of a sense of community among the 
54Ibid., pp. 29-30, 370, 374. 
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people of an area. It required the cooperation of developers of 
commercial centers, churches, schools, parks, and housing to help 
people feel at home in a new environment. 55 
The role of the schools in this process was to provide 
quality programs at all levels in order to help stabilize neigh-
borhoods in "retaining white fami_lies, or in retaining middle 
class families." The report noted that problems of pupil behavior 
and low motivation were major causes for poor academic performance 
in low-income areas. It discovered "no deliberate attempt to give 
pupils in low-income areas an inferior education.'' Indeed, it 
( 
found staffs in these areas often.worked hard at developing effec-
tive methods of teaching. While ·the Survey called for continued 
efforts to develop effective methods, it concluded that "Negro 
children who go to de facto segregated schools are getting an 
inferior education because of the fact of segregation. 56 
These objectives left the school administration with its 
continuing dilemma--how does the system bring about integration 
and retain white families? The Havighurst Survey stated, "Resi-
dential segregation is the basic problem. 1157 That this problem is 
beyond the scope of the educational institutions was a position 
55rbid., p. 373. 56Ibid., p. 373-74. 57Ibid., p. 374. 
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which must have appealed to many school administrators. But during 
the early 1960's pressures existed at many levels which would not 
brook such contentions, and the Chicago Board had already adopted 
a resolution embracing the principles of integration. 
The Havighurst Survey considered the limited success of open 
attendance and permissive transfer plans in achieving desegregation. 
While_Chicago policies regarding transfers had been severely 
limited at the time of the study, it was observed that open attend-
_ance policies had not resulted in much integration in.cities which 
had encouraged use of the method. The long distances usually 
required to travel from overcrowded to underutilized schools was 
identified as one factor which limited the numbers of volunteers 
for permissive transfer plans. Furthermore, it was observed that 
"the great majority of parents will send their children to the 
nearest school, no matter how good or bad it is." It was concluded 
that everyday living pressures and the uncertainties concomitant 
with sending their children to a distant school would keep most 
parents from utilizing a transfer program. These factors worked 
especially to limit the transfer of children of the lowest 
socioeconomic status, while children with ambitious parents were 
seen as more likely to utilize transfer plans.SS 
58rbid., pp. 374-76, 377(Quote). 
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Thus it was argued that permissive transfer programs could 
help avoid conflicts at a receiving school between children of 
greatly varying socioeconomic levels, that might occur in a manda-
tory transfer program. But, because of the lack of voluntary 
transfers, it was pointed out that permissive transfer programs 
based in a concept of relieving overcrowded schools would neither 
achieve desegregation nor a balancing of class sizes. Indeed, the 
open attendance feature of the transfer program would permit white 
children to leave a largely Negro school. While the Havighurst 
Survey saw this as a positive value in keeping white families in 
.a changing neighborhood, the result in some schools would be a 
resegregation of the student body. 59 
The Havighurst Survey identified five necessary conditions 
for successful integration. First, compensatory education programs 
requiring added expenditures in all ~ower socioeconomic areas were 
advocated. Second, any plan for integration would have to respect 
the comp~ex and diverse ethnic group feelings in the city. A 
pragmatic policy of integration was suggested in which the degree 
of opposition to desegregation would be taken into consideration. 
The Survey proposed that school desegregation policies would work 
best in those areas where community organizations already existed 
59rbid., pp. 377-78~ 
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to promote integration and stabilization. Other areas were to be 
chosen on the basis of the possibility of developing rational 
discussion of the problems involved in stabilizing a community. 
Some sections of the city would have to be written off for anything 
except long range integration plans. 60 
Third, Havighurst agreed with Hauser that the neighborhood 
school policy be retained in principle but modified by the clus-
tering of groups of schools into one attendance district. Fourth, 
it was suggested that the city could be broken into "local commu-
nity areas" of about 250,000 residents which would contain segre-
gated white and black areas within the larger integrated area. It 
was hoped that these large areas would develop "home rule11 
which would allow them to adopt long range plans and work for 
their realization. These home rule areas would thus be abie to 
develop policies for their own unique problems without being seen 
as a threat by other corrn:nunities within the city. In order to 
accomplish this task the Board of Education would have to set up 
districts contiguous with the defined areas. Strong connnunity 
councils with power to call for local bond issues and special edu-
cational plans would be necessary. The Board would be expected to 
60ibid., pp. 379-80. 
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cooperate not only with the community.councils but with other city 
agencies to promote integration and urban development. Fifth, the 
Board would be obliged to consult with local community leadership 
in choosing sites for new buildings and additions to existing 
schools in order to alleviate crowded conditions which threatened 
, 61 
the success of school programs.· 
Havighurst warned that school integration could take place 
only as a part of an overall city plan. The Board was to offer 
a program which would guarantee that schools being desegregated be 
kept 60 percent white. Pupils being allowed to transfer into such 
schools were not to be more than one year behind their age level 
in reading. Students were to retain their right to attend the 
school in their home district. The Board was to cooperate with 
local community organizations in choosing the location of deseg-
regated schools~ 2 A crux of the entire Havighurst scheme for 
successful desegregation rested on the assumption that the intel-
lectual community within an area would be able to exert a suffi-
cient persuasive force to overcome the fears of the community at 
large and that desegregation would be most successful when the 
community participated. 
61Ibid., pp. 380-82. 62rbid., PP· 382-83. 
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In order to implement integration policies the Havighurst 
survey called for the creation of an assistant superintendent's 
position directly responsible to the General Superintendent. This 
new administrator would have subordinates in each school district 
and be a specialist in school-community relations. It was further 
suggested that the citizens committee created under the Hauser 
Report expand its duties to include public hearings, define central 
issues and make recommendations to the Board and the public. 63 
The Havighurst Survey identified three areas "where conditions 
appear to be ready for an active program of integrated education 
as part of a plan for community redevelopment and social urban 
renewal." The Austin community was not experiencing any consid-
erable integration at the time of the survey and thus was not 
studied. The South Shore area, however, was designated as part 
of a southeast Chicago area "nationally famous for its demonstration 
of a stabilized integrated residential area in the Hyde-Park-Kenwood 
community [near the University of Chicago]." Numerous community 
organizations were cited as examples of responsible grassroots 
associations which could foster stabilization. It was recommended 
that Bowen, South Shore, and Hirsh High Schools be clustered in 
63Ibid., p. 384. 
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an open attendance area. The Board.was asked to guarante~ that 
south Shore and Bowen High Schools not be allowed to become less 
than 60 percent white.64 
When the Havighurst Survey was considered by the Board 
members in November, 1964, it met with a variety of evaluations. 
Mrs. Malis saw "nothing new" in the Survey. Bernard Friedman 
considered it "a logical approach to touchy issues" which the Board 
should begin implementing by early spring. Mrs. Wild had "no 
argument with any of it," but Edward Scheffler complained, "He's 
trying to do a lot of things in there that are impractical .... 
The difficulty is his trying to take care of school matters from 
a sociological point of view instead of a practical point of view." 
·Warren Bacon questioned the thesis that only areas which were 
receptive to integration should be considered for desegregation 
moves. He stated, "I believe that in those areas where there is 
allegedly some hostility, there are many many people.who are not 
as hostile as it appears." But Bacon was pessimistic about the 
probability of implementing the Survey suggestions when he com-
mented, "Just as in the Hauser Report, it raises the question of 
64rbid., pp. 385 (First quote), 386-87, 388 (Second quote), 
388-90. Board action on these recommendations is considered in 
chapter iv. 
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whether the Board wi 11 fol low through .. " 6 5 
The cluster plan suggested by both the Hauser and Ha.vighurst 
reports brought up the busing issue in 1964. Cyrus Adams spoke 
for many Board members when he stated his position regarding 
integration. He pointed out that white children would not be 
forced to attend schools in areas far from their homes, nor would 
Negro children be sent around to "overwhelm white schools." 
Children attending neighborhood schools would not be forced out 
to make room for transfer students from more distant schools. 
Children who were educational or disciplinary problems would not 
be allowed to utilize the transfer program, nor would the quality 
of teaching and the educational environment in any school be 
lowered by reasons of transfers into it. Finally, no money would 
be spent for transporting children for the sole purpose of deseg-
regation, and under no circumstances would a great deal of money 
be spent to bus children all over the city.66 
Statements such as those by Adams were obviously designed 
to alleviate the fears of those parents who were not in sympathy 
with the objectives of the Hauser and Havighurst reports. Within 
65ch· D ·1· N N b 13 1964 5 icago ai y ews, ovem er , , p. . 
66Chicago Daily News, November 19, 1964, pp. 1, 18 (Quotes). 
Editorial, Chica.go Sun-Times, November 23, 1964. 
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a week Dr. Willis offered a plan which was seen as an alternative 
to the Havighurst Survey. At an estimated cost of one billion 
dollars Willis proposed to increase educational services and 
decrease class sizes throughout the system with emphasis on 
remedial programs in schools requiring these services. The plan 
was rebuffed by Bacon who stated it 
sounds very much like someone saying I can do this better than 
you can. We've just had the Havighurst study. It would have 
been better if Willis had incorporated his views in that study, 
since he was a member of the survey comraittee. Such figures as 
[one billion dollari) only serve to unnerve the citizenr6--
people will be scared to death their taxes are going up. 7 
In January, 1965, Willis again bore the brunt of the blame 
for the inaction of the school system regarding integration. In 
a radio interview Havighurst and Hauser stated they felt Willis 
had done little to implement their reports and that he was hiding 
problems and deficiencies in the school system.68 Community and 
federal pressures were increasing the tensions between the Super-
intendent and the Board, but the Superintendent's strong personality 
tended to make him the focal point for criticisms of the school 
system's lack of action on matters of integration. 
67
chicago Sun-Times, November 26, 1964, pp. 3, 32. 
68
chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1965, p. 5. The news-
paper was reporting a WIND radio interview between Havighurst, 
Hauser and two of the periodical's reporters. 
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Willis' contract was being considered for renewal during the 
summer of 1965 amid much turmoil as some factions within the city 
called for his continuance in office and others demanded his 
removal. At its first night meeting in eighteen years, called at 
the request of the mayor, the Board promised to expand its search 
-for a successor to Willis and require a commitment to integration 
from the new superintendent. It denied the need to create a 
special staff to implement the Havighurst Survey but did concede 
that a position of assistant superintendent for integration should 
be created in accordance with the Survey recommendation.69 
In August, 1965, Virginia Lewis was appointed to the newly 
created post of Assistant Superintendent for Integration. The 
superintendent took the occasion to reiterate his philosophy of 
quality education. He stated: 
I wish to say again that we all recognize that it is desirable 
for children of different races to associate with, and to come 
to know and to understand each other. The achievement of 
integration, however, should and does involve every member of 
the professional and non-professional staff in the schools. 
. . . These all must be part of the continuing effort to have 
quality education for each child according to his needs.70 
69Chicago Sun-Times, June 30, 1965, p. 3; July 8, 1965, 
pp. 1, 4. 
70Proceedings, August 11, 1965, pp. 228-29. 
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Raymond Pasnick, who was resigning from the Board in protest 
of Willis' leadership, complained that the Superintendent, 
has consistently objected to the creation of such a position 
arguing that a responsibility of this kind should be shared 
by the entire school system which in effect means we cannot 
pinpoint responsibility with respect to an important question 
of integration in our schools. . . . The Superintendent has 
even objected to the Board interviewing this candidate to 
ascertain her attitudes and her qualifications.71 
Pressure continued to build for more positive actions from 
the Board regarding integration. By October, 1965, in response to 
testimony of Chicago civil rights leaders at Washington, D.C., 
Office of Education Commissioner Keppel delayed federal funds 
earmarked for Chicago. The decision drew protests from Roman 
Pucinski, a United States Representative from a northwest district 
in Chicago and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education. 
Warren Bacon felt the "government is perfectly right if they h:..ve 
the evidence," although Mrs. Wild denied that the public school.s 
were deliberately segregated.72 
The funds were restored amid rumors that Mayor Daley had 
intervened, and the Board promised to take action regarding charges 
of segregation including the establishment of a committee for the 
71rbid., PP· 232-33. 
72
chicago Sun-Times, October 22, 1965, p. 3; October 27, 1965, 
p. 1. Chicago Daily News, October 12, 1965, pp. 1, 3 (Quote); 
October 26, 1965, p~ 1, 3.-
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purpose of reviewing attendance boundaries, branch arrangements, 
high school feeder patterns and related policies. However, the 
threat of further federal intervention remained. In December, 
Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Gardner ordered that a 
team be sent to Chicago to investigate segregation in the city 
schools on reports that the Board committee headed by Cyrus Adams 
was stalling.73 
The plan for clustering schools rested at the heart of the 
Hauser and Havighurst suggestions for desegregating schools while 
retaining the neighborhood school pattern. Willis apparently 
ignored the Hauser recommendations for clustering when he submitted 
a voluntary transfer plan in May, 1964. Bacon accused Willis of 
making derogatory remarks about the Hauser Report and decried the 
emphasis the Board placed on overcrowded schools rather than 
integration. Under pressure from Bacon, Adams asked Hauser to 
meet with the Board committee to reconsider the cluster plan 
concept.74 
In August the Board suggested that Willis develop several 
73chicago Sun-Time-s, December 15, 1965, pp. 1, 42; January 4, 
1966, p. 1. Chicago Daily News, December 30, 1965, pp. 1, 4. 
74Proceedings, May 27, 1964, p. 2157; June 24, 1964, p. 2215. 
Chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1964, p. 4; June 25, 1964, p. 44. 
Editorial, Chicago Daily News, June 19, 1964. 
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~ school clusters. Only Murray objected on the grounds that "the 
great majority of the people of Chicago are opposed." The Board 
specifically ordered the Superintendent to submit a plan detailing 
how Hyde Park, South Shore, Hirsch, and Bowen High Schools could 
be clustered. A plan was adopted involving Hirsh, South Shore and 
Bowen High Schools, but by the spring of 1965 the administration 
was accused of not informing eighth grade graduates of their 
right to choose between attending any one of the three schools.75 
Requests for cluster plans were ~eceived from school and 
community groups which hoped to stabilize already integrated 
schools by linking them with nearby all-white schools. The only 
plan adopted was the Hirsh, Bowen, South Shore cluster, but the 
result was an ironical twisting of the Hauser objective of inte-
gration. White students used the plan to transfer from predom-
inantly Negro Hirsh High School into the other predominantly white 
schools. By the spring of 1967 Superintendent Redmond observed 
that the flow of students was only in one direction out of Hirsch. 
South Shore High School had already been dropped from the plan and 
75Chicago Sun-Times, August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 30; August 26, 
1964, p. 20; August 27, 1964, pp. 3, 90 (Quote); December 10, 1964, 
p; 32; January 14, 1965, pp. 1, 6; March 18, 1965, pp. 3, 22. 
Chicago Daily News, August 12, 1964, pp. 1, 12;.editorial, August 
28, 1964. 
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the superintendent recommended its total termination as Hirsch 
High School was at 157 percent of capacity while Bowen had reached 
-over 210 percent of its capacity. 76 
Another program which met with only limited success for 
,purposes of integration was the permissive transfer policy. Indeed, 
, 
,the plans were designed to ·relieve overcrowding and not to imple-
ment integration. In December, 1961, when Willis first intro-
duced a scheme he suggested that students from schools with class-
room sizes of forty or more might transfer to those schools with 
classroom sizes of less t;han thirty. As the transfers would be 
voluntary and no transportation costs would be paid, there was 
little doubt in many minds that few students would utilize the 
plan. The 1962 civil rights report observed that as most over-
crowded classrooms were in Negro schools, the ratio set by the 
policy in effect insured that a student class size of forty 
would be established in black schools and a limit of thirty 
students per class would. be common in white schools.77 
A new elementary permissive transfer program suggested late 
76chicago Sun-Times, August 8, 1964, p. 3; August 26, 1964, 
p. 20; May 20, 1965, p. 43. Proceedings, April 12, 1967, p. 2741. 
77 Coons, "Chicago," p. 191. Proceedings, December 2 7, 1961, 
pp. 924-25; August 14, 1963, pp. 274-76. 
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in 1963 dropped the minimum class size for a sending school to 
thirty-five students. Warren Bacon attacked the plan as being 
destined to failure. He pointed out that only twenty-eight students 
had used a similar plan in 1962. He complained that the plan was . 
announced in the middle of the year thereby insuring that a transfer 
would cause a maximum disruption to the individual's education. 
He chided the administration for making little or no effort to 
prepare the community and the school for the reception of transfer 
students. He blamed this lack of preparation and the lack of 
expansion of the human relations staff for trouble which occurred 
in some areas. He pointed out that a list, exempting those schools, 
which had high school branches, special education classes, tempo-
rary structures, no lunchrooms or needing boundary adjustments, 
would allow neighborhood pressures to stop the acceptance of 
transfers into local schools. 78 
As a method of desegregating the Chicago schools, the per-
missive transfer program was accused of having serious defects. 
The plan put its emphasis in the wrong place by permitting deseg-
regation only on the basis of under-utilized or overcrowded class-
rooms. Its noncompulsory provision put the whole burden of the 
78Proceedings, August 14, 1963, p. 274; October 30, 1963, 
pp. 608-13; November 13, ~963, pp. 620-22. 
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decision to integrate on the parent. The lack of transportation 
provisions insured that few young children, certainly the most 
impressionable, would be involved. The Havighurst Survey had 
warned against these pitfalls while pointing out that the permis-
sive transfer plan had not worked in other cities.79 
In July, 1964, a Board committee recommended that transpor-
tation costs be paid for any child wishing to use a transfer plan. 
A deluge of mail descended on the Board which was estimated to be 
about nine to one against this policy. Thomas Murray opposed any 
form of paid transportation on the grounds that costs would snow-
ball. Cyrus Adams suggested that private donations be sought to 
pay bus fares, but opposed the use of school funds. Warren Bacon 
estimated that it would cost twenty-six million dollars to provide 
facilities in overcrowded schools. He pointed out that the 
interest on ·this sum would provide the money necessary to pay 
transportation to underutilized schools. 80 
The debate continued but the Board took no actions to provide 
transportation costs. Adams summarized the Board's position when 
79chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1964, p. 4. Havighurst Survey, 
pp. 274-78. 
80 . . . Chicago Sun-Times, July 10, 1964, p. 26; July 12, 1964, p. 
Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1964, Section 1, p. 12. 30. 
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he flatly stated, "No money is going to be spent for transporting 
children for the sole purpose of integration." Without an organ-
ized busing program providing free transportation there was little 
chance that children in the early elementary grades would utilize 
the program. Indeed, when it was suggested that pupils from 
kindergarten through fourth grade be permitted to participate in 
a city-wide transfer plan, Willis opposed the idea on the grounds 
that it would create health and safety problems.Bl 
Fifteen hundred students used the permissive transfer program 
in 1966, but almost all transfers were at the high school level. 
No studies had been made on the effects of the plan when Mrs. Malis 
asked what results the program had on overcrowding, integration, 
academic and social problems. Undoubtedly, some high schools had 
been integrated as Negroes utilized the plan. But white students 
also were using the program to transfer out of integrating schools 
into those schools with almost all-white student bodies. Adams 
felt that Illinois law allowed white students as well as Negroes 
to take advantage of permissive transfers. He pointed out that 
there would be no way to keep whites from leaving the city if 
81_C~h_i_c_a_g_o....,...,.D_a_i_l~y~N_e_w_s, November 19, 1964, pp. 1, 18 (Quote); 
November 20, 1964, p. 8. Chicago Sun-Times, June 23, 1964, pp. 3, 
24. 
r 
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attempts were made to force them into integrated schools.82 
By the close of 1966 none of the various proposed methods 
of fostering integration had been successfully implemented in 
Chicago. The 1967 Civil Rights Report found 89 percent of Chicagq's 
Negro students in elementary schools which had less than 10 percent 
white students, and 97 percent of the system's Negro pupils were 
in elementary schools with a Negro majority. Thus, if a 10 percent 
guideline was to be used to consider schools to be desegregated, 
only a relatively few black students attended these schools. 
The Board had no active policy which was designed to bring 
about desegregation. Its stabilization policy was, at best, an 
attempt to slow down the white exodus from a changing neighborhood 
by controlling the number of black students allowed in previ.ously 
all-white schools. Attempts to achieve desegregation by adju&ting 
contiguous school boundaries probably did hasten the withdrawal 
of white students. 
The permissive transfer program offered students, seeking 
what they hoped to be a better quality education, a chance to 
controi some aspects of their learning by choosing to attend one 
of the less crowded schools. While this policy provided for the 
82chicago Daily News, April 27, 1966, pp. 38, 39; editorial, 
May 19, 1966. Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3304-05. 
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desegregation of some previously all white schools, it also allowed 
whites to escape from schools which were desegregating and then 
resegregating with all-black student bodies. Also, the relatively 
long distances which a transferring student was required to travel 
had limited the use of the permissive transfer policy to high 
school students. Without an officially sponsored and publicly 
paid p~ogram of transportation, there was little chance of 
utilizing a transfer program for elementary school students. 
While the discussions about methods of desegregation had 
little effect on the actual integration of the Chicago system, 
.they had a pronounced effect on attitudes of residents in the city. 
As Adams observed, "Whenever we propose a transfer plan, the 
'redneck' areas of the city start rumors that their [black] 
children are going to overwhelm their [white] schools. Such 
statements are either malicious lies or nonsense. 1183 There seemed 
to be little chance that any prog~am of rational discussion with 
community groups would lead to the curtailment of opposition to 
desegregation by a growing vocal element. 
83chicago Sun-Times, June 19, 1966, p. 19 (Quote). Civil 
!._ights Report, 1967, p. 7. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS: 
THE COMMUNITIES AND THE SCHOOLS 
Mayor Daley once said at a convention, "Some have criticized 
us because we reach out into nationality, religious, and racial 
groups. It's the greatest thing we have ever done. It's been the 
strength of our party from the beginning.' 1 1 The mayor was talking 
about the Chicago Democratic Party's power base created by estab-
lishing an arbitrary balance of positions between various ethnic 
groups in the city. This base was created in the late 1920's by 
Mayor Anton Cermak. A decade later University of Chicago Professor 
Louis Wirth was identifying seventy-five distinct community areas 
in the city. These communities were differentiated from one 
another on the basis of their historical settlement and growth, 
the identification of local inhabitants with the area, centers of 
trade local to the community, and the existence of natural and 
artificial barriers such as rivers, railroads, and local 
1Chicago Tribun'e, April 23, 1964, p. 16. 
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. 2 transportation systems. These communities were also classified 
by ethnic groups which tended to be predominant within the area. 
Through various organizations these communities were able to exert 
some influence on the decision-making process of the Democratic 
party which has controlled the city since the 1930's. 
For purposes of statistical comparison demographers have 
retained the boundaries of the seventy-five communities just. as 
the Democratic Party has retained its ethnic orientation to con-
tinue winning elections. Not all groups had been equally repre-
sented in the party, just as the various ethnic groups were not 
equally represented in all of the communities. The maps on the 
following page indicate the geographical distribution of some 
ethnic groups throughout Chicago. While definite concentrations 
of population can be seen for people of all origins, it is easily 
detected that individuals of European background were able to move 
throughout the city. Groups arriving more recently in Chicago, 
such as the Puerto Rican and Mexican, were still concentrated 
closer to the center of the city, and dispersal was minimal. 
The Negro, howeve~, represented the most obvious exception 
2Evelyn Kitagawa and Karl Taeuber, ed., Local Community Fact 
.!!_ook: Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1960 (Chicago: Chicago. ~ommunity 
Inventory, 1963), p. xiii. Hereinafter referred to as Factbook. 
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to the dispersal of an ethnic group over a period of years. In 
1920 about four percent of the city's population was Negro. In 
1923 and 1928 national quota laws sterrnned the immigration of white 
ethnic groups into this country. Thus, Negro migration into the 
city began to exceed the white irrnnigration. The use of restrictive 
covenants to exclude Negroes from neighborhoods had become corrnnon 
during World War I in reaction to the growing movement of Negroes 
from the Southern United States. By 1930 the Negro population of 
.the city, which had doubled and represented seven percent of the 
total number of inhabitants, was restricted to a few areas, mainly 
. on the south side of Chicago (see map on preceding page). By 1950 
the Negro population represented over thirteen percent of the 
city's population and the proportion leaped to twenty-three percent 
in 1960 and twenty-eight percent in 1966, as the nonwhite popu-
lation of Chicago increased from about one-half million to around 
one million persons during this period.3 
Despite this expansion of population, the Negro had not 
scattered throughout the city. He was held in a "black belt" area 
resembling an inverted "L" radiating south and west from the center 
o.f t.he city. This pattern of residential segregation became an 
3Harold Baron, "History of Chicago School Segregation to 
1953," Integrated Education, I (January, 1963), 17-19, 30. 
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established practice by 1920, and concentration within all-Negro 
areas had steadily increased over the decades. As the number of 
Negroes expanded, it was obvious that the area of the city they 
would occupy would have to expand. However, this expansion 
was consistently limited to areas contiguous to or closeby the 
exclusively Negro section.4 
Factors which tended to affect Negro migration into an area 
are somewhat nebulous, but some tendencies have been noted. 
Neighborhoods which drew strongly from one ethnic group had shown 
greater resistance to invasion. This was particularly true of 
people of a southern or eastern European background. Neighborhoods 
made up of owner-occupied housing tended to change over more grad-
ually than in those areas where there were a large number of 
renters. Parks, railroad tracks, industrial districts, and major 
commercial streets often became barriers between the races. 5 
Sociologists have described the process in which an area 
4otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of 
Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 87-107, passim. 
SReal Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared f.or .. tJ:ie 
Board of Education, City of Chicago, December, 1967, Preliminary 
findings and Projections of Population and School Enrollments for 
£hicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1967), 
p. 67. Hereinafter referred to as RERC, Preliminary. 
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changes over from white to non-white. This process of residential 
succession has been practiced by most ethnic groups throughout the 
history of the city as some group, achieving a higher socioeco-
nomic status, moved into outlying areas and was replaced by a 
newer group of ~ower socioceonomic status. Duncan and Duncan have 
described four stages in the process. 
During the first stage called "initial entry" or "penetra-
tion" a Negro family bought a home in an area occupied totally by 
whites. Once entry occurred in an area contiguous to the Negro 
community, it was very uncommon that a new white family would move 
into the neighborhood. Thus, as members of the white group moved 
out, they were replaced by Negro families. The second stage 
referred to as "invasion" occurred when a substantial number of 
Negroes moved into the area. 6 
Two factors are worth noting at this point. First, as the 
black belt was generally contiguous to older and less desirable 
areas of residency, most of the Negro expansion had occurred into 
these poorer areas. However, Negro expansion tended to move along 
the paths of least resistance. It had been observed that in a 
.contiguous area where the white residents were more affluent, 
6Duncan and Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago, pp. 98-
115, passlm. 
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they were more likely to move than less prosperous residents and 
more expansion occurred in these areas. Second, during this 
period of invasion, and during the next stage, integration was 
occurring. However, this integration had been only a temporary 
situation which existed until most whites were replaced by non-
whites. 7 
During the third stage called "consolidation" an increasing 
number and proportion of the area population became Negro. The 
fourth stage was characterized by a "piling up" of people as the 
population density continued to grow. Pierre deVise, a Chicago 
·sociologist, pointed out that Negro population density in what also 
were Chicago's ten poorest communities was over forty percent 
higher than the average population per square mile figure for the 
entire city. If the four communities in which industrial and com-
mercial prope·rties occupy much land were excluded from the list of 
the ten poorest communities, then the Negro population density in 
the remaining six communities was actually double the city average. 8 
This increase in population, which put a strain on all the 
7Pierre deVise, Chicago Widening Color Gap, Report Number 2 
of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee, December, 1967 
(Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1967), pp. 63-73. 
115. 
8nuncan and Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago, pp. 98-
deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap.J.. p. 42. 
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community's resources and particularly its schools, actually began 
with the invasion stage. As the newer group moved into a community, 
the age level of the families often dropped back into the period 
where there were more children of school age. Negro families were 
less likely to send their children into the Catholic schools whose 
, 
enrollment represented about one-fourth of the total school enroll-
ment of the city in 1967. The non-white fertility rate had also 
been higher than the white rate for the same age group. Further-
more, the newly arriving families were often of a lower socioeco-
nomic status than the established residents and thus there was more 
doubling up of families in order to afford the facilities.9 These 
factors placed a new burden on the community schools and contrib-
uted to the decision of white parents to withdraw their children 
from the public schools as overcrowding and racial tension rose. 
Througi.1out the 1960' s white out-migration had steadily in-
creased. In 1960 the white population of Chicago was 2,712,000. 
In 1965 this number dropped to 2,484,000, representing 68.6 percent 
of the city's population. The Real Estate Research Corporation 
estimat~d the total white population of the Chicago Standard 
9 .. 
RERC,Preliminary, pp. 21, 70-74. 
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Metropolitan Area would be about 2,300,000 in 1970. 10 With the 
drop in white population there had not been a corresponding drop 
in the real number of white children in the public schools. 
Indeed, the white enrollment increased until the 1967 headcount. 
In this year the Chicago Board of Education began classifying 
Puerto Rican students separately and the Caucasian count dropped. 
When the Puerto Rican count is added to the Caucasian, the drop of 
white students does not occur until 1969. However, the steady 
increase in Negro students from 236,00 in 1963 to 313,000 in 1969 
represented a much faster increase in the numbers of Negroes rather 
than of whites. Therefore the percentage of Negro students rose 
from 46.5 percent in 1963 to 53.9 percent in 1969. 11 
In areas experiencing Negro invasion a drop in white attend-
ance at public schools was often experienced. The Real Estat0 
Research Corporation explained this situation by pointing out that 
white households with school age children were among the first to 
lOReal Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared for the 
Board of Education, City of Chicago, April, 1968, Projections of 
Population and School Enrollments by Community Area for the City of 
Chicago: 1970 and 1975 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1968), pp. 
II-2, II-3, IV-5. Hereinafter referred to as RERC, Projections. 
While this report was issued three months after the busing decision, 
the general information would have been available to Board members 
through the school system demographers. 
11Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand 
tabulated Xeroxed copies, ~hicago, 1963, 1969). 
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move from changing neighborhoods. Other families transferred 
their children to Catholic schools, private schools, or used the 
permissive transfer program of the public school system to transfer 
their children out of a changing school. 12 
By 1967 the black belt had reached the city limits along 
Roosevelt Road and gone beyond Cicero Avenue along Lake Street into 
the Austin Community. The northern border of the west side was de-
terminded by the Galena line of the Northwestern Railroad. By com-
paring the ethnic maps on page 120 with the map of Negro distribution 
on page 121, it may be seen that Polish and Italian neighborhoods 
. were unyielding borders which channeled Negro expansion as it moved 
west. The Bohemian community along Cermak Road represented the 
southern border of the Negro west side. 
The south side Negro community had extended to 99th Street 
by 1967, almost totally filling in the area between State Street 
and Cottage Grove Avenue. New expansion occurred west along 63rd 
Street to about Darnen Avenue and south bordering Halsted Street to 
g5th Street as may be seen on the map. Eastward expansion into the 
conununities of Avalon Park and South Shore was also evident. 
In a "Comparison of Racial Enrollment and Block Statistics" 
12RERC, Preliminary, pp. 70-74. 
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the Real Estate Research Corporation divided the city into three 
sections (see map on following page). In the area north of Chicago 
_Avenue an estimated 2,184 Negro students, representing 4.4 percent 
of the increase in the total elementary school city enrollment, 
entered the public schools while twenty-four city blocks were 
changing from white to non-white. In the west corridor 15,543 
Negro students, representing 31.2 percent of the total increase in 
elementary enrollment, entered the public schools while 172 blocks 
were changing. In the south section 32,081 students, representing 
64.4 percent of the total increase in elementary enrollment, en-
tered the public schools while 853 blocks were changing. From this 
data it was observed that Negro migration in the west section was 
most significant since 31.2 percent of the increase of Negro enroll-
ment occurred in the confined area in which only 16.4 percent of 
the Negro block expansion occurred.13 In the period from 1965 to 
13RERC, Preliminary, pp. 65-67. RERC, Projections, pp. vi-8, 
vi-9. The data given here is from the Preliminary Report which was 
available in December, 1967, when the busing decision was being 
made. The Projection Report was issued four months later but most 
of the conclusions were already expressed in the Preliminary Report. 
Most of the changes in the later report were updatings of statis-
tical estimates. The Projectio~ Report divided the city into four 
sections separating the south into southeast and southwest areas. 
In the later report the total non-white enrollment increase was 
lowered from 49,808 to 48,508 students. Of this 2.4 percent en-
rolled in the north section, 30.3 percent enrolled in the west 
section, 24.7 percent enr~lled in the southeast section and 
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1967 Negro enrollment in elementary schools of District Four which 
serves Austin rose from 466 to 2,786 students.14 
That this expansion was also relatively rapid may be seen by 
o~serving-on the map of Negro expansion on page 130 that Negro 
penetration into the Austin area had not reached a twenty-five 
percent ·proportion in any of the corrnnunity's neighborhoods in 1965. 
This rapid expansion westward along Madison Avenue may in part be 
explained by the strong resistance of residents of Cicero to 
nori-white penetration. Thus, geographical expansion of the Negro 
oelt-turned north and further west into Austin.15 
It is obvious from this data that a neighborhood school 
policy would result in segregated schools as neighborhoods change. 
Furthermore, static school boundaries will result in a period of 
overcrowding as change-over and piling-up occur and place great 
strain on inflexible school plants and facilities. The neighborhood 
42.6 percent enrolled in the southwest section. For this data the 
elementary school headcount statistics were used, and the high 
school enrollment was not included. 
14chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, 
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1965, 1967). Hereinafter 
referred to as Headcounts. The map of Superintendent Districts 
on page 150 shows the large area served by District Four. 
15RERC, Projections, pp. vi-6, ix-2. 
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school policy failed to meet the challenge of integration. 
Changing contiguous school boundaries had often failed to keep 
white students in changing schools. Yet altering school boundaries 
on the theory that a neighborhood may be "stabilized" during a 
period of change-over had been a major policy of the Chicago Board 
of Education. 
In 1964 the Board had adopted a statement claiming its desire 
to "increase the interracial association of students," and recog-
nizing "a responsibility to help preserve, as far as possible, 
such associations in areas where they now exist." In order to 
achieve this goal it asserted that "it is its policy to seek and 
take any possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize 
the integration of schools in neighborhoods which already have 
an interracial composition. 11 16 The difficulty with such a policy 
is that "integration" in a changing neighborhood had represented 
only a temporary stage between occupation by a white group and the 
final consolidation as a Negro neighborhood. 
Efforts of the Board to increase integration through attend-
ance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer programs, 
16Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of 
!ducation, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, October 
27, 1964), p. 542; (November 12, 1964), p. 548. Hereinafter 
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number. 
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open enrollments in vocational and technical high schools, and the 
planning of new building facilities had been evaluated in Superin-
tendent Redmond's Report as meeting "with varying degrees of sue-
SS 1117 ce . If a 15 percent criteria for integration was applied 
(used by the Chicago School System in implementing the busing plan 
of 1968), in which at least 15 ~ercent of the students are Negro 
and at least 15 percent, of the students attending the same school 
are white, then only thirty-eight Chicago elementary schools were 
integrated to this level in 1964. By 1967 twenty-five of these 
schools still fell into this category. However, the proportion 
of Negro students rose in all but four of these schools during the 
period between 1964 and 1967, although the percentage of Negro 
students increased by less than ten percent in thirteen more 
schools. 18 
17James F. Redmond, Increasing Desegregation of Facilities, 
~tudents, and Vocational Educational Educational Program, Report 
to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August 23, 1967 
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1967), p. B-4. HereinafLer referred 
to as Redmond Report. 
18Headcounts, 1964, 1967. During this period 10 percent 
attendance by one race was still being considered the basis of 
integration. In 1967 Puerto Rican students were listed separately 
in the teacher observation headcounts. It was apparent that most 
school teachers had listed Puerto Rican students under the white 
category.prior to this time. In computing the above 1967 inte-
gration data Puerto Rican students were considered as white. 
There were over four hundred elementary schools in the Chicago 
system in 1964. 
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This limited degree of success was more apparent in consid-
ering some elementary schools in the southeast area of Chicago. 
In 1965 District Twenty-two was created and three of its seven 
elementary schools fell within the fifteen percent definition of 
integration (although O'Keeffe Elementary had only 14.3 percent 
white students). By 1967 O'Keeffe Elementary had only 44 white 
students in a school body of 1198, and it was obvious that the 
other two schools were rapidly segregating (see chart next page). 
In early 1967 the Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association 
made a study of the stabilization policy of the Board of Education. 
They observed that the Negro population of the city had increased 
from 837,656 to 974,839 between 1960 and 1966. During this period 
the white population was estimated to have declined from 2,712,748 
to 2,490,043. Seyenteen of the seventy-five Chicago comrnunitLes 
were predominately white (less than 3 percent non-white). Oniy 
nine communities were identified as integrated (between 24.9 percent 
and 43.6 percent non-white), and five of these communities were 
considered markedly unstable, as the non-white percentage was 
iµcrea.sing rapidly. 19 
19Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago Region, 
"A Study of Stabilization of Integrated Schools," Chicago, April 6, 
1967, p. 5 (Mimeographed). The difference between the Real Estate 
Research Corporation's estimate of non-white population and that 
of the Parent-Teachers Association is the result of the Real Estate 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
TABLE 1 
INCREASING SEGREGATION IN SELECTED SCHOOLS 
OF SOUTHEAST SIDE OF CHICAGoa 
Total Enrollment White Negro 
Bryn Mawr Elementary--South Shore 
1114 634 385 
1207 529 666 
1209 375 799 
Annex 200 51 148 
1302 279 1005 
Annex 200 57 161 
Mann Elementary--South Chicago 
907 623 230 
1002 541 417 
1041 543 574 
1155 275 858 
O'Keeffe Elementary--South Shore 
1195 323 686 
1334 184 1101 
1380 80 1296· 
1198 44 1149 
Other 
17 
12 
35 
1 
1 
2 
12 
12 
14 
22 
10 
4 
4 
4 
aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Obser-
vation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964, 
1965, 1966, 1967, Districts Fourteen, Seventeen, Twenty-two). 
After 1965 all three were in District Twenty-two. Variations from 
total enrollment occurred as only students present on the day of 
the headcount were reported. 
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The Parent-Teacher study noted that elementary schools 
located on the border of the expanding Negro community were not 
remaining integrated. Indeed, the schools were changing in racial 
composition much faster than the neighborhoods were changing. In 
the nine integrated communities 48 percent of the schools were 
Negro, 18 percent were white and 34 percent were integrated. The 
study ~onsidered over ten percent enrollment of white or Negro 
students to be the basis of integration. Only one-half of the 
integrated schools were considered to be likely to remain inte-
grated for any length of time. As the study noted, "The school is 
. at once the 'most tender' of the community institutions in reaction 
to racial change and the most important potential instrument for 
stability. 1120 
One of the most identifiable characteristics of the unstable 
integrated school was overcrowding. In order to meet the demands 
of an enlarged student body, schools often surrendered services 
and special purpose rooms. The Parent-Teachers Association recom-
mended that every effort be made to retain and expand special 
Research Corporation's estimating an undercount of the non-whites 
in the 1960 Census and including an incremental adjustment for 
migration between 1960 and 1965. 
20 . 
Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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services in unstable integrated schools. 21 A brief description of 
two such schools may shed some light on the difficulty involved in 
attempting to use school policy to overcome socioeconomic problems 
in a community. 
In 1963 the Bryn Mawr school had 989 students of whom 80 per-
cent were white. In 1967 the school, with a branch, had 1522 stu-
dents of whom 22 percent were white. Mrs. Jeanne Junker, principal 
of the school, reported that the teacher turnover at the school 
was less than average. The curriculum had been enriched with a 
Junior Great Books course, a bi-weekly paperback book fair, a cul-
tural enrichment program, an art study program in conjunction with 
the Art Institute and an eighth grade music program. In 1970 the 
school and its two branches had 1912 students of whom 43 were white. 
At the Mann school white students represented 91.8 percent of ~he 
enrollment in 1963. By 1967 the white enrollment was only 23.3 
percent of the student body. Six classes in typing were offered. 
A humanities program in conjunction with the Art Institute and a 
Junior Great Books course were enriching the curriculum. In 1970 
the white students represented 1.1 percent of the student body. 22 
21Ibid. 
22southeast Economist (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1. 
Headcounts, 1970 (District Twenty-two). 
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The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association study, which 
appeared five months before the Redmond Report, did not mention 
busing out some of the excess enrollment as a possible means of 
stabilizing an integrated school. In December, 1967, four months 
after the Redmond Report suggested busing as one possible method 
. 
of decreasing segregation, the Real Estate Research Corporation 
observed: 
A stable balance between white and non-white population within 
the city of Chicago will occur only if nearly all future net 
non-white population growth takes place in the suburbs. At 
present the reverse is true--nearly all such growth is oc-
curring within the city .... [The] conclusion is inescapable 
that attainment of a stable population balance between white 
and non-white groups within the city of Chicago requires a 
major shift in the location of future non-white population 
growth to the suburbs .... educational policy ... must 
be directed in part at shifting future non-white population 
growth to the suburbs.23 
The Real Estate Research Corporation suggested that "one 
mechanism for encouraging such a shift would be undertaking poli-
cies that would continue the expansion of non-white residential 
areas directly toward and beyond the city limits on both the \iest 
and south sides." The report questioned the use of busing as a 
method of achieving long term racial integration. It pointed out 
.that b:using non-white students out of schools in racially changing 
23RERC, Preliminary, p. 12. 
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neighborhoods, in an attempt to stabilize the white population near 
those schools, would probably fail. Failure would occur as it 
became impossible to find white families to move into those vacan-
cies created by even a normal exodus of white families from the 
neighborhoods. 24 
' Indeed, the report argued~ 
. . . stabilization of white population in this part of the 
city [contiguous to black belt] would probably just divert non-
white population growth to one or more other parts of the 
city. In those other parts racial transition will occur 
faster than if the busing policy had not been adopted. For 
non-white population expansion must occur somewhere.25 
One undeniable factor in integration was that white students 
must continue attending a school if it was to remain integrated. 
The existence of a large parallel system of schools in Chicago 
could offer a means of "escape" from the public schools by white 
students as integration occurred. Forty-three percent of the white 
students in Chicago attended parochial schools in 1967, while only 
seven percent of the non-white students attended these schools. 
However, by 1967 the enrollment in parochial schools had dropped 
.from about one-third to around one-quarter of the combined public 
25Ibid., p. 13. Underlining in original report. 
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and parochial enrollment.26 
This drop was the result of the reduced birth rate beginning 
in 1961, the movement of Catholic families to suburban areas, 
rising costs of private education, newly imposed ceilings on class 
sizes and urban renewal projects which reduced the number of 
school age children in some neighborhoods. Furthermore, the 
expand~ng Negro population did not utilize private and parochial 
schools to the extent that other ethnic groups had in the past. 
But not all non-public schools were experiencing contraction. In 
the integrating community of South Shore private and parochial 
. schools were expanding facilities to accommodate new students while 
the white enrollment in the public schools of the community was 
dropping between 1964 and 1967.27 
The leading Negro newspaper in Chicago had been critical of 
the Superintendent of Catholic Schools in the Chicago Archdiocese 
for supporting Chicago Schools Superintendent Willis and the 
261.b1°d., 10 24 pp. ' . RERC, Projections, pp. vii-25, vii-26. 
27New World(Chicago), August 11, 1967, pp. 1, 3. Headcounts, 
1964, 1967. The South Shore Commission reported two Jewish schools, 
four Catholic schools, a Greek Orthodox school and the Faulkne~ .. 
School operating in South Shore. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color 
Gap, p. 108. South Shore was serviced by District Seventeen in 
1964. By 1965 an expansion of school districts in Chicago created 
District Twenty-two to service the South Shore Community. 
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neighborhood school policy. However, there is little to indicate 
that any leader of this Church defended segregation. Indeed, the 
Catholic Interracial Council had been critical of Willis' policies 
concerning integration and Monsignor John Egan of the Chicago 
Chancery Office had been active in supporting community organ-
izations which endorsed integration. The Interreligious Council 
on Urban Affairs had been originated by Msgr. Egan and included 
participation by representatives of the following churches: Roman 
Catholic, Episcopalian, Illinois Synod of Lutheran Churches in 
America, Presbytery of United Presbyterians, Church of the U.S.A., 
Rock River Conference of the Methodist Church, and the Jewish 
Council on Urban Affairs. It was reported that prointegration 
groups within Austin and the northwest side of Chicago received 
aid from this short-lived council.28 
Although some community organizations such as the Back of 
the Yards Council dated back to 1939, these groups tended to rise 
and fall with the development of issues within the community. The 
Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs defined a community 
28Chic~go Daily Defender, October 14, 1963, p. 11. Chicago 
Tribune, January 21, 1968, Section 10, p. 4. 
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organization as having a broad base of citizen participation rather 
than representing some vested interest. Its leaders were to be 
identified with and accepted by sub-groups within the corrnnunity, 
and its goals and programs must have been arrived at democrat-
ically. The discontentments which the organization expressed were 
to be widely shared, and the group had to be able to focus and 
channel the discontent into an organized plan of action relating 
to specific problems. This definition would exclude those groups 
which Bouma and Hoffman, in a study of school integration, warned 
would arise to use school oriented issues not from genuine concern 
. for educational problems but to serve their own power interests.29 
The fifty-one corrnnunity organizations identified on the map 
following this page consisted of numerous smaller affiliates. 
The South Shore Corrnnission, organized in 1954, claimed 3500 mem-
hers in 1967 .in a corrnnunity of 85,000 people with a large Jewish, 
Irish, and Negro population. The South East Connnunity Organization 
established in 1960, claimed 158 affiliates in a corrnnunity of 
60,000 described as Jewish, Catholic, and about one-fourth Negro 
. 
29Ipter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, Dire~to~y of 
Community Organizations in Chicago, 1967-1968 (Chicago: Inter-
Religious Council on Urban Affairs, 1967), pp. 6-9, 29 .. Ponald 
H .. Bouma and James Hoffman, The Dynamics of School Integration: 
Problems and Approaches in a Northern City (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), p. 16. 
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Council on Urban Affairs,Directorylof Community 
Chicago: Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, 
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in population. One stated goal of this organization was to elimi-
nate prejudice.30 
In the Austin community the Organization for a Better Austin 
was established in 1967. It claimed 160 affiliates serving the 
area of 126,000 predominately Greek, Jewish, Italian, and Irish 
, 
residents. About 6,000 Negroes· were estimated to have entered the 
area. The purpose of this organization was "to unite all elements 
in Austin in an organization concerned with the common problems of 
the area." To the north of Austin the Organization for the North-
west Communities had been formed in 1967. Fifty affiliates were 
said to represent the 82,300 residents who were white and predom-
inately Roman Catholic. Among the stated goals of this organi-
zatioh were neighborhood conservation and the study of city 
1 . 31 p anning. 
In March, 1967, a survey was made of participants in com-· 
munity organizations. In analyzing the result~ Bogue and McKinley 
of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee observed that 
whites who reported membership in local clubs and associations 
were not. any more likely to endorse civil rights for Negroes 
30 Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, Dir~~-t~~y, p. 30. 
3libid., pp. 21-22, 24, 30 (Quote). 
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than their non-participating neighbors. However, active members 
in Parent-Teachers Associations were significantly more likely to 
hold liberal views in their attitudes toward civil rights. In 
general, the authors concluded that active members of organizations 
tended to hold more liberal views than inactive members and non-
participants, but the chasm between white and Negro was marked, 
with a_ majority of whites interviewed opposing integration. It 
was observed that the views of "whites active in PI'A (and similar 
groups) are as far removed from the views of active Negroes as 
the mass of whites is from the mass of Negroes, for such groups 
. recruit not only disproportionate numbers of liberal whites but 
also disproportionate numbers of even more liberal Negroes. 11 32 
The rise of community organizations represented the growing 
concern of citizens with the changes occurring in their neighbor-
hoods. The attempts of these organizations to deal with change 
were bound to meet with varying degrees of success as they met 
resistance from vested interest groups and dissension within the 
community. The success of organizations such as the Woodlawn 
3.2P_onald_ J. Bogue and Richar9 McKinlay, Militancy For and 
Against Civil Rights and Integration in Chicago: Summer, 1967, 
Report Number 1 of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee, 
August, 1967 (Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1967), 
pp. 30-35 (Quote from p. 32). 
r 
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Organization and the Coordinating Council of Community Organi-
zations on the southeast side of Chicago in bringing about the 
eventual retirement of Superintendent Willis brought some hope to 
those who saw the superintendent as an obstruction to integration. 
But the fight which centered on Willis also helped to polarize 
factions within the city, and a countermovement of white resistance 
to in~egration developed. An underlying weakness of many community 
organizations was that in issues of integration there was little 
_support from the white community and much outright resistance. 
City wide organizations with members who often live in suburiJs, 
. such as the Human Relations Council and the Better Schools Com·· 
mittee, would openly support integration plans, but grassroots 
organizations often faltered. 
Thus, in the South Lynne community on the southwest side of 
Chicago, the ·community council had been severely criticized by 
Father Lawlor, a local leader of whites who had formed block clubs 
to stop Negro penetration into the area west of Ashland Avenue 
between 59th and 67th Streets. The community council was criti-
cized for not dealing effectively with panic peddlers and youth 
gangs and not stopping the decline of small business districts. 
The council was condemned for its part .in making Lindbloom High 
School a technical school. In becoming a technical school its 
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contributing area was extended further throughout the city and 
large numbers of Negro students entered the building which was 
we~t o_f Ashland. _ Within a few years the student body became 
Rredominantly Negro.33 
. Father Lawlor expressed the views of many whites regarding 
the perils of stabilization in a neighborhood when he stated, "I 
came to feel that everybody panics, nobody stays. The very root 
of the current racial crisis is the fear inspired by violence that 
occurs mostly along [racially changing areas]." He professed, "I 
do not blame this condition on the generality of the Negro popu-
lation ... for they too are victims of this violence." For 
advocates of Father Lawlor integration was "not an issue" because 
they would move if the boundary line between white and Negro was 
not held. People were experiencing a fear that control of their 
lives and their neighborhoods was not in their own hands but in 
those of "unconscionable bureaucrats. 11 34 
By _1960 the South Shore community was integrating. Germans, 
Russian Jewish, and Irish ethnic groups remained dominant with the 
33New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16. , 
Proceedings, June 26, 1963, p. 2371. 
34New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16. 
r 
! 
148 
ten percent Negro population concentrated in an area west of 
Stony Island outside of School District Twenty-two. The median 
family income for the entire census area was $7,888 but 34.1 
percent of the families were earning over $10,000. Only 21.1 
percent of the housing was owner occupied. While 2 percent of the 
housing was considered substandard, only 6.2 percent of the 
housing units had been built since 195o.35 
By utilizing the factors affecting Negro migration discerned 
by the Real Estate Research ·corporation, it could be predicted that 
South Shore was likely to undergo further transition. The white 
ethnic groups of the area were not likely to organize in open re-
sistance to Negro penetration as had occurred in South Lynne. The 
large number of rented units made white outmigration more likely. 
While housing units were not particularly low priced or substandard, 
deVise had pointed out that the Negro belt did not typically expand 
into areas of lowest quality housing. It was expanding along the 
paths of least resistance, typically into areas of middle income 
residency adjacent to the Negro belt.36 
35Factbook, p. 100-01. The Real Estate Research Corporation 
estimated that the actual non-white population of South Shore was 
about twelve percent as the census had underestimated non-white 
population. RERC, Projections, Appendix, p. 2. · 
36RERC ,_ Preliminary,~ p. 6 7. de Vise, Chicago's Widening Color 
Gap, pp. 15, 42, 66-73. 
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In December, 1967, the Real Estate Research Corporation 
observed that middle-income Negroes were moving into every section 
of South Shore in dispersed but quite substantial patterns. An 
Interuniversity Social Research Committee report estimated that 
the Negro population in the area had risen from 7,579 in 1960 to 
31,581 in 1966, representing 43.6 percent of the total community 
population. In the fall of 1965 a new school superintendent's 
district had been created to serve the schools of South Shore east 
of Stony Island Avenue, the northern tip of the South Chicago 
community and a fraction of the Avalon Park community (see map 
on following page). 37 
This new district, which had the backing of the Friends of 
the Chicago Schools Committee, was created for the expressed pur-
pose of stabilizing the integrated schools in the area. It was 
pointed out·that a special staff in the smaller new district could 
work closely with community groups, especially the South Shore 
Commission which had provided constructive leadership in the past 
and had demonstrated its willingness to work for integration. A 
special program for South Shore included reducing class sizes to 
.th.irty .st:u.dent.s a.nd saturating the curriculum with special course 
37RERC, Preliminary, pp. 9, 69-70. deVise, Chicago's Widening 
Color Gap, p. 146. Proceedings, April 15, 1965, pp. 2336, 2427-36. 
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ration, Report prepared for the Board of Education, City of Chicago, 
December, 1967, Preliminary Findings and Projections of Population 
and School Enrollments for Chicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago: 
Board of Education, 1967), p. 26A. 
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offerings and supplementary staff. 38 
A cluster plan under which the attendance areas of South 
Shore, Hirsh, and Bowen High Schools were combined had been put 
into effect in January, 1965. The purpose of this plan, suggested 
by the Havighurst Survey, was to aid stabilization by allowing 
students to choose between the three high schools. However, the 
result was that white students transferred out of predominantly 
Negro Hirsh High School into the other less integrated schools. 
In the spring of 1967 Dr. Redmond discontinued the plan. High 
school branches created in the Bradwell and Luella Schools also 
. tended to withdraw white students from the South Shore and Bowen 
High Schools as the percentage of white students was always sub-
stantially higher in the branches than in the main buildings. The 
Bradwell Branch was discontinued in 1968 and the Luella Branch 
38 . 
Proceedings, January 27, 1965, pp. 2071-72; March 25, 1965, 
p. 2325; April 15, 1965, pp. 2336, 2437-36. The Friends of the 
Chicago Schools Committee had been created in 1965 in compliance 
with a r~commendation of the Hauser Report to establish a "commit-
tee of outstanding community leaders, broadly representative of the 
city at large and biracial in composition," to work with the Board 
on problems relating: to school integration. Advisory Panel on In-
tegration of the Public Schools, Report to the Board of Edu.c.a.tio.n.,. 
City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Integration of the Public Schools--
Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, chairman (Chicago: Board of Education, 
1964}, p. 38. 
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was abandoned in 1969.39 
As representatives of the school system attempted in various 
ways to deal with the problem of stabilization, fear grew among the 
residents of South Shore. In response to complaints of a growing · 
crime rate in the area Paul Hartrich, president of the South Shore 
Corrnnunity Organization, enumerated the services available in the 
corrnnunity. Police protection had been increased and a citizens' 
radio patrol, maintained by area citizens, Negro and white, had 
been established to assist the police in law enforcement.40 Police 
statistics actually showed a decrease in the crime rate in the 
Fourth Police District which included the area to the south of 
76th Street, although the Third Police District, which included 
Woodlawn, had one of the highest crime rates in Chicago. In 
response to the influx of young families which were replacing the 
older residents in the conununity, a tenant referral service had 
been established to aid new arrivals in securing apartments. The 
South Shore Open Housing Conunittee had an expressed goal of helping 
39Headcounts, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1968, 1969 (Districts 
Fourteen, Seventeen, Twenty-two). Proceedings, August 11, 1964, 
p. 2713; February 23, 1967, p. 2560; April 12, 1967, pp. 2741-45; 
April 26, 1967, pp. 2743, 2838-40; June 28, 1967, p. 3338. 
40New World (Chicago), February 16, 1968, New Chicago Supple-
ment, p. 15; February 16, 1968, p. 5; February 23, 1968, p. 5. 
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white as well as Negro families in the area to create an integrated 
community .. With the strong influence of University of Chicago 
faculty and students residing in the area, and the numerous pro-
. 
grams aimed at stabilizing the area, South Shore might have 
appeared to be moving toward becoming one of Chicago's few inte-
grated communities. But'in 1967 Chicago sociologists had already 
classified South Shore as a slowly changing neighborhood rather 
than an integrated one.4 1 
While Mrs. W. Lydon Wild lived in South Shore, another Board 
of Education member lived in the area directly south of the 
changing community. John Carey's position as a steel union offi-
cial was directly related to the major steel companies which were 
located in the South Chicago community. In 1960 Poles and Mexicans 
were the dominant group among the foreign stock and an established 
Negro element had remained stable at about five percent of the 
population. The median family income for the entire census area 
was $6,949 with 23.2 percent of the families earning over $10,000. 
While income was relatively low, the 41 percent owner occupied 
41 .. 
Ibid. Maurice Moore and .James McKeown, A Study of Inte-
grated Living in Chicago, Report Number 4 of the Interuniversity 
Social Research Committee, December, 1968 (Chicago: Community and 
Family Study Center, 1968), p. 2. This report was prepared during 
1967. 
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housing would have indicated a degree of stability for the com-
munity, although deVise ranked the community 194th in economic rank 
among the 250 communities of the Ch~cago Metropolitan areas.42 
By 1966 it was estimated that little change had occurred in 
the percentage of Negroes in South Chicago. Negro students in 
School District Seventeen, which served the southern part of the 
commun~ty, had actually declined as the result of the creation of 
District Twenty-two in 1965. The new district then served South 
Shore and the South Chicago area north of s3rd Street. However, 
in this northern portion the Mann Elementary School showed a rapid 
,increase in Negro enrollment from 26.6 percent in 1964 to 55.1 
percent in 1966. 43 
To the west of the southern half of South Chicago lies the 
corrnnunity of Calumet Heights. In 196G Poles, Russians, and Germans 
were the leading nationalities among the foreign stock and only 
nine Negroes had been counted in the census. The median family 
income fqr the entire census area was $8,611 and the two census 
t_r_a_c,t_s __ i,n the m.i.d_dl_e of the community were above $9,000. In 
42· •.. 
Factbook, pp. 106-07. 
. . 
43deVise, Chic~go' s Widening Color Ga_E, pp. 146, 152. 
counts, 1964, 1965, 1966.(Districts Seventeen, Twenty-two). 
public elementary schools serving the community were: Mann, 
Sullivan, Coles, J. N. Tho!p, P. Sheridan. 
Head-
The 
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stability of housing Calumet Heights remained very high with 77.2 
percent of the units being owner occupied and about seventy-three 
percent of the units being single-family structures. In 1966 the 
. k d 68th . . k 250 . . community was ran e in economic ran among communities 
of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. In this year it was also esti-
mated that the Negro population of the cormnunity had advanced to 
1,224 people representing 6.2 percent of the total population. 
This increase was reflected in an increase of Negro students in 
the community's elementary schools from 67 in 1964 to 315 pupils 
in 1966. The McDowell Branch of Caldwell Elementary School, in 
the northwest corner of Calumet Heights, accounted for 269 of these 
students. 44 
To the south of Calumet Heights lies the community Qf South 
Deering. In 1960, among the numerous native born Americans, 
Yugoslavians, Russians, and Poles were the leading nationalities 
of foreign stock. In the Chicago Housing Authority's Trumbull 
Park Homes 125 Negroes represented less than one percent of the 
total corrnnunity population. The median family income for the 
en.t.i_re. ar.ea. was $7., 768 with 27 .1 percent of the families earning 
44Factb6o~, pp. 110-11. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color 
Gap, pp. 146, 154. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen). 
The public elementary schools serving the community were: Hoyne, 
McDowell, Warren, Buckingham, Earhart. 
r 
over $10,000. Only 1.8 percent of the housing units were consid-
"'"·· ered substandard and 72. 2 percent were owner occupied with about 
seventy-nine percent of the units being single family structures. 
In 1966 South Deering was ranked 174th in economic rank among 250 
communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. The Negro population 
was estimated to have dropped to 57 individuals although 59 Negro 
~tudents were counted in the community's elementary schools.45 
The Avalon Park community lies to the west of South Shore 
and the northern portion of South Chicago. In 1960 Irish and 
Germans remained the leading nationalities of foreign stock. 
Census data recorded only six Negroes. The median family income 
for the entire census area was $8,697 with 40.3 percent of the 
families earning over $10,000. Only 0.4 percent of the housing 
units were considered substandard and 74.2 percent were owner occu-
pied with about seventy percent of the units being single fami.ly 
structures, about one-fourth having been built since 1.940. In 
1966 Avalon Park was ranked 122nd in economic rank among 250 com-
munities of the Chicago Met~opolitan Area. The Negro population 
had .leaped to an estimated 3,161 and further penetration was 
45 
. , Factbook, pp. 116-17. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color 
Qal?_, pp. 146, 156. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen). 
The public elementary schools serving the community were: Anthony, 
Burnham, Goldsmith, Luella, Marsh, Bright. 
r ~ . 
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occurring. The number of Negro students in Caldwell Elementary 
school, the only Avalon Park public school in District Seventeen, 
had advanced from twenty-five in 1964 to 221 in 1966.46 
An incident occurred in Marynook, an area in Avalon Park, 
which was indicative of a serious problem in developing a school 
integration policy which would not have negative effects on the 
conununity. In the spring of 1962 a large number of Negro students 
were transferred into Avalon Park Elementary School which served 
the Marynook neighborhood. When protests against the move failed 
to change the policy, thirty white families sold their homes to 
Negro buyers within a few months and it appeared that the area 
would change over rapidly. The efforts of the local Parent-Teacher 
Association, home owners' group, and the pastor of the neighborhood 
Catholic Church helped to slow down the succession process consid-
erably, and· it was not until 1967 that the school fell below tne 
10 percent criteria for integration. However, in an attempt to 
keep white students in the school, the Board of Education was 
obliged _to make numerous changes in attendance areas and graduates 
46Factbook, pp. lb4-05. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color 
Gap, pp. 145, 155. Headcounts, 1964, 1966 (District Seventeen). 
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of the school were allowed to attend any high school. 4 7 
In reviewing the data concerning the five communities in the 
south Shore area it could be seen that most were experiencing some 
degree of new integration. South Shore and Avalon Park were 
changing rapidly as the black belt reached the community borders 
, 
and advanced phalanx-like into· the areas. Calumet Heights was 
beginning to change. The northern portion of South Chicago, bor-
dering on South Shore was integrating. Only South Deering, still 
somewhat remote from the expanding belt, was apparently stable. 
On the northwest side of Chicago the western arm of the black 
belt was advancing into the Austin area. Situated on the western 
edge of Chicago, this community extended from Fullerton Avenue 
(2400 North) at its northern tip to Roosevelt Road (1300 South) 
at its souttern edge with Kolmar Avenue (4500 West) and the Chicago 
and Northwestern Railroad tracks as its eastern border. The 
extreme length and size of this community with its 125,133 resi-
dents counted in the 1960 census made generalizations hazardous, 
but if the five northern census tracts were excluded, no census 
tract p.r.ea varied more than $771 from the median family income of 
47Moore ?-nd McKeown, A Study of Integrated Living in Chicago, 
pp. 54-55. Headcounts, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966 (District Sixteen 
and after 1964, District Twenty-seven). Chicago Sun-Times, June 19, 
1965, p. 3. Proceedings, June 16, 1967, pp. 3247-48, 3270. 
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$7,602 for the entire census area and 27.4 percent of the families 
earned over $10,000. Only 37.7 percent of the housing units were 
owner occupied and 4 percent were judged substandard while three 
of the four tracts directly south of Ohio Avenue (600 north) varied 
from 11.6 percent to 21.6 percent substandard units with owner 
occupancy as low as 22.3 percent. The census counted thirty-one 
. h . 48 Negroes in t e community. 
In 1966 Austin ranked 104th among the 250 communities of the 
Chicago Metropolitan Area. It was estimated that 774 Negroes lived 
in the community in April, 1966, but 1,995 Negro students were 
counted in the area high school and elementary schools in October, 
1966. The Real Estate Research Corporation pointed out that 
resistance to Negro movement in the nearby areas of South Lawndale, 
Cicero, and Humboldt Park had intensified penetration into. Austin, 
and an annual transition rate of thirty-six blocks occurred between 
1964 and. 1967. In 1964 only the May and Young Elementary Schools 
were integrated above the 10 percent criteria. By 1966 the May and 
Spencer schools were over fifty percent Negro (see chart on next 
page). The Young School, in the northeast corner of the community, 
:rema.in~P. stp.bi.li.z.ed at near 10 percent for the entire decade of 
48 Factbook, pp. 64-65. 
TABLE 2 
INTEGRATION IN SELECTED SCHOOLS 
OF THE AUSTIN COMMUN IT Ya 
Year Total Enrollment White 
May Elementary 
1964 847 571 
1965 917, 575 
1966 1035 400 
1967 1559 244b 
Spencer Elementary 
1964 971 936 
1965 1116 870 
1966 1304 592 
1967 1325 227c 
Young Elementary 
1964 757 585 
1965 797 704 
1966 798 685 
1967 845 729d 
Negro 
184 
259 
597 
1308 
0 
103 
694 
1091 
74 
91 
104 
112 
Other 
12 
19 
38 
41 
7 
L~9 
18 
7 
0 
2 
9 
4 
aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Obser-
vation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964, 
1965, 1966, 1967, District Four). Variations from total enrollment 
occurred as only students present on the day of the headcount were 
reported. 
Puerto iican Students Included in White Students Count 
b41 students C69 students dg students 
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1960. This was because Negro migration continued west and south 
into Austin rather than northward.49 
In April, 1967, the Interuniversity Social Research Committee 
sent interviewers into the Austin area to poll white residents on 
attitudes toward integration. Over one-half of the people ques-
tioned in the sampling were Roman Catholic, about one-third were 
Protestant and less than two percent were Jewish. In ethnic back-
ground one-third were of British, German, or Scandinavian descent, 
about one-third were Irish and less than one-fifth were Italian. 
The remainder were of Polish or other central and eastern European 
.ancestry. Two-fifths had lived in Austin over ten years while 
about one-fourth lived in the community two years or less. Mem-
bership in church related clubs was claimed by about one-fourth of 
the interviewees. Another 17 percent were members of parent-
teachers associations. Only eighteen of the approximately 198 
people a,nswering questions claimed membership in neighborhood 
improvem~nt 4r block clubs. Active membership in these organi-
aztions was not ascertained . Thirty-seven percent had school-age 
. . . . 4_99eVise, Chicago's Widening Color Ga£, pp. 145, 152. , RERC, 
ProjectionsL pp. x-1, x-2. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four). 
444 Negro students in special schools for the handicapped have 
not been counted. 
r 
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children.SO 
Austinites expressed great concern about conditions in the 
community. Although 87 percent considered their neighborhood a 
good place to live, 27 percent considered the immediate area as 
dangerous and 58 percent felt their area would be worse in the 
future. About two-thirds thought Austin would be integrated 
within five years and another 17 percent saw the community as 
probably all Negro within this period. Nearly one-half of the 
survey respondents living in integrated blocks said they were 
against Negroes living there. In all-white blocks 29 percent 
expressed opposition to integration of their neighborhood and 
only 5 percent said they would favor integration. Almost one-
half of the interviewees said they intended to move within the 
-, 
next two y\ars although 39 percent said they would not move . .) ... 
When compared to two other Chicago communities and two 
suburban areas which were surveyed, Austinites rated their schools 
"poor" far more frequently. It was ascertained that this dissat-
.isfaction was associated with the number of Negroes in the local 
..... 
5?Richard McKinlay and Ethyl Shanas, Austin: Civ:i·l Rights 
and Integration in a Chica£$o Community, Report Number 3 of the 
Interuniversity Social Research Committee, August, 1968 (Chicago: 
Community and Family Study Center, 1968), pp. 1-10. 
52ibld., pp. 10-20. 
r 
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school. While only 8.7 percent of the Austinites with no Negroes 
in their school rated the schools "poor", 31.8 percent of the 
respondents in areas with over one-half Negro enrollment considered 
their schools to be substandard. The most frequent specific com-
plaints were that schools were overcrowded (21.8 percent) and "too 
much integration" (16.7 percent). When questioned if white and 
Negro students should attend the same schools, almost seventy per-
cent said they should, but 23.3 percent favored different schools. 
Regarding the degree of integration 54.1 percent of the respond-
ents would not object if the school planned to make each classroom 
one-fou,th Negro. When the planned integration was to be one-half 
Negro, those not objecting dropped to 40.2 percent of the 
A . • 52 ustinites. 
All i~dicators in Austin pointed to a rapid succession 
through the invasion and consolidation stages in the southern 
portions. The area was situated directly in the path of the 
we.stern expansion of the Negro belt. It could be estimated that 
52oavid Street, Race and Education in the City: Findings 
on Chicago, Report Number 5 of the Interuniversity Social Research 
Committee, January, 1969 (Chicago: Community and Family Study 
Center, 1969), pp. 5-9. The other communities surveyed were: 
Ashburn, Rogers Park, Elmhurst, River Forest. 
r 
r 
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over 5000 whites had left the community between 1960 and 1966.53 
Almost one-half of the whites interviewed intended to move within 
two years. The large number of apartment units made mobility 
easier. The composition of ethnic groups was not likely to pro-
duce any organized resistance to penetration. Reports of panic 
peddling and blockbusting by real estate agents had been registered 
with the Chicago Council on Human Relations, and disturbances with 
racial overtones plagued Austin High School.54 
The community of Belmont-Cragin was directly north of Austin, 
being s\parated by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad 
tracks. In 1960 Poles remained the largest foreign stock group 
with Italians and Germans representing the other leading nation·-
alities. Only three Negroes were counted in the community of 
60,883 persons. The median family income for the entire area was 
$7,547 and 25.8 percent of the famili.es earned over $10,000. Over 
53deVise, pp. 143, 145. McKinlay and Shanas, Austin: Civil 
Rights and Integration in a Chicago Community, p. 4. The decline 
in white.population was computed by adding the estimated increase 
in Negro population in Austin between 1960 and 1966 to the esti-
mated decrease in total population between 1960 and 1966 and re-
ducing the sum by 30 percent to account for white replacement as 
indicated by the McKinlay and Shanas survey in which 29.9 percent of 
the interviewees had lived in the area for less than six years. 
54~hicago Daily Defender, October 29, 1965, p. 4. Chicago 
Sun-Times, December 8, 1965, pp. 1, 48. 
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one-half of the housing units were owner occupied. By 1966 it was 
estimated that 349 Negroes lived in the community but no Negro 
students attended the two public schools in District Four, which 
served the western half of the area. Belmont-Cragin was placed 
118th in economic rank among the 250 communities in the Chicago 
Metropolitan Area.SS 
The small community of Montclare was situated directly west 
of Belmont-Cragin. In 1960 Italians and Poles were the leading 
ethnic groups. Only one Negro was counted in the census among 
11,802 r\sidents of the area. The median family income was $7,843 
with 28.3 percent earning over $10,000. Almost two-thirds of the 
housing units were owner occupied. In 1966 fifteen Negroes were 
estimated to be living in the community but no Negro students were 
counted in the Locke School which served the area. The economic 
rank of Montclare was 107th among the 250 communities in the 
Chicago Metropolitan Area.56 
The community of Dunning ran west from Austin Avenue to 
Pontiac and Cumberland Avenues. It was bounded by Belmont Avenue 
SSFactbook, pp. 52-53. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap, 
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four). 
56Factbook, pp. 50-51. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap, 
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four). 
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on the south and Irving Park Road on the north. Poles and Germans 
were the leading ethnic group, but large numbers of Italians were 
moving into the area in 1960. Two Negroes were counted in the 
census among 41,626 inhabitants. Median family income was $7,953 
with 30.8 percent earning over $10,000. Four-fifths of the housing 
units were owner occupied. In 1966 twenty-one Negroes were esti-
mated to be living in the community, but no Negro students were 
counted in the three schools and one branch serving the area. 
Dunnin7was placed 76th in economic rank among the 250 communities 
in the Chicago Metropolitan Area..57 
Portage Park Community was directly east of Dunning and only 
its four western census tracts were in the School District Four 
area. Poles, Germans, and Italians were the leading foreign stock 
in 1960. Seventeen Negroes were listed in the census among 65,925 
inhabitants, _of which 24, 903 lived in the four western tracts. 
The median income in the western section varied from $7,210 to 
$8,532 w~th the percentage earning over $10,000 ranging from 23.1 
percent to 33.8 percent. About seven-tenths of the housing units 
in the western area were owner occupied. In 1966 an estimated 140 
Negroes lived in the community, but no Negro students were counted 
57Factbook, pp. 48-49. deVise, Chicago's Wid~ning Color Gap, 
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four). 
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in the 0. A. Thorp and Smyser Schools which were in District 
58 Four. 
These four communities to the north of Austin were well above 
the main movement of Negro expansion. They were not integrated, 
nor were they likely to experience integration in the next decade. 
While no studies had been made ·regarding attitudes toward inte-
gration, ~he large number of residents of central and southern 
European background indicated that some resistance to penetration 
might be expected, but the question would indeed be academic. The 
integration of schools in these areas would not be the result of 
integrating communities. 
In the meantime, the schools in southern Austin were rapidly 
resegregating. By June, 1967, the North Side Boundary Committee 
of the Chicago Board of Education had been working for months with 
representatives of the Austin community to reduce overcrowding at 
the Spencer School. It was reported that "many pla~s have been 
considered and eliminated because of certain elements in the plan 
or because of rejection by a significant section of the community." 
Consideration was given to transferring 1400 students among most 
of the schools in Austin south of North Avenue to relieve 
58Factbook, pp. 43-44. deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap, 
pp. 145, 151. Headcounts~ 1966 (District Four). 
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overcrowding. This plan was abandoned because of the magnitude of 
numbers of students being transferred. Instead, a plan for moving 
288 students from the Spencer to the Hay Elementary School was 
--------
considered. An attempt to stabilize a school by moving students 
to another school in a nearby area was very unlikely to solve any 
problems. As integration of the second school occurred, white 
parents were likely to withdraw their children and sell their homes 
to Negroes as had happened in Marynook. A plan to stabilize 
schools without causing further segregation was needed. It would 
have to be found soon. As the Real Estate Research Corporation 
observed, when considering the exodus of whites from Chicago, "Any 
policies aimed at achieving racially integrated education by 
stabilizing the racial balance in public schools must take effect 
almost immediately. 11 59 
59Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3310-11, 3339 (First 
quote). RERC, Preliminary, p. 14 (Second quote). 
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CHAPTER V 
-rN'TELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS: 
A PLAN EMERGES 
Negro community spokesmen hailed the departure of Benjamin 
Willis from the Chicago S~hool Superintendency as "positive in 
itself and ending an era which was marked by a vigorous defense 
of the racial status quo." However, they held reservations about 
the ability of Superintendent Redmond to alter "the same social, 
political and economic forces that have successfully maintained 
the racial status quo [which] will continue operating inside and 
outside of the Chicago School system." As a yardstick against 
which future progress in school desegregation could be measured, 
it was pointed out that over 90 percent of Negroes in public 
elementary programs were in racially segregated schools in 1966. 
In high schools over 71 percent of the Negro students were racially 
segregated. At the same time almost 76 percent of white children· 
on the elementary level and about 69 percent of white pupils at 
the secondary level attended public schools in which less than 
170 
10 percent of a minority group were present.l 
Certainly Redmond would not be able to alter these statistics 
without the backing of his policy-making Board. Two incidents may 
reflect the difficulty he would encounter in obtaining any con-
sensus from this body on matters of integration. 
' 
In January, 1967, the United States Office of Education 
released a report criticizing the segregation in the Chicago 
Public Schools. A liberal Board member, pointing out the diffi-
culty of initiating integration policies in a city which was 
residentially segregated, complained that "discriminatory practices 
by city landlords, lending institutions, and real estate brokers 
have accentuated the residential confinement of Negroes." Even 
the F~deral Housing Authority had been responsible for increasing 
segregation 0y choosing housing project sites in all-black areas. 
At this time a movement to prohibit discriminatory practices in 
housing was underway in the state. In May the Board unanimously 
supported a resolution to pass a meaningful fair housing law. 
1Harold M. Baron, Racial Segregation in the Chicago Public 
Schools, 1965-1966, A pamphlet prepared by the Research Department 
of the Chicago Urban League, September 20, 1966 (Chicago: Urban 
League, 1966), pp. 1 (First and second quotes), 6-9, 18. The 
Urban League used the 10 percent guideline to define segregation. 
The statistics were based on an elaborate analysis of the racial 
headcount taken in the Chicago Public Schools by teachers. 
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In Chicago, "Project Good Neighbor" had been initiated by the 
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities to disseminate 
information on integration. But when Redmond requested that the 
Board grant permission to distribute Council leaflets dealing wit~ 
fair housing questions in the schools, the Board denied the request 
in a five to four vote. Apparently a majority of Board members 
were willing to endorse principles but did not wish to involve the 
school system in any controversy in the communities regarding these 
principles. 2 
Another incident indicates the growing inclination of the 
Board to disregard recommendations from the superintendent. The 
Caldwell Elementary School in Avalon Park was about 30 percent 
Negro in October, 1966, and the growing number of black students 
was seen as a threat to the stability of the school. In ordei to 
alleviate fears of white residents and stabilize the racial mixture 
at the school, the superintendent recommended that a number of 
bl~ck students be transferred to the almost all-white Warren 
Elementary School further south in Chicago Heights. The plan was 
2u.s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of 
Office of Education, "Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public 
Schools Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, January, 
1967" (Washington, D.C.: ERIC Microfilms, June 21, 1968), ED015969. 
Chicago Daily News, February 20, 1967, p. 3 (Quote). Chicago 
Sun-Times, May 25, 1967, p. 3. 
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rejected by the Board in a seven to one vote, on the grounds 
that the students at the Caldwell School did not want to transfer. 
When Redmond requested that the matter be referred back to the 
Board South Side Boundaries Committee, Mrs. Wild replied, "Doctor, 
we've had all that. 113 
Changes were made in the administration of the permissive 
transfer program. In February, 1967, Redmond commented: 
While relieving overcrowding in some high schools the per-
missive transfer program has also had a marked effect on 
integration. Despite housing patterns only four high schools 
have no Negro pupils enrolled; two far Northside high schools 
have an enrollment of more than 10 percent Negro students as 
a result of the permissive transfer programs. In some schools, 
however, white children taking advantage of the permissive 
transfer plan have endangered integration as the percentage 
of white versus Negro students decreased sharply. In order 
to prevent resegregation and to contribute to the stabili-
zation of communities, eight integrated schools should be 
eliminated from any list of sending or receiving schools.4 
In accordance with this observation six high schools had 
been dropped from the transfer program in 1966. In the spring of 
1967 Austin and South Shore High Schools, in rapidly changing 
3Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, 
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1966, 1967, District 
Seventeen). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. Chicago 
Sun-Times, January 17, 1967, p. 14. 
4Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board 
of Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, 
February 23, 1967), p. 2560. Hereinafter referred to as 
Proceedings, date of meet~ng, page number. 
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connnunities, were also withdrawn from the list of sending schools.5 
But the Board did allow an exception. At a public hearing 
on the permissive transfer program held in April, 1967, the room 
was packed with protestors from Bogan High School on the southwest 
side of Chicago. These people complained of the Board's "under-
handed and tyrannical tactics in making decisions without con-
sulting the community," and threatened to "meet with total oppo-
sition any plan that even in the smallest way jeopardizes the 
peighborhood schools." They warned that any attempt to allow 
outside students to transfer to Bogan would cause white parents 
· to run to the suburbs. In the face of this opposition the Board 
dropped Bogan from the list of receiving schools. It was con-
tended that by withdrawing its branches back to the main building 
the school would be at the city-wide average of facility utili-
zation. This capacity ratio was determined by comparing the 
·number of students in a school to its facilities. If the ratio 
was above the city average, the students at the school qualified 
5Proceedings, February 23, 1967, p. 1560; April 12, 1967, 
pp. 2837-2838. James F. Redmond, Increasing Desegregation of 
Faculties, Students and Vocational Education Programs, Report to 
the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August 23, 1967 (Chicago: 
Board of Education, 1967), pp. B-4, B-5. Hereinafter referred to 
as Redmond Report. Also see above chapter iii, pp. 83-84. The 
excluded high schools were Austin, South Sho~e, Waller, Harper, 
Calumet, _Morgan Park, Harrison and Tilden. 
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to transfer to other schools which were below the city average.6 
When Warren Bacon, an outspoken Board member who advocated 
desegregation policies, was asked if Bogan should be forcefully 
integrated, he replied, "No they are living in the nineteenth 
century. Perhaps in another century or two they might catch up 
to modern day thinking .... I think we have enough schools in 
Chicago where we can move ahead positively without bothering with 
Bogan."7 
Not all integrationists agreed. The vice president of the 
Organization for the Southwest Community asked that Bogan be put 
. back on the transfer list and stated, ''We are shocked at the 
Board's capitulation to the local pressure of Bogan property 
owners' leaders on the issue of desegregation." Representatives 
of Mather and Sullivan High Schools on the far north side of the 
city also expressed their support of the transfer program.8 
6proceedings, March 22, 196l, p. 2671; April 12, 1967, pp. 
2740-42~ 2837-38. Chicago Sun-Times, April 13, 1967, p. 8 
(Quotes). The ratio was based on assuming the school had a nine 
period day and then computing overcrowding on the basis of how 
many students the school was built to hold. The city-wide average 
was 132.1 percent more students than the capacity of all the 
schools. If a school exceeded this percentage, it was a receiving 
school. 
7chicago Sun-Times, April 13, 1967, p. 8. 
Brbid. 
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Obviously, any choice of communities for purposes of inte-
gration would hav~ to consider the hostility of the residents 
and the effect this would have on the program. Cognizant of the 
vast differences between connnunities within the city, Redmond 
called for more experimentation within a more decentralized 
school system. He identified three distinct major areas of con-
cern ~mong the vast ghetto areas, the fringe middle class areas 
and the peripheral areas of the city "where communities know 
neither integration nor crowding nor lack of opportunity and where 
city-wide techniques for sociological change have been questioned. 11 9 
Redmond saw the need for a saturation of all areas with 
innovative skills, services and programs. He emphasized building 
programs and facility development to help stabilize existing 
integrated neighborhoods and "make possible experiences of multi-
racial, multi-cultural education" by building "ahead, not behind 
·the movement of people." The schools had to be made more at-
tractive if they were to be a factor in a city-wide plan to sta-
bilize neighborhoods and provide for future growth. The need for 
programs to reduce class sizes, introduce innovative teaching 
9James F. Redmond, "Chicago Schools: Problems and Perspec-
tives" (Speech delivered at University of Chicago, Chicago, 
Illinois, December 6, 1966). (Typewritten copy). 
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techniques, and provide better working conditions for teachers 
was reiterated by the new superintendent. 10 
In January, 1967, the Chicago School Superintendent had a 
more specific set of problems placed before him by the federal 
government. The United States Office of Education presented to 
the Chicago Board a brief of complaints about segregation in the 
schoo~ system which had been garnered over the prior few years. 
Special attention was paid to the segregation of faculty through 
assignment patterns, questionable boundary and student placement 
patterns, the lack of non-white students in the apprenticeship 
. training program, and the development of open enrollment for 
vacational and trade schools.11 In April, 1967, with a government: 
grant, the Chicago School staff and advisors began to consider 
school desegregation policies which would remedy the problems 
presented in·the government's complaint. 
The Redmond Report, as the Chicago School response came to 
be called, admitted the segregation of the school system in the 
four aforementioned areas. It went on to complain that the 
lOibid. 
llu.s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of 
Office of Education, "Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public 
Schools Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, January, 
1967" (Washington D.C.: ~RIC Microfilms, June 21, 1968), ED015969. 
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Chicago system did not have the necessary staff to explain planned 
changes in order to gain necessary public support and called for 
more sophisticated communication and the development of a community 
relations department. The report emphasized that "people are not 
going to accept and support what they do not understand or believe 
in."12 
Regarding desegregation, the report observed that the task 
of obtaining quality and integrated education was made formidable 
by the large influx of children from rural families who had "suf-
fered every form of deprivation." This influx had also resulted 
in a rapid increase of minority children as compared with the 
percentage of white children in the schools. This change in 
population "in large measure, reflects residential changes within 
the city which have been a cause for serious concern by those 
responsible or deeply interested in the future of Chicago." The 
report quoted the Chicago Region, Illinois Congress of Parents 
and Teachers statement that "unless this trend is reversed the 
city will continue to find its problems and expenses multiplying 
at the same time that its resources and tax base decline." Thus, 
the report summarized its major problem as "achieving extended 
12'Redmond Report, pp. 1, A-3, B-16, C-5, D-7, D-8 (Quote), 
D-9--D-25. 
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integration while at the same time stabilizing the city through 
reassurances to the white community. 11 13 
In considering the implementation of school desegregation, 
plan consultants brought in from outside the school system agreed 
that the immediate short range goal must be to anchor the whites 
that still resided in the city. The major problem was seen to be 
in fringe areas which were undergoing racial change. White people 
in these fringe areas were generally ''less secure economically and 
~:;ocially than their middle class counterparts" who lived on the 
periphery of the city. Much of the "integration" which city offi-
. cials had calculated existed in fringe areas which would soon be-
come black segregated areas. Attempts to integrate schools by 
changing boundary lines in fringe areas often hasten~d the white 
exodus. The consultants observed, "There is little reason in pre-
cedent for whites to believe that the school and neighborhood will 
remain integrated, and white perception of the situation is the 
determining factor in the consecutive resegregation of 
13rbid., pp. B-3 (First quote), B-4 (Second, third quote), 
B-5 (Fourth quote). 
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neighborhoods. 11 14 
The consultants concluded that while the fringe areas should 
be integrated, it was imperative that policy makers "avoid forcing 
the extreme pressures of school integration exclusively upon such 
vulnerable neighborhoods." To alleviate the pressure it was sug-
gested that school administrators limit the minority percentage 
intro4uced into fringe schools and shift some of this pressure into 
more remote and unthreatened neighborhoods. While the committee 
was divided, it was suggested that Negro students be assigned, 
without choice, in transfers from their neighborhood. school to a 
. remote receiving school. This position was taken because of the 
historical fact that few Negroes transferred when a choice remained 
open to them. Because of the possibility of Negro rejection of the 
imposition of a compulsory plan and the apprehension that parents 
in the sending areas might have, the recommending committee was 
unable to present a unanimous report.15 
In- selecting receiving schools it was suggested that criteria 
14Ibid., pp. B-15, B-16, B-17 (First quote), B-18, B-19 
(Second quote). John E. Coons, Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University, was one member of the panel who had been an outspoken 
critic of the lack of a positive integration policy in the 
Chicago Schools. 
15rbid., pp. B-19 {Quote), B-20. 
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include non-threatened areas of somewhat higher income families in 
single residence homes relatively distant from the sending area. 
If schools in the receiving area did not have sufficient space for 
new students, it was recommended that mobiles and additions be 
used. To maintain a stable racial proportion in the schools, a 
quota system was endorsed as "the only feasible short range approach 
that will anchor sufficient members [numbers] of whites to make 
meaningful integration even a long range possibility. 11 16 
In specific plans the Redmond Report introduced some impor-
tant innovations in Chicago school policy. In a union of inte-
gration and stabilization policy, it called upon the entire white 
community to share in the responsibility for integration by main-
taining fixed racial proportions in the schools. In fringe area 
schools which were already experiencing integration, it was 
recommended.that the number of minority students be limited to a 
"viable racial balance." In order to keep this viable balance it 
would be necessary to transfer some minority students living in 
the racially changing school attendance area to other schools which 
were not threatened by racial inundation. It was suggested that 
geographic blocks which were predominantly Negro within the 
16Ibid., p. B-21. 
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integrated school attendance area be selected, and the pupils in 
these blocks be assigned to schools in non-adjacent areas of the 
city where integration would result. Transportation would be 
provided with adult supervision on the buses between the sending 
and receiving schools.17 
In order to minimize opposition and allay any fears which 
might result in white flight from the receiving area, it was 
recommended that the number of students allowed to transfer from 
a sending school should be limited to not more than 15 percent 
of the total student body in a receiving elementary school. As 
students from non-contiguous attendance areas would also be 
eligible to attend the high school of the receiving school, it 
I 
was recommended that this number be limited to 25 percent of the 
total student body in the high school. Provision was also to be 
made for additional educational staff and services to meet the 
needs of the newly enrolled pupils. The staffs of the rec·eiving 
school were to be given in-service education in human relations.18 
Besides the non-contiguous assignment program, an intra-
community pilot program was recommended in which the racial 
17Ibid., pp. B-6, B-7. 
lSibid., pp. B-7, B-17. 
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percentages in selected schools of one area of the city would be 
equalized. The transfer of students between these intra-community 
school3 would also require the busing of pupils. The non-con-
tiguous and intra-community programs represented the two most novel 
plans for the Chicago schools. They were considered "short-term" 
recommendations, policies which could be put into effect within 
three years. 19 
Other short term recommendations included: a continuation 
of the voluntary permissive transfer program; continuation of the 
examination of school attendance areas with racial integration as 
a factor to consider in establishing attendance boundaries; se-
lection of school sites in accordance with the Armstrong Act which 
required that integration be considered; development of cooperative 
programs with private and suburban school systems. A magnet school 
offering superior instruction and programs in integrated classrooms 
and drawing from a city-wide area was proposed for an intermediate 
term objective, to be implemented within three to seven years. A 
long range plan called for a feasibility study on the possibility 
of establishing educational parks. 20 
When the Redmond Report was presented to the Board it was 
l9Ibid., p. B-8. ZOibid., p. B-21. 
r 
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accepted by a ten to one vote. Judge Scheffler abstained on the 
grounds that acceptance involved the Board in making commitments 
it could not keep. He further contended that establishing racial 
quotas was illegal. Scheffler also complained that the Report made 
no cost ~rejections. It was reported that the study deliberately 
avoided considering costs in order to keep the Board from becoming 
involved in arguments about whether it could afford the proposals. 21 
Board President Whiston accepted the Report in principle but 
reminded everyone that the Board members did not promise to 
authorize every specific proposal. He pointed out that meetings 
would have to be set up with Mayor Daley as the "plan affects the 
public and public finances to such a great degree that the mayor 
is certain to be interested in it." Mrs. Green and Mrs. Wild also 
had reservations about particulars in the Report and Mrs. Wild was 
concerned with the lack of funds for any immediate implementation.22 
Board Vice-President Murray observed that the Report appeared 
to end the neighborhood school concept, but concluded that the 
21Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534. Chicago Sun-Times, 
August 24, 1967, pp. 1, 4; August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago 
Dally News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. 
22Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 524 (Quote). Chicago 
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. Chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 
1967, pp. 1, 4 . 
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recommendations are "proper and right and should be implemented as 
soon as possible." Mrs. Malis felt the plan should be implemented 
immediately in light of racial change occurring in Austin, Lake 
View, Lincoln Park and South Shore communities. She, however, did_ 
later express doubts about forcing children to bus on a nonvoluntary 
basis. Redmond stated that in drawing up the Report "we didn't 
back away from things because someone thought they might conflict 
with law. 1123 
Although the plan designated no specific areas, opposition 
to it was widespread in the peripheral areas of the city. An 
Illinois Senator from the southwest side promised to meet with 
other politicians to stop the Report from being implemented. While 
protests were especially strong in the Bogan High School area, the 
Kilbourn O~ganization of the northwest side and Operation CreJcent, 
a suburban based group, were vocal in their opposition.24 
Representatives of the Negro community also found fault with 
the Report. Al Raby of the Coordinating Council of Community 
Organizations was opposed to the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro 
23Proceedings, August 27, 1967, p. 534. Chicago Sun-Times, 
August 24, 1967, pp. 1, 4; August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago 
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. 
24Chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 1967, p. 3. 
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children and implying "that a black Chicago would be undesirable 
and that Negroes will always be underpaid." Raby had been influ-
ential in stopping government funding in 1965 and again tttreatened 
to ask the government to withhold its support. While the Chicago. 
Urban League praised the Report, by November, 1967, it was demanding 
that a clear statement of priorities be issued along with a time-
table for implementing the major features. The Urban League showed 
more concern that education in the ghetto be improved and the 
intermediate range magnet schools and long range educational parks 
be developed than in the busing proposal. Indeed, one Negro news-
paper was emphasizing that quality education in already integrated 
schools would be most effective. The Negro press displayed no 
great enthusiasm for busing to integrate in the period of 1967 
following the Redmond Report.25 
The Catholic press reflected the mixed feelings which Church 
members had toward the Report. In one article entitled, "Redmond 
Plan met with 'cautious' enthusiasm by Catholic educators," James 
25chicago Daily News, September 11, 1967, p. 34 {Quote). 
Above, p. 109. Chicago .Daily Defender, November 28, 1967, p. 8; 
December 5, 1967, p. 13. In late December, 1967, the Chicago 
Daily Defender did carry a series on the Educational Park concept 
which articles described as the "most specific proposal being dis-
cussed today . . . in keeping with the principles of integration 
and quality education." Chicago Daily Defender, December 18, 
1967, p. 6. 
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McDermott of the Catholic Interracial Council supported the plan 
arguing, "it gives the changing neighborhood a fighting chance for 
establishing interracial stability," and the quota plan was seen 
as an "opportunity for further interracial contact and not as some-: 
thing devised as a barrier impeding integration." However, other 
spokesmen felt the plan "writes off the present children in the 
inner city" by not emphasizing programs to alleviate their plight. 
Fr. Mallette, a pri:est in an inner city parish criticized the plan 
for not considering the growing demand for local control of neigh-
borhood institutions, and Rev. John T. Richardson, the executive 
vice-president of DePaul University of Chicag~ pointed out that 
the "plan could be dangerous if it engendered the feeling that our 
education system alone could solve our racial problem. 11 26 
Despite complaints that the Redmond Report was not being 
implemented,· and even an announcement by an assistant superin-
tendent of Chicago Schools that busing would probably not begin 
until September, 1968, work was in progress during the surmner of 
26New World (Chicago), September 1, 1967, pp. 1-2. The 
Redmond Report did recognize the plight of ghetto children and 
recommended that a "purely voluntary transfer plan be available" 
to them. Observing that "few families will avail themselves of 
the opportunity," the authors postulated that the offer would have 
"symbolic importance. It would suggest that the interests of the 
Negro child in the ghetto have not been subordinated to an all-
encompassing policy of neighborhood stabilization." Redmond 
g_eport, p. B-21. 
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1967. United States Senator Dirksen of Illinois was considering 
submitting a proposal in Congress to forbid the use of federal 
funds to achieve racial integration by busing. School officials, 
however, felt $5p0,000 could be obtained under the Civil Rights 
Act to bus Negro children out of fringe areas where the racial 
balance of schools had been upset and an exodus of white families 
was threatened.27 
Funds would be an issue in the busing program, but, as John 
Coons had observed in a civil rights report in 1961, paid trans-
portation was critical to the success of any transfer program. 
Another caveat not so easily observed was that transfer students 
should be carefully screened to avoid sending children from cul-
turally deprived backgrounds into an area where their poor social 
attitudes, preparation and interests might confirm stereotypes. 28 
However, as the plan developed this problem tended to resolve 
itself. 
27chicago Sun-Times, August 25, 1967, pp. 3, 19. Chicago 
Daily News, August 25, 1967, p. 6. Chicago Daily Defender, 
December 7, 1967, p. 17. 
28John E. Coons, "Chicago," Civil Rights U.S.A.: Public 
Schools Cities in the North and West, 1962, A Report to the United 
Stated Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Off°ice, 1962), pp. 232-
33. Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case Study 
(Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), p. 20. 
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Another problem rested in the lack of any accepted guidelines 
defining racial imbalance. Neither the courts nor the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act had set any fixed ratio as the basis for an integrated 
school. Adam Clayton Powell had suggested a "community ratio" 
which would allow only a 20 percent deviation from the ratio in 
the community. Obviously, the committee which drew up the busing 
plan for the Redmond Report considered the community ratio to be 
untenable for the city in which over 50 percent of the public 
school students were Negro.29 The 15 percent quota for elementary 
schools and 25 percent quota for high schools appears to be an 
arbitrary figure chosen on the basis that it would not create 
undue unrest ~n segregated white areas marked for integration. 
Other cities had initiated busing programs prior to the 
Chicago plan. A questionnaire was sent out by the Chicago admin-
istration to 128 cities asking reasons for busing, details about 
how it was carried out and an evaluation of the success of the 
program. Of the 104 cities which replied, about three-fourths 
were busing students other than the handicapped. The most common 
reason given for transporting students was t.hat they lived beyond 
29James Bolner, "Defining Racial Imbalance in Public Educa-
tional Institutions," Journal of Negro Education, XXXVII (Spring, 
1968), 118. Northwest Times(Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 1. 
Headcounts, 1967. 
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a given distance from the school. However, twenty-eight systems 
listed overcrowding as a factor, twenty-nine systems listed inte-
gration as a purpose and another eleven gave the improvement of 
the educational program as a goal. A surprisingly few students 
were being bused--about 20,000 in all the replying cities.30 
It was often difficult to relate many aspects of these other 
busing programs to the particular problems of Chicago. The 
Evanston, Illinois plan, mentioned frequently during the busing 
decision controversy in Chicago is a good illustration. Located 
just north of Chicago, this community of about 80,000 population 
differed considerably from Chicago in social and economic status 
as well as ethnic composition. With about one-fourth of its 
population contained in a Negro ghetto near the g~ographic center 
of the relatively compact suburb, it was not difficult to adjust 
boundaries and bus students in a two-way plan to achieve inte-
gration. Nonetheless, the implementation of the plan had taken 
30Francis B. McKeag, past Assistant Superintendent, School 
Planning, Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview held in 
his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971. Thomas S. Teraji, 
past Director, Division of Attendance Area Studies, Chicago Public 
Schools, private taped interview held in his office, Chicago, 
Illinois, May 30, 1973. Mr. McKeag referred to his personal files 
to answer questions about other plans. Some of the responding 
cities were: Syracuse, Rochester, Berkeley, Seattle, Evanston, 
Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. 
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three years and was not actually begun until September, 1967. The 
two-way program, in which both white and Negro students were trans-
£erred, became a major aspect of the comparisons and debates in 
the Chicago imbroglio.31 
Philadelphia was a city which was more easily compared to 
Chicago. About one-third of its population was Negro and over 
one-half of its public school enrollment consisted of black stu-
dents. It had a large Roman Catholic system in which the student 
body was about 90 percent white. A busing program which began in 
1964 had originally been designed to relieve overcrowding. 
Beginning with a few hundred students the program had expanded to 
over 1000 pupils. Philadelphia authorities were reported to see 
little evidence that the busing program had stabilized any neigh-
borhoods and were introducing the magnet school and educational 
park concepts. 
During the Chicago busing decision controvers~, studies of 
the Philadelphia program were published pointing out that Negro 
students being bused into formerly all-white schools did better on 
31chicago's Ameri~an, December 28, 1967, p. 4. Southeast 
Economist (Chicago, January 7, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times 
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 6. Pierre deVise, Chicago's 
Widening Color Gap, Report Number 2 of the Interuniversity Social 
Research Committee, December, 1967 (Chicago: Community and Family 
Study Center, 1967), pp. !35, 139. 
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achievement tests than students from their neighborhood who were 
not bused. The effect was more pronounced in the earlier grades 
than for students at a sixth grade level. The study was reported 
to also indicate that white students in receiving schools 
performed better than children in all-white classrooms although 
no effect was discernible in the sixth grade. The children being 
bused in Philadelphia were chosen at random rather than being 
selected to avoid cultural clashes.32 
Specific information about racial stability in neighborhoods 
of the city was a critical factor in determining the details for 
the busing plan. The Board had authorized the Real Estate Research 
Corporation to. make a detailed study of demographic patterns in 
the ciuy. The Interuniversity Social Research Committee, con-
sisting of locai universities, was conducting studies of attitudes 
on integration in selected neighborhoods. Chicago Board demog-
raphers also had access to racial spot surveys. All students in 
the public schools filled out a slip with their address, and 
teachers indicated the race of the student on the form. Local 
32
chicago Sun-Tim~s, February 25, 1968, pp. 20, 44. North-
west Times (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 8. The effects of 
busing in Chicago will be considered in the next chapters of this 
dissertation. The effects of busing in other cities are noted here 
as an indication of the information which was being made available 
to Chicago citizens by their local press. 
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school administrators then plotted the racial composition of each 
block in their district. These spot surveys, filled out in 
September, 1967, gave a relatively accurate indication of the race 
:of public school students in each block of Chicago. 33 
A choice of communities from which to obtain students for 
,busing was not difficult to make. All evidence pointed to the 
South-Shore and south Austin areas. Community organizations in 
South Shore had been asking the School Board to allow some form of 
-planned integration to help stabilize the community, and Julian 
Klugmann of the South Shore Commission reported that his organi-
· zation had specifically requested an intra-community plan in the 
_fall of 1967. 34 
In South Shore the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Schools had 
been resegregating. In 1963 the Bryn Mawr was over 80 percent 
white while in 1967 only about 22 percent were counted as white. 
At the Mann the comparable figures for these years were 92 percent 
33Teraji, May 31, 1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Chapter 
iv of this study deals in detail with numerous aspects of the data 
available to the school administration planners. 
34chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 1967, p. 8. Ter'aji, May 31, 
1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Corrnnunity demands for stabili-
zation in South Shore and relief from overcrowding in Austin are 
described in chapter iv of this study. 
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and 24 percent, while they were 95 percent. and 35 percent at the 
Caldwell. These schools were overcrowded, and action would have 
to be taken immediately to keep the remaining white students in 
the building. 35 
In the Austin area overcrowding at the May and Spencer 
Schools had beome a severe problem. Classrooms had fifty to 
fifty~five pupils, and rooms normally used for such services as 
the library and auditorium had been pressed into use for classes . 
. A new upper grade center (middle school) was to be built but was 
not near completion. Recommendations to adjust boundary lines in 
· seven schools in order to relieve overcrowding at Spencer were 
abandoned on the basis that 1400 students would have been required 
to change their scho.ol affiliation. A substitute proposal scheduled 
about 300 students in the seventh and eighth grades of the Spencer 
to be transferred in September, 1967, to the Hay School which had 
space made available when it was closed as a branch of Steinmetz 
High Schoo1. 3? 
35Proceedings, January 10, 1967, p. 2436. 
36Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp.' 3309-10, 3339-40.· Teraji, 
May 31, 1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Stanley Ptak, past 
Principal of the May School, private taped interview held in his 
office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972. 
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the sending communities precluded any serious consideration of it 
for receiving schools. In retrospect, one planner recognized that 
no community was likely to have a majority of its citizens favor 
this social experiment.38 
Thus, demographic data and geography determined the areas 
into which the students would be bused. The areas directly south 
of the three schools in south Chicago were relatively stable and 
middle-class communities. None of the schools in the area were 
integrated at a 10 percent level although most of them had Negroes 
in attendance. ~ny of the schools were filled to capacity and 
.would require mobile units in order to accommodate new students. 
The Austin area offered a more comfortable situation. The com-
munities to the north were stable, middle class, and the schools 
were not crowded. Unlike the area south of South Shore, these 
communities did not rest in the path of the expanding Negro ghetto. 
The busing of black students into the northern area was not likely 
to create a situation which might hasten an exodus of white resi-
dents as was possible in the southern area plan.39 
No organizations were contacted during the time the plan was 
38Teraji, May 31, 1973. 
39Proceedings, January 10, 1967, pp. 2431, 2433, 2436, 2438. 
Above, chapter iv, pp. 153-68. 
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being conceived. Local administrators in sending schools were 
contacted for particular information and were aware that a plan 
was being developed, but the number of people aware of specifics 
was kept to a minimum. One planner reported that the adminis-
tration, "wanted the Board to get the report Lbusing plan] without 
' 
too much flak from the community. 11 40 The Redmond Report required 
action. Legal and moral imperatives were present. The decision 
to implement the busing plan, however, belonged to the Board, not 
the administration. The new Superintendent of Schools was observing 
the relationship in which it was his duty to recommend but the 
Board's task to make decisions. The way was open for the Board 
to bear the burden of accepting or rejecting a very controversial 
program. 
On December 28, 1967, during the Christmas recess of the 
schools, the initial busing recommendation was submitted to the 
Board. The official statement was rather brief. Attention was 
called to the Redmond Report and its observation "that any plans 
undertaken by the Board of Education to promote stabilization and 
40McKeag, August 30, 1971, (Quote). Ptak, August 14, 1972. 
Julian Lewitt, Principal of the Sayre Elementary School, August 12, 
1972, Telephone interview, Chicago Illinois. Robert Bell, Retired 
Superintendent of District Four, containing the· Austin community, 
private interview at Schurz High School, Chicago, Illinois, June 
22, 1972. 
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integration must be implemented immediately, if they are to be 
effective." Data from the preliminary report of the Real Estate 
Research Corporation regarding school enrollment was cited to 
justify the decision to bus from the Austin and South Shore areas .. 
Specific schools were not mentioned; rather, the recommendation 
utilized the rationale that 
arid 
overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary 
schools of the Austin Area dictate the need for implementing 
the Non-Contiguous Attendance area recommendation of the 
Desegregation Report immediately 
overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary 
schools of the South Shore and related areas urge that 
immediate steps be taken to implement the Intra-Community 
Pilot Program which is a short term recommendation in the 
Desegregation Report.41 
Board President Frank Whiston was reported to have no 
comments at the time the busing recommendation was made. Vice-
president Thomas Murray felt the Board should delay action until 
further studies could be made of the effects of inte~ration plans 
in other cities. Mrs. W. Lydon Wild objected to the assignment 
of students to different schools according to the blocks they 
lived on as "herding ch{ldren like cattle." She favored deferment 
41Proceedings, December 27, 1967, pp. 1032-33. Pertinent 
data from the Real Estate Research Corporation is discussed in 
chapter i~ pp. 123, 126-3~, 138-40, 148-50. 
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of the plans and indicated she would probably oppose the final 
plan which was to be presented on January 10, 1968. Warren Bacon 
observed that the plans represented a move to stabilize already 
integrated schools and cautioned that not to use vacant classrooms 
in outlying all-white areas would be indefensible in view of the 
Board's pressing financial needs. Cyrus Adams, considering the 
loss of white students in the public school system, urged that, 
"this is a trend we've got to arrest. This plan may or may not 
work, but we've got to try." Mrs. Louise Malis spoke of the need 
for stabilization and prophetically observed, "We will never get 
·a consensus from an entire community, no more than we can get a 
consensus on this Board. 1142 
As presented, the rationale for the plans was based on the 
proclaimed Board policies of stabilization and relief from over-
crowding which now became entwined in a discernibly resolute 
desegregation policy. An outright rejection of the .plans would 
have been difficult to justify for any Board member who might have 
been inclined to do so. A request that the recommendation be 
deferred to another meeting (a common Board policy on new business) 
was voted down with only the Board president and vice-president 
42chicago Sun-Times, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 20 (Quote). 
Chicago's American, Decem~er 28, 1967, p. 1. 
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favoring deferment.43 The Board would now enter the first phase 
of its encounters with community reaction. 
Three of the four major Chicago newspapers announced their 
guarded approval of a busing program. The Chicago Daily News, 
while considering the plan to be controversial not only on an 
emotional plane but also at practical and educational levels, con-
cluded that the program should be tried as "the future of the 
entire city is at stake in the battle to stabilize neighborhoods 
and to upgrade the quality of education throughout Chicago." 
Chicago's American favored busing as "no other approach has been 
suggested . that seems likely to accomplish the goals of 
improving the schools and stopping the exodus of white families 
from an expanding Negro core." In considering protests against the 
busing program, th~ newspaper stated, "It is up to the opponents 
of this plan to come up with something better. They cannot merely 
block it and hope for some alternative to turn up." ·On the other 
hand the American's sister paper, the Chicago Tribune, contended 
that "nobody ever told the school board that its job was to make 
over the community in terms of some abstract sociological 
43Proceedings, December 27, 1967, p. 1033. 
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principle. 1144 The Tribune continued to oppose the busing plans 
during the period the decision was being made. 
Early newspaper reports announced that 5000 pupils were to 
be bused in a two-way plan, moving both white and black students, 
to begin January 29, 1968. These accounts identified the Spencer 
and May Schools in the Austin district as sending schools and 
suggested that schools to the south of the South Shore District 
Twenty-two would·be designated as receiving schools.45 As the 
plans developed, the number of pupils to be bused decreased, the 
two-way plan was dropped, and the date for commencing the program 
.was pushed back as the Board expanded the number and scope of its 
hearings with the public. 
That the transportation of 5000 students was ever seriously 
contemplated by the school administration seems highly unlikely. 
Francis McKeag, who was Assistant Superintendent for School 
Planning, has denied that this number was being considered. When 
44Editorial, Chicago Daily News, December 28, 1967, p.14. 
Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 1967, p. 23. Editorial, 
Chicago Tribune, January 11, 1968, p. 12. Editorial, Chicago's 
American, December 27, 1967, p. 24. 
45chicago Daily News, December 28, 1967, p. 3. Chicago's 
American, December 27, 1967, pp. 1, 4; December 28, 1967, p. 1. 
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1968, p. 28; January 8, 1968, p. 5. 
Chicago Sun-Times, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 20. Chicago Daily 
Defender, December 27, 1967, p. 4. 
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the initial recommendation was introduced to the Board in December, 
1967, the superintendent estimated the cost to bus fifty children 
for a school year would be $5700. If the total $150,000 he asked 
to be appropriated for the plan was to be spent only on buses, 
1300 would have been the maximum number of students which could 
have been involved. A number approximating this figure was being 
considered when the plans were introduced to the Board in December, 
1967. However, as the Board's representatives met with community 
groups, adjustments were "made in plans discussed in order to 
minimize opposition in communities." One official observed, 
"Every time we went out to the community the thing got smaller. 1146 
The contemplated two-way busing referred to the South Shore 
area where community organizations had been working with the Board 
in attempting to stabilize the area. Both the South Shore Com-
mission and· the South East Community Organization had supported 
the Redmond Plan in principle. However, the South Shore Commission 
was much more adamant in its demands for a two-way busing plan 
involving thousands of students than the South East Community 
Organization which encompassed the area where receiving schools 
46McKeag, August 30, 1971 (First quote). Proceedings, 
December 27, 1967, p. 1932. Teraji, May 31, 1973 (Second quote). 
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would be located in District Seventeen.47 
The president of the South Shore Commission expressed the 
belief that "many people want to raise their children in integrated 
communities but are afraid of 'inundation' and deterioration of 
education. Guaranteed racial quotas is reassuring to both whites 
and Negroes who want to prove that integration can work." In 
attempting to create this stable integrated community, several 
busing plans were discussed with school officials. The Com-
mission's representatives expressed the belief that a two-way 
busing plan, involving fourteen schools and integrating all with a 
racial composition of 65 percent white and 35 percent Negro, was 
a workable design.48 
However, school officials did not concur. On January 3, 
1968, the Assistant Superintendent for Planning announced a plan 
to a group of principals and parent-teacher association presidents 
that involved compulsory busing of only Negro students. This 
scaled down plan was immediately attacked by liberal white elements 
47Lester Mouscher, staff member of the South Shore Commission, 
telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois, August 26, 1971. Southeast 
Economist (Chicago), January 7, 1968, pp. 1, 7; January 11, 1968, 
p. l; February 29, 1968, p. 7. 
48chicago Daily Defender~ January 10, 1968, p. 5 (Quote). 
Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1968, p. 4. Southeast Economist 
(Chicago), January 7, 1968~ p. l; January 11, 1968, p. 1. 
r 
203 
in the community. In a letter to the Superintendent of Schools, 
the chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois in 
south Shore complained that the announced plan discriminated 
against black children by eliminating the busing of white students .. 
The letter predicted "substantial opposition and resistance 
to compulsory busing which affects only Negro children." The 
compromise plan was considered to be a capitulation to white back-
lash sentiment and the "fears and prejudices of some individuals 
in the communities of the receiving schools." It was further con-
tended that by reducing the number of pupils to be bused and not 
providing white students to replace the Negro students being trans-
£erred, the compromise plan had destroyed any possibility of 
stabilizing the neighborhoods and schools of South Shore. As an 
example it was pointed out that under the school administration 
plan the percentage of Negro students in the Bryn Mawr School would 
only be reduced from 77 percent to about 70 percent.49 
The South Shore Commission also opposed the school adminis-
tration's proposal. The organization's president announced that 
the plan was "so meager that the commission would prefer that the 
49saul Mendelson (a letter to James Redmond, from private 
file of Mr. Mendelson, Chicago, Illinois, January 5, 1968). 
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board drop it." The commission contended that "few South Shore 
residents voiced disapproval of the original plan. Now, however, 
the commission is trying to mobilize all South Shore residents in 
opposition to the compromise proposal. 11 50 The commission appar-
ently felt the integration of nine nearly all-white schools in 
District Seventeen and the relief of overcrowding in the three 
predominantly Negro schools were not sufficient palliatives for the 
apparent abandonment of the stabilization aspect of the plan. 
While city-wide organizations such as the Catholic Inter-
racial Council, the Women's Committee of the National Conference 
of Christians and Jews, and the Leadership Council for Metropolitan 
Open Communities had expressed their support of the proposed busing 
plans, these organizations did not necessarily reflect the grass 
roots opinion of a majority of people. The city-wide Chicago 
Parent-Teacher Association had given its immediate support to the 
busing proposal, but its president had warned that the organization 
was not in favor of large scale busing and expected opposition to 
busing from hoth black and white parents. Furthermore, the 
association feared opposition from factions not immediately 
involved in the busing plan and requested that the rest of the 
SOChicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (First quote). 
Southeast Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote). 
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city should leave the involved communities alone to work out their 
problems, because, "if it isn't worked out, both communities will 
0 1151 g . 
Numerous conflicting public opinion polls were presented 
which supported or refuted the contention that the busing program 
would be accepted. 
In a poll by the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois, 
175 respondents· favored provisions by the Board to increase oppor-
tunities for integration of students in the Chicago Public Schools 
while only seven people expressed opposition. When busing was 
,proposed as a method of integrating schools and relieving over-
crowding, 157 pollees favored busing while only twenty were opposed. 
When questioned on preference between the one-way plan, the two-way 
plan or another plan, only three favored the administration's one-
way plan while 137 respondents expressed approval of the two-way 
plan and. another twenty pollees desired other busing plans.52 
However, this independent survey was open to serious question 
regarding the adequacy of the crass-section of the population being 
polled if a true picture of public opinion was desired. In a WGN 
51southeast Economist (Chicago), January 21, 1968, p. 1. 
Chicago's American, December 27, 1967, p. 1 (Quote). 
52copy of poll obtained from private file of Mr. Mendelson. 
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radio survey taken in January, 1968, on "Chicago Speaks," over 60 
percent of the respondents expressed opposition to busing as a 
means of achieving racial balance in the schools. A little over 
19 percent favored busing, and over 20 percent had no opinion. Iq 
the segregated white northwest area of Chicago, a Lerner Press 
survey showed overwhelming opposition to busing. The poll asked, 
"Should busing be used as a method of stabilizing racial balance 
in the schools?" Over 95 percent of those who mailed in their 
questionnaires expressed opposition to busing.53 While these 
surveys were also not controlled to represent adequate cross 
sections in public opinion, they did represent a strong opposition 
to the busing program and lent credence to the statement of one 
South Shore mother who proclaimed, "When the South Shore Com-
mission stands up and says it represents the thinking of the 
community, I take issue. 11 54 
While opposition to the busing program was reported to be 
53chicago's American, January 11, 1968, p. 4. Northwest 
Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. l; February 1, 1968, p. l; 
February 8, 1968, p. 1. Three separate surveys were reported over 
a three week period by the Lerner Press. The exact figures were 
broken down into city arid suburban respondents. They were: 
January 28, 1968 City--97.4% Suburbs--97.5% 
February 1, 1968 City--95.3% Suburbs--96 % 
February 8, 1968 City--95.6% Suburbs--96.1% 
54chicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, p. 2. 
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slow in organizing in the southeast receiving communities, anti-
busing petitions were being circulated, and Board member John 
Carey denounced a "barrage of vicious propaganda" by neighborhood 
papers in the far south side of the city. Other Board members 
complained of numerous and often obscene telephone calls.SS Fears 
' 
of some parents, especially of ·a two-way busing program, were 
expressed by one mother who stated, 
We moved out of South Shore to put our children in decent 
schools. Now we're faced with this busing. 
day it was no longer safe for our daughter. 
to walk her to school and that was too much 
Shore schools are not safe.S6 
. We left the 
My husband had 
for us. The South 
South side protests against busing continued to mount even 
after the compromise plan which deleted two-way busing was an-
nounced. At a rally held in the Croatian Hall on the south side, 
a petition signed by 7SOO who opposed busing was presented to 
Board President Whiston. Liberal spokesmen denounced the compro-
mise plan as inadequate. The opposition of numerous white parents 
was obvious, but black parents expressed opposition also. The 
one-way busing program singled out Negro children as the only 
students to be forced to bus. Furthermore, the plan would have 
SSchicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32 (Quote). 
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1968, p. 2. 
S6southeast Economist (Chicago), January 7, 1968, p. 2. 
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no effect upon the majority of the city's Negro pupils who attended 
all-black ghetto schools. Parents of children attending the desig-
nated south side sending schools expressed opposition on the basis 
that "most Negroes in this community [South Shore] moved here 
because of better educational facilities." Black parents expressed 
the belief that their children had little to gain through the 
busing program.57 On the south side the Board faced almost uni-
versal opposition from all factions in the community. 
Opposition in the northwest receiving communities was 
expressed at numerous meetings organized by protest groups and 
held in public park field houses. Emotions ran high at these 
rallies. The Board was criticized for discontinuing the Steinmetz 
High School branches in elementary schools. This action had 
produced vacant elementary school classrooms on the northwest side. 
A school administration official was reported to have left a 
meeting after being asked if Negro youngsters would be searched for 
weapons before being allowed into school buildings. Local poli-
ticians were beginning to respond to the clamor. United States 
Congressman Roman Pucinski, chairman of the House of Representatives' 
57
chicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (Quote). 
Chicago Daily Defender, January 11, 1968, p. 4. Southeast 
Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 2. 
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Subcommittee on Education, attended meetings along with numerous 
state senators and representatives and city aldermen. One ex-state 
representative characterized the reaction of residents on the 
northwest side as "the sleeping dragon of democracy is awake and 
preparing to turn against a totalitarian school board. 11 58 
:_~,c :-,,_White parents in the. fringe integrated areas of Austin tended 
to favor the busing plan. The Organization for a Better Austin, 
representing about 190 neighborhood groups in south Austin, 
announced its full support for the proposed busing plan. Emphasis 
was placed on the relief of the severe overcrowding in the sending 
schools. While no one could seriously believe that the plan would 
racially stabilize the sending schools which were already over 80 
percent Negro in racial composition, stabilization of the rest of 
the community certainly appealed to some white parents. Because 
of the severe overcrowding in the Austin schools, Negro parents 
were also willing to accept the busing plan although there was 
little support among black parents for the integration aspects 
58Northwest Times, (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 6 
(Quote). Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1968, p. 1. Creation of 
high school branches as a possible method of filling empty ele-
mentary school classrooms is examined in chapter iii, p. 81-84. 
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of the plan. 59 Thus, in the Austin plan, the Board was not faced 
with the complete opposition of all the involved conununities. 
In the period between the announcement of the busing proposal 
on December 27, 1967, and the formal presentation of the plan at 
the January 10, 1968, meeting, school officials had contacted 
numerous concerned recognized conununity organizations, parent-
teacher associations and lower echelon school officials in order 
to both explain the plans and work out further details. When the 
first plans had been originally formulated, some contacts had been 
made in the sending schools before the first announcement, but 
receiving schools were contacted only after the proposal was pre-
sented to the Board. All meetings concerned with formulating the 
plans were held privately, and the press was not invited to these 
meetings. On the basis of an Illinois law requiring public boJies 
to hold open meetings, a south side lawyer brought suit for an 
injunction against the busing plans because the planning sessions 
were not open to the public. However, the court refused to take 
action on the basis that the meetings did not come under the tenet 
59Northwest Times '(Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. Ptak, 
August 14, 1972, and Bell, June 22, 1972. One administrator 
remembers a conunent by a white parent who app~oved of the plan 
because it would allow the community to share its "black" with 
other communities. 
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of the law.60 
At the January 10, 1968, Chicago Board of Education meeting 
the complete plans were presented for approval. In the Austin area 
the May and Spencer Elementary Schools were designated as sending 
schools in a non-contiguous attendance area plan. Pupils in grades 
one to six were to be transferred from selected blocks in the 
integrated school area to eight all white receiving schools located 
about four to seven miles away in the Belmont-Cragin, Montclare, 
Dunning and Portage Park communities. The initial percentage of 
children received was not to exceed 11 percent of the total enroll-
·ment of the receiving school. In September, 1968, pupils in the 
seventh grade were to be transferred, and in September, 1969, 
eighth grade pupils would be added. As these grades were added, 
the total percentage of transferred pupils was not to exceed 15 
percent of the total enrollment of a receiving school. 61 
Geographic blocks within the integrated May and Spencer 
attendance areas were chosen on the basis that they were predom-
inantly Negro and essentially at the greatest walking distance 
60chicago Tribune, January 9, 1968, p. 1; January 10,, 1968, 
p. 2. Chicago Daily Defender, January 10, 1968, p. 5. Northwest 
Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 8; January 18, 1968, p. 7. 
Southeast Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. 
61Proceedings, Janua~y 10, 1968, pp. 2430-35. 
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from the May and Spencer Schools. The designated blocks were to 
be considered attendance areas of the receiving schools. As long 
as a student lived in one of the blocks, he was to remain in 
attendance at the receiving school. Upon graduation the student 
would attend the Steinmetz High School to which the receiving 
elementary schools contributed.62 
A total of 573 pupils was to be involved in the program. The 
May School was to transfer 317 pupils to five schools, and the 
Spencer was to transfer 256 pupils to three schools. As a result 
of opening empty classrooms the average number of pupils per room 
·actually dropped in five receiving schools. In two schools the 
class size increased and in one it remained constant. It was not 
necessary to use mobile classrooms to accommodate students at any 
of the receiving schools. As some receiving schools had no lunch-
rooms, provisions were to be made for facilities. An adult who 
was to travel with the students on the bus would remain at the 
receiving· school as an aide and lunch supervisor.63 
In South Shore area the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Elemen-
tary Schools were designated as sending schools in an intra-community 
busing plan. Six of the nine designated receiving schools already 
62Ibid. 63Ibid., PP· 2431, 2433. 
TABLE 3 
PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE 
BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM 
School Number 
Involved 
May 317 
Sending to: 
Bridge 50 
Burbank 47 
Lyon 75 
Sayre 55 
O.A. Thorp 90 
Spencer 256 
Sending to: 
Smyser 66 
Locke 95 
Dever 95 
AUSTIN PLANa 
Average 
Class Size 
Before 
Average 
Class Size 
After 
38.5 30.6 
(with 18 class-
room additions 
just completed) 
31.1 32.6 
32.9 31.4 
33.3 31. 9 
33.7 32.7 
32.9 32.6 
37.7 29.0 
(with 12 mobile 
classrooms) 
33.0 33.0 . 
32.5 33.8 
32.5 32.4 
% Negro 
Before 
83.9 
o.o 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
82.4 
o.o 
o.o 
0.0 
% Negro 
After 
77.4 
10.8 
10.8 
10.8 
10.8 
10.8 
74.9 
10.5 
10.1 
10 .0 
anata compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago, 
Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board 
of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2431, 2433. 
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2M 
had small proportions of Negro students, an indication of the fact 
that the receiving communities were in the path of the historical 
direction of expansion of the Negro belt in the city. Two area 
schools had been dropped as receiving schools on the basis that 
they were already over 15 percent Negro. Whereas the initial 
percentage of Negro children was not to exceed 11 percent of the 
total enrollment of the receiving school in the Austin plan, the 
proportion was immediately set at 15 percent in the South Shore 
plan.64 
A total of 462 pupils was to be involved in the program. The 
·Bryn Mawr School was to transfer 206 pupils to three schools; the 
Mann was to transfer 141 pupils to four schools; the Caldwell was 
to transfer 115 pupils to two schools. All the schools would have 
their average class size reduced; however, it would have been 
necessary to ·1ocate mobile classrooms at five of the receiving 
schools in order to accomplish this. Particulars regarding desig-
nated blocks, to be considered as attendance areas of the receiving 
school, were similar to the Austin plan. The right of transferred 
students to continue on to upper grade centers and high schools 
serving the receiving schools was essentially the same as in the 
64rbid., pp. 2436-39. 
TABLE 4 
PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE 
BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM 
School Number 
Involved 
Bryn Mawr 206 
Sending to: 
Luell~ 67 
Sullivan 79 
Warren 60 
Mann 141 
Sending to: 
Hoyne 40 
Buckingham 30 
Coles 48 
Burnham 23 
Caldwell 115 
Sending to: 
Anthony· 56 
Goldsmith 59 
SOUTH SHORE PLANa 
Average 
Class Size 
Before 
35.7 
33.2 
35.6 
32.8 
37.0 
34.1 
34.3 
33.4 
31.2 
18.2 
31.9 
31.6 
Average 
Class Size 
After 
30.2 
32.0 
34.4b 
32.6 
30.2 
34. 7 
33.7b 
32.2b 
29.7 
32.4 
31.0b 
31.lb 
% Negro 
Before 
76.5 
3.2 
2.5 
3.1 
74.3 
1.3 
0.0 
6.1 
0.0 
61.1 
% Negro 
After 
72.7 
11.0 
11.1 
9.6 
70.8 
12.0 
10.8 
13 .1 
12.2 
57.7 
14.1 
13.8 
anata compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago, 
Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago:, Board 
of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2438, 2439. 
hrhe addition of mobile classroom units would be required 
to obtain these average class sizes. 
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Austin plan. Provisions for bus and lunchroom aides were also 
. · 1 65 simi ar. 
The plans presented to the Board in January, 1968, had 
simply filled in geographic and administrative details left open 
in the earlier Redmond Report. The Board members could have been 
surprised neither with the general tenor of the presentation nor 
with the selection of the two areas in which the city was expe-
riencing its most rapid racial change. With the plans before it, 
the question now became, "How would the Board go about acting 
upon its superintendent's proposals?" 
CHAPTER VI · 
PRESCRIPTION FUNCTION: 
A DECISION IS MADE 
By the time the Board members met on January 10, 1968, to 
consider the formal busing proposals of the school administration, 
community action was already well-developed. The initial announce-
ment of the plans was thoroughly covered in the newspapers. 
Meetings were held in the concerned communities by organized and 
ad hoc groups. While some groups announced their support of the 
proposals, most of the meetings were called to protest the plans. 
As opponents of busing became more organized, they turned ~o and 
received the support of local politicians. The support of these 
political representatives served to strengthen the anti-busing 
elements in ·i.:he communities and to exert pressure upon members of 
the Board of Education. 
An incident may serve to indicate the growing concern of 
politicians over the busing issue and the alignment of the Board 
president against implementing the plans. On the day the plans 
were formally presented to the Board, an estimated thousand 
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demonstrators packed the corridors of the Board of Education 
building to protest against any favorable Board action. Before 
the Board convened, Frank Whiston met in a closed door meeting 
with neighborhood political leaders. The president was reported 
to have said, "If I were a betting man, I would not expect busing 
this year." When the Board did vote to make a decision in February, 
Peter J. Miller, a state representative from a northwest side 
district, was reported to have declared, "Whiston said the busing 
would not take place in 1968. This [Board action] puts the presi-
dent in a bad light. I don't doubt that he was sincere when he 
· talked to us." Miller then turned to Whiston and said, "But this 
puts you in a position where you didn't keep your word--you were 
voted down. 11 1 
While Whiston and Miller denied having made these statements, 
Whiston's previous positions on matters of desegregation would lend 
credence to the possibility. However, events during and following 
the Board meeting indicated that the faction opposed to imple-
menting the plan met strong resistance from the rest of the Board 
1chicago Daily News, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 8 (First quote). 
Chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 32 (Second and third 
quotes). Christopher Chandler of the Sun-Times and Edmund Rooney 
of the Daily News reported substantially the same story about the 
Whiston encounter with Miller before and after the Board meeting. 
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members. This resistance could well have been bolstered by the 
manner in which the plans were introduced by the Superintendent of 
Schools. Redmond again reminded the Board that while it was his 
role to recommend, it was the Board's duty to set policy. He 
commented, "I am recommending deferral and referral to a Board 
Committee in order that you may· have hearings to hear the people." 
He indicated that the plans were initial proposals and could "be 
modified (some are saying we are not doing enough; some are saying 
we are going too far)." He suggested that the plans be implemented 
"on or about Monday, January 29, 1968 [the beginning of the second 
half of the school year], but pointed out that the date could "be 
altered, [sic J (although Spencer and May are in critical con-
dition)." He left little doubt as to where the responsibility 
for the busing decision rested when he stated, "The Board of Edu-
cation must have an opportunity to examine our recommendations and 
give us direction on the policy of transporting children. 112 
Apparently not all Board members remembered the clashes 
between the Board and its previous superintendent over the decision-
making roles of each body. Redmond's meticulous observation of the 
2Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of 
Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, January 
10, 1968, pp. 2430 (Quotes), 2432, 2435, 2437, 2441. Hereinafter 
referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, page number. Chica.go 
Sun-Times, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 32. 
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rights and responsibilities of the Board led one member to complain, 
"He dumped these plans in our laps at the last minute, and then 
asked us for directions. 11 3 
During the meeting Whiston called for extensive hearings and 
an indefinite deferral of action on the plans. However, Bacon 
disagreed and urged speedy action. He said, "I think we ought to 
act with urgency. It is so ingrained in this board to put off 
these crucial decisions, and it's high time we decided to act." 
Further discussion led to the decision not to hold hearings in the 
communities but only at the Board of Education building. When the 
· final vote came, Carey moved for deferral of the reports with no 
definite date set. Bacon moved to amend the motion to put a limit 
on the hearings and set the last Board meeting in February for the 
Board to act one way or another on the proposals. When the roll 
was called, Green, Friedman, Bacon, Adams, Malis, and Oliver voted 
for the amended motion. Whiston, Murray, Wild, and .Carey voted 
against the motion. Scheffler was absent.4 
As the Board members left the meeting, they were greeted by 
3chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4. 
4chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32 (Quote). 
Northwest Times (Chicago, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Proceedings, 
January 10, 1968, pp. 2435, 2441. 
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numerous angry politicians. State Representative Hyde was reported 
to have said that fifteen state representatives would promise to 
obtain more state aid to build more schools in overcrowded Negro 
neighborhoods if the Board would drop the busing plans. Other 
proposals were not as positive. Board members were warned that a 
school tax referendum would be voted down, and state aid would 
not be_ increased unless the busing plans were shelved. United 
States Representative Roman Pucinski, addressing the crowd in the 
lobby, stated, "Any school board member who doesn't have the cour-
age to come out and talk to you in your community should turn in 
·his resignation." For two hours the politicians haggled with Board 
members. When they left, they _had a promise that the Board would 
hold hearings in the communities·. 5 
The following day Whiston created a committee under the 
chairmanship of Mrs. Wild to hold hearings. Adams, Bacon, Friedman, 
and Malis, all proponents of the plan, were originally appointed, 
but Adams and Bacon refused to serve. At this time Adams said he 
would vote reluctantly to abandon the plans because of the furor 
encountered. He declined to serve on the committee, stating: 
5chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32. Chicago 
Tribune, January 11, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). Northwest Times (Chicago), 
January 11, 1968, p. l; January 18, 1968, p. 1. 
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[it] won't hear anything that I have not heard several times 
before over the last four years. In order to be fruitful, 
hearings such as these must be two-way streets. In this case 
I don't feel there will be communication either way. The 
committee won't hear anything new and the people won't listen 
to anything the committee says. These particular plans (for 
Austin and South Shore) are dead in my opinion. I feel it 
was a mistake to postpone implementation of the plan even 
though I voted for postponement. I become surer of this the 
more I think about it .... As I understand it the poli-
ticians persuaded the board to hold meetings in the community 
after the meeting [of the Board on January 10, 1968]. That 
wa~ wrong. The whole thing is improper.6 
Bacon contended that Whiston never asked him before announcing 
the members of the committee. He expressed his belief that the 
hearings would be "an exercise in futility," and expressed the 
·belief that "the president and board are hell-bent on killing the 
busing plan." Regarding the advisability of hearings he stated, 
"I don't think matters of principle like integration should be put 
virtually to a vote like this. It's fallacious to think people 
6chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 16. Chicago 
Tribune, January 13, 1968, pp. 1, 2; January 19, 1968, pp. 1, 2. 
Northwest Times (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1 (Quotes). 
Readers of the Chicago Tribune at the time may have been confused 
by some of its reports. On January 13, it reported that Adams 
"would vote reluctantly to scrap plan because furor has killed it." 
On January 19, it stated he felt the "board should vote down busing 
plan without hearings." This second report lent a different 
connotation to Adam's statement which conflicted with the Tribune's 
prior report and the January report in the Northwest Times. 
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should vote on ,something we know is right. 11 7 
The committee, with Green appointed to replace Adams and 
Bacon, set about establishing a set of guidelines for determining 
who might speak at the hearings. It passed over the request that 
only parents of public school children be permitted to speak. 
Rather, it required that representatives of established school 
oriented civic organizations and community groups submit formal 
written requests to be heard. The schedule of the meetings was 
to be established after all requests were submitted by a January 
26, 1968, deadline. Two meetings were to be held in each of the 
·three school districts which were affected by the plans. In order 
to allow full participation by citizens the meetings were to be 
scheduled in the evening between 7:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. Only 
one speaker was to be allowed for each organization accepted and 
the speech was limited to five minutes. The speaker was to submit 
ten copies of the original statement on the night of the presen-
tation so that they could be compiled for the full membership of 
the Board (Scheffler was ill and no longer attending meetings).8 
7chicago Tribune, January 13, 1968, p. 2 (Third quote); 
January 19, 1968, pp. 1, 2 (First and second quotes). Northwest 
Times (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1. 
8chicago Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4. Proceedings, 
January 24, 1968, pp. 1397. 
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The Board had a short information bulletin drawn up sum-
marizing the salient points of the plans. These fact sheets were 
sent: to the organizations chosen to speak and any other individual 
who requested one, as well as the metropolitan and community news 
media. Separate fact sheets were developed for the two plans, 
but the majority of the information applied to both proposals. 
The Austin area fact sheet is duplicated in its entirety below. 
Where data for the South Shore area differed, the changes are 
inserted in brackets beneath the corresponding section. 
January 26, 1968 
KNOW THE FACTS ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION BUSING PROPOSALS9 
WH"l? 
AUSTIN AREA 
- To relieve serious overcrowding at May and Spencer Schools. 
- To promote stabilization througrout the Austin Area. 
- To increase desegregation in District Four. 
- To improve educational experiences for all children. 
- To relieve serious overcrowding at Bryn Mawr, Mann and 
Caldwell Schools. 
- To promote stabilization throughout the greater South Shore 
area. 
- To increase desegregation in District Seventeen. 
- To improve educational experiences for all children. 
911Know the Facts on the Chicago Board of Education Busing 
Proposals: Austin Area," and "Know the Facts on the Chicago Board 
of Education Busing Proposals: South Shore Area." Mimeographed 
handouts prepared for the Chicago Board of Education, January 26, 
1968. 
HOW? 
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- Transfer predominantly Negro pupils from selected blocks in 
the integrated school area to all white receiving schools 
where space is available. The blocks from which these pupils 
are transferred will become part of the receiving school 
attendance area. 
- Only pupils in grades 1-6 will be included in the plan at 
this time. As these pupils progress the seventh grade will 
be added in September, 1968 and the eighth in September, 1969. 
- No kindergarten children will be transferred. 
- No students will be transferred from the receiving schools. 
- Students graduating from the receiving elementary school will 
be eligible to attend the high school to which the receiving 
school contributes. 
The plan proposed is similar in many respects to the Evanston 
plan instituted in September, 1967. 
- Transfer predominantly Negro pupils from selected blocks in 
the integrated school attendance area to the basically all 
white receiving schools. The blocks from which these pupils J 
are transferred will become part of the receiving school 
attendance area. 
HOW MANY? 
573 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program. 
May and Spencer Schools will transfer pupils to O.A. Thorp, 
Lyon, Burbank, Bridge, Smyser, Sayre, Locke, and Dever 
Schools. Children with severe Jocial adjustment or physical 
problems, or with mental handicaps will be provided for 
under established procedures for children needing special 
education classes and services. 
- 462 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program. 
- Where receiving schools currently have grades 1-5, pupils 
in grades 6-8 will attend the upper grade centers assigned 
to the receiving school until they graduate. 
- Bryn Mawr, Mann and Caldwell Elementary Schools will, transfer 
pupils to Burnham, Luella, Sullivan, Warren, Hoyne, Bucking-
ham, Coles, Anthony and Goldsmith Elementary Schools. 
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AVAILABILITY OF SPACE 
Adequate space exists in these receiving schools to permit 
each school to enroll up to 15 percent of its total enroll-
ment from the sending school. 
- Some classrooms are currently available to meet the needs of 1 
the transferring pupils. A quota will obtain which will 
limit the number of Negro children transferred to a receiving 
school 15 percent of the total enrollment of that school. 
- Mobile classrooms will' be needed to care for transferring 
pupils at some of the receiving schools. 
TRANSPORTATION 
Only insured and reliable carriers will be considered in 
providing the means of transportation. 
- Students involved in the sending program who reside at an 
excessive distance will be transported from a convenient 
point in their residential area to the receiving school and 
returned at the end of the school day. 
- Pupils will be picked up and released within two blocks of 
their residences. The Child Welfare Attendant will escort 
children who must cross any main thoroughfare. 
- The average daily travel time will be 20 minutes. The bus 
schedule will provide 30 minutes to cope with unusual 
weather conditions. 
- Adult supervision on the buses will be provided through an 
assignment of a Child Welfare Attendant. A plan will be 
given the attendant to make certain that all children are 
in attendance. 
LUNCH 
Where receiving schools have no lunchroom, children will 
bring their lunch from home and will follow the procedure 
that schools normally use for children who live too far to 
go home for lunch, especially in severe weather. 
- The adult who supervises on the bus will be available for 
supervision during the lunch hour. 
ILLNESS AND ACCIDENT 
Children in any school who become too ill to remain in 
school or have an accident that requires medical or parental 
attention are generally called for by a parent or other 
authorized relative -or neighbor. 
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- In emergency cases the ill or injured child would be cared 
for in the same manner as is now the practice when a parent 
is not at home or cannot be reached. 
PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT 
COST 
- Cities which have bused Negro.children to white schools 
report that the bused children in general made much greater 
academic gains than their counterparts who were not bused 
even though the latter were provided with a strong compen-
satory education program .. 
- Quality education programs will be offered in all of the 
receiving schools. 
All studies show that the white children of the receiving 
schools show no loss in academic achievement. 
- Chartered buses--,$32. 00 per bus capable of accommodating 
55 pupils and 1 adult. 11 buses will be required for this 
program. 50 percent of the total cost is reimbursable from 
the State of Illinois. 11 Child Welfare Attendants at a 
total cost of $4,950 per month. 
- Total cost of transportation program--$11,990 monthly, 
without considering the state reimbursement. 
- Chartered buses--$32.00 per bus capable of accommodating 551 
pupils and 1 adult. 9 buses will be required for this 
program. 50 percent of the total cost is reimbursable from 
the St~te of Illinois. 9 Child Welfare Attendants at a 
total cost of $3,950 per month. 
- Total cost of transportation program $9,810 monthly without 
considering the state reimbursement. 
ADULT SUPERVISION 
- Adult supervision on the buses and during the lunch period 
will be provided through the assignment of a Child Welfare 
Attendant. This person will also be available to assist in 
providing comfort to pupils who need special attention during 
the school day and to assist in the school generally under 
the supervision of the principal. 
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STAFFING 
- New divisions in the receiving schools needed to accommodate 
the new pupils will make possible the transfer of interested 
teachers according to the established transfer policies and 
procedures. Additional divisions required in the receiving 
schools will be offset by the .loss of teaching divisions in 
. the sending schools. 
While the Board was preparing to meet with concerned corn-
' 
rnunity organizations, pressures for and against busing continued 
to mount. Even before the hearings committee had set up guide-
lines, forty-eight requests to speak had been submitted for consid-
eration. In the City Council, aldermen had moved to defer passage 
of the school budget levy because it included funds for the purpose 
of busing. In response, the president of the Woodlawn Organization 
announced that he would ask the federal government to cut off 
school aid pending the positive action of the Board on the busing 
proposals.lo 
A pro-busing rally was held in the Resurrection Catholic 
Church hall in south Austin. About 1500 people were reported to 
have listened to speakers representing mothers of students 
attending the May and Spencer Schools and the Organization for a 
Better Austin. Both black and white parents in this fringe area 
tended to support the busing plan on the basis that it would 
lONorthwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1. Chicago 
Tribune, January 18, 1968, p. 4; January 19, 1968, p. 2. Chicag~ 
Sun-Times, January 19, 1968, pp. 9, 20. 
r 
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relieve overcrowding in the schools and help stabilize the neigh-
borhoods of the desegregated community. Two hundred parents from 
the May and Spencer Schools later marched on the Board in support 
of busing. These parents also organized a boycott of the May and 
Spencer Schools to protest the severe overcrowding. The United 
States representative whose district included the south Austin 
area as well as unaffected suburbs and a Negro area in west 
Chicago, announced his support of the busing proposal. The 30th 
Ward Democratic Organization of the Austin area also supported 
busing.11 
The majority of the support for the announced busing plans 
• 
- . 
came from groups in the fringe areas of south Austin and city-wide 
organizations. Predominantly Negro organizations such as the 
Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People and T.he Woodlawn Organization were joined by the 
Citizens Schools Committee and the Leadership Council for Metro-
politan Open Communities in supporting busing. The Citizen Schools 
Committee, representing 230 civic groups, criticized legislators 
for reflecting the bias of their electorate and pointed out that 
llchicago Daily News, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Chicago 
Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4. New World (Chicago), January 
26, 1968, p. 3. Chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 6; 
. February 14, 1968, p. 4. 
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neighborhood schools were not the exclusive property of the neigh-
bors. Rather, the schools belonged to the residents of the entire 
city, and school problems could only be solved with reference to 
the whole system and the good of the entire city. The president 
of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Corrnnunities prom-
ised to appoint a committee to discuss implementation of the busing 
proposals with Redmond, Whiston, and Daley.12 
Many groups with religious affiliations supported the busing 
proposals. The Church Federation of Greater Chicago was among the 
first to announce its approval of the busing plans. Ninety-one 
ministers of the Methodist Church Northern Illinois Confederation 
voted to endorse the plans with. only nine Chicago ministers with-
holding support. The executive director of the Union of American 
Hebrew Congregations announced the support of his organization. 
The Organization for Northwest Communities also favored the plans. 
This pro-integration group formed in 1967 in predominantly white 
north Austin was sponsored by the Corrnnunity Renewal Society, a 
part of the United Church of Christ. On January 24, 1968, the 
Chicago Conference on Re·ligion and Race announced that its members 
12Chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 6; February 
14, 1968, p. 4. Chicago Tribune, January 16, 1968, p.2; January 
18, 1968, p. 27. Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968 
p. 17. 
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were preparing a plan "similar to, and· in support of, the busing 
plan propased by Chicago Schools Superintendent James F. 
Redmond. 11 13 
The Conference represented the Catholic Archdiocese, the 
Church Federation of Greater Chicago, and the Chicago Board of 
Rabbis. In a formal declaration the Conference called on the 
Chicago School Board to approve the busing programs. It announced 
that busing programs-in religiously affiliated schools would be 
undertaken, however, even if the public schools did not initiate 
their program. Clergy associated with the Conference were called 
upon to announce the support of their Church for the busing pro-
posals to their laity. While the news media observed that the 
Church busing plans were nebulous, the announcement of the program 
was important in that it cut off the possibility of using the 
religiously affiliated schools as an escape for parents involved 
in the public school plans.14 
The moral admonitions of the Churches were met with 
13chicago Daily News, January 18, 1968, p. 1. Chicago Tribune, 
January 13, 1968, p. 2; January 19, 1968, p. 2, Northwest Times 
(Chicago), August 10, 1967, p. l; February l,· 1968, pp. 1, 11; 
February 8, 1968, p. 3. New. World (Chicago), January 26, 1968, 
p. 1 (Quote). 
14chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1968, p. 4. _New World 
(Chicago , January 26, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times (Chicago), 
February-1, 1968, p. 11; February 8, 1968, p. 3. 
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resistance by numerous organizations in the communities. These 
organizations often contained such epithets as, "taxpayers," 
"property owners," "homeowners," "protective," and "concerned 
parents," in their titles. Some of the most vociferous organ-
izations were not in areas directly affected by the public school 
busing plan. "Operation Crescent" was headed by a suburban lawyer 
whose opposition to civil rights and open housing antedated his 
involvement in protesting the busing plans. The "Concerned 
Catholic Parishioners" had drawn its greatest strength in the 
southwest side Bogan High School area. This organization had taken 
stands against various changes in Catholic Church rituals and the 
introduction of a new catechism·series which placed more emphasis 
on social issues. It was outspoken against busing and recom..~ended 
reducing Sunday contributions to the local church to five cents as 
well as withholding payments to the city-wide church building fund 
as a protest against the involvement of the Catholic.Church.ls 
Bogan area residents also protested against the implications 
of the Redmond Plan. They demanded that public hearings be 
extended to consider the.entire contents of the Redmond 
15concerned Catholic Parishioners, "Fact Sheet No. 3" Chicago, 
February 25, 1968. (Mimeographed.) These flyers were handed out 
by volunteers in front of churches. Southeast Economist (Chicago), 
February 1, 1968, p. 2. 
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recommendations and complained that their area had no represen-
tation in the membership of the Chicago Board of Education. When 
a motorcade was organized by leaders of the Concerned Catholic 
Parishioners of the Southwest Side to protest the Board's deseg-
regation policies, it was joined by members of south Chicago organ-
izations such as the Murray Park Civic Organization, the Bogan 
Women,-the Concerned Parents of Bogan, the Hegewisch Property 
Owners, the Southwest Property and Homeowners Protective Associ-
ation, the Southwest Side Polish Homeowners, and Operation 
Crescent. 16 
These organizations drew much of their support from people 
who feared the violence and racial changeover that had accompanied 
the desegregation 0f neighborhoods in the past. The fact that the 
busing plan was designed to alter this pattern did not alleviate 
these fears. At public hearing after public hearing this element 
of the community shouted down pro.;...busing speakers in. a protest that 
they did -not believe any plan would change the historical pattern. 
A good deal of the protest came from white ethnic groups that 
drew heavily from first or second generation immigrants to the city. 
The significance of this observation, however, is clouded by the 
16chicago Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4. Southeast 
Economist. (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 2. 
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fact that the city.has always been a port of entry for those seeking 
new opportunities. As descendents of earlier immigrants have pros-
pered, they have tended to move further from the city and some of 
its problems. Thus, to a great extent, it is the later immigrants 
who have lived in areas which experienced desegregation with the 
new Negro community. It would be unfair and nonproductive to con-
clude that this group was any more or less prejudiced than other 
Americans. 
A possible fault in the busing plans rested in the fact that 
the city could not reach out into suburban communities where fear 
of innundation and previous unpleasant experiences with desegre-
gation were absent. But suburban areas have not been receptive to 
proposals from the Chicago system for exchanging students. The 
Catholic busing program did involve busing children from the inner-
city to suburban parishes, but the number of children remained 
small and has even declined. One Chicago administrator observed 
that suburban systems were in effect saying, "We ran away from it 
and we want to stay away from it . . . what do you think we left 
Chicago for. 11 17 While this was an obvious oversimplification, it 
was unlikely that any suburban school administrator would wish to 
17Interview with Teraji, May 31, 1973. 
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become involved in this controversy when it could be avoided. 
The inability of some white people to understand the problems 
of Negroes ran the gamut from open hostility to a subtle desire to 
stabilize their neighborhoods by limiting the further penetration 
of Negro families. In protesting the busing proposals one south-
east side leader admonished, "Let the Negroes work hard like we 
had to do and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." On the 
northwest side a protester claimed Willis "built a great educa-
tional complex for Negroes in their own neighborhoods and that 
they should stay there. These are not ghettoes."18 
The chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of 
Illinois observed that few Negroes had attended block councils to 
discuss busing proposals. He surmised that "there was too little 
evidence on the part of white people in South Shore of a real 
desire to foster integration, rather than to accept it where it 
already existed." Negroes, thus, were free to come "to the con-
clusion that whites here were interested exclusively in containment 
and stabilization and not in integration as a positive affirmation 
18New World (Chicago), February 2, 1968, p. 1. 
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of racial equality and democracy. 11 19 Indeed, a perusal of the 
positions taken by various groups indicates that the greatest 
support for the busing plans came from white residents of areas 
which had already experienced integration. The greatest oppo-
sition came from whites not only in those neighborhoods chosen as 
receiving areas but also whites in non-integrated neighborhoods. 
These factors, coupled with the one-way aspect of the busing plans, 
could not have appeared very promising to any Negro who might have 
sought a white alliance for the successful implementation of a 
busing plan. 
A poll taken for Fortune magazine during October and November, 
1967, had indicated strong support in the black corrnnunities for 
integration. About 77 percent of 300 Negroes interviewed in 
thirteen cities indicated they favored integration limited to edu-
cation, jobs and housing. 20 But there is little to indicate that 
Negroes in Chicago supported the busing program in its specifics 
on the basis of integration. Indeed, the busing program, as pro-
posed, met with Negro opposition, especially on the south side. 
l9saul Mendelson, "A Reaffirmation and an Apology," (an open 
letter from the private file of Mr. Mendelson, Chicago, Illinois, 
February, 1968). 
20Roger Beardwood, "The New Negro Mood," Fortune, LXXVIII 
(January, 1968), 147-48. 
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Black parents complained that the busing plans should have involved 
all-Negro and all-white segregated schools rather than schools 
which were already integrated. Black Alderman Willian Cousins, Jr., 
urged two-way busing. Others argued that stability was the respon~ 
sibility of the whole conununity and using black children to main-
tain racial balance was "racism at its worst." One mother angrily 
exclaimed, "We will not allow our children to become helpless pawns 
in a desperate scheme to forestall the inevitable exodus of whites 
. nor do we particularly care to stem that exodus. 11 21 
As has already been established, many liberal white groups 
on the south side opposed the compromise busing plan on the basis 
that the one-way plan was a surrender to white backlash and dis-
criminated against Negro children. The transfer of Negro students 
from the three sending schools without replacing them with white 
students would not significantly alter the racial composition of 
the schools nor help to stabilize the neighborhoods .. A speaker 
for the South Shore Gardens Betterment Association opposed the 
busing program on the grounds that action by the Board would upset 
the plans formulated by the group to stabilize the integrated 
21chicago Daily Defender, February 7, 1968, p. 24. Southeast 
Economist (Chicago), January 21, 1968, pp. 1-2; February 8, 1968, 
p. 2 (First quote); February 15, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote). 
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neighborhood as it would speed the exodus of whites. 22 By the• 
time the first hearing on the south side was held, it was becoming 
apparent that the South Shore plan was not likely to be accepted. 
Three public hearings were scheduled for the south side. The 
first, February 5, 1968, met at South Shore High School and was 
open to District Twenty-two groups only. The majority of the 
speakers expressed opposition to the Board plan. The Sullivan 
Parent Teachers Association, representing a receiving school with 
a largely Mexican student body, called for more studies to prove 
the necessity of busing. The Bradwell Parent Teachers Association 
represented a predominantly white school which was not involved in 
the plan as its student body was already over 15 percent Negro. 
A poll of its membership resulted in 291 responses favoring the 
neighborhood school policy, 31 responses favoring a two-way plan, 
and 36 responses favoring the one-way busing plan. The Coles 
School, with a predominantly white student body scheduled as a 
receiving school, tallied 100 votes in opposition with only 5 
favoring the busing plan. The Mann School, with a student body 
almost three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending school, 
22chicago Daily Defender, January 30, 1968, p. 4. Southeast 
Economist (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. l; January 21, 1968, 
p. 1. 
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expressed general opposition to the Board plan. Their poll showed 
148 respondents favored the neighborhood school policy, 139 respon-
dents desired a two-way plan, 90 voted for one-way busing, and 
41 responses indicated no preference. The Bryn Mawr School, with 
a student body over three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending 
school, expressed opposition to the one-way busing plan on the 
grounds that it would not stabilize the schoo1.23 
The two meetings at Bowen High School in District Seventeen 
reinforced the impression of almost total opposition to the Board's 
plan. The Hearings Committee had relaxed its original rule against 
· allowing speakers from groups which were not established school-
oriented organizations. Some of these groups had been newly 
organized to oppose the busing program. All the Parent-Teacher 
Associations announced their opposition to the plan. In the three 
south side meetings only six of forty-one speakers favored any 
program even close to the Board's proposa1.24 
In contemplating the results of the South Shore hearings 
Bernard Friedman expressed doubts about the success of the Board 
23southeast Economist (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p: 1. 
24southeast Economist (Chicago), -February 11, 1968, pp. 1, 3; 
February 15, 1968, p. l; February 18, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Tribune, 
February 13, 1968, p. 1. The meetings were scheduled on February 8 
and February 12 at 7: 00 P .M. at Bowen High School. 
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plan. H~ felt that much of the opposition expressed had been 
rational, and that the plan would not accomplish stabilization of 
the area. In contradiction to another Board member he did not 
feel that the opposition to busing was the fault of the school 
system staff. Rather, he felt it was a symptom of the Board's 
inability to act. He criticized the Board for responding to, but 
. . . . 1 25 not initiating, new p ans. 
Mrs. Wild claimed to be still undecided about the plan but 
expressed her concern with the strong opposition, as she felt the 
busing proposal could not succeed without community support. The 
compulsory aspect of the proposal also bothered Mrs. Wild, as she 
thought much of the opposition was because the plan was not volun-
tary. Cyrus Adams also felt a voluntary plan would be useful in 
reducing opposition to the plans. In speaking of the strong emo-
tional objections of northwest side residents to busing he stated, 
[it] seems to stem from a psychotic fear by parents that if 
we bus any children,now into their schools, next week we'll 
be busing their children out. The voluntary approach will 
knock out that prop and unmask remaining ogposition such as 
'we don't want Negro kids in our schools' ,26 
25southeast Economist (Chicago), February 15, 1968, p. 1. 
26southeast Economist (Chicago), February 15, 1968, p. 1. 
Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1968, p. l; February 13, 1968, 
p. 1 (Quote). 
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The situation in the Austin area differed from that in South 
Shore. Both whites and blacks in the sending areas tended to 
support the Board plan. Negro parents, concerned with the over-
crowded conditions of their schools rather than with integration, 
were willing to accept the one-way busing proposal. White resi-
dents in Austin who favored busing seemed most concerned with the 
stabilization aspects of the plan. However, most residents of the 
northwest side, where the receiving schools were located, were 
adamantly opposed to the busing plan. The school superintendent 
of District Four, which encompassed both areas, felt compelled to 
announce at one meeting that: 
the people are worried. They think if these pupils are bused 
in it will ruin the neighborhood. The important thing to 
remember, however, is control. These kids will be spread 
through ~he grades. No white child will be disestablished 
from a lunchroom facility. The kids will not be roaming 
around t~e neighborhood after school. They will be brought 
in under supervision and bused back home immediately after 
classes.27 
Obviously, the plan lacked some aspects of a successful inte-
gration scheme. Racist emotions arose at numerous meetings. At 
27stanley Ptak, Past Principal of May School, taped interview 
held at his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972. Ptak 
emphasized the fact that his selling point to Negro parents was 
relief from overcrowding and not integration. Robert Bell, Retired 
Superintendent of District Four, containing the ·Austin community, 
private interview at Schurz High School, Chicago, Illinois, June 
22, 1972. Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 
(Quote). 
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one assembly of the Organization of Northwest Communities a reso-
lution was introduced to have an I.Q. test administered to all 
children being bused. While the resolution was defeated, it was 
recalled and then tabled. One state representative refused to 
speak at the meeting as thirty-five Negroes were present. The 
same representative had implored parents at an earlier meeting 
"not to make this a racial battle," which evoked a retort from the 
audience, "But it is!" The constant barrage of such outbursts had 
led the editor of the local newspaper, the Northwest Times, to 
observe, "Anyone who doubts that the main busing opposition has 
its roots in racism need only have attended one of the citizens' 
organizational meetings held on the Northwest Side during the 
past 10 days. 1128 
The first two Board hearings on the northwest side were held 
at Steinmetz High School in the receiving area. While Board member 
Green was applauded, the Board's human relations staff member was 
booed when she tried to explain the busing p1lan rationale to the 
audience. A representative of the Austin-Irving Council on the far 
northwest side reported that a poll showed almost all their members 
opposed busing, despite earlier reports that members were "not 
28Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6 (Quote); 
editorial, January 18, 1968, p. 6; February 1, 1968, p. 1. 
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crazy about the transfer program, but they see the cultural and 
economic need." The president of the Smyser Parent Teachers 
Association, a receiving school, reported that the vote was 402 
to 18 against the busing proposal. She expressed fear of a two-
way busing plan, argued that children should not be used to in-
crease integration, and suggested that the money set aside for 
busing be spent on education classes for the parents of the chil-
dren designated for busing so that they could help their children 
by_ themselves. The president of the Locke Parent Teachers Asso-
ciation called for the replacement of Redmond, argued that the 
main idea of the busing plan was to break up the family, contended 
that the plan was communistic, and questioned the proposal on the 
basis of moral, health, and discipline problems. Another speaker 
protested that the northwest side had no representative on the 
Board. At the second meeting the one speaker who favored busing 
was booed down by the audience in the capacity filled auditorium.29 
The third hearing at Austin High School in the sending area 
presented a different picture. About five hundred persons attended 
the meeting at which nine of ten speakers supported busing. 
Another five scheduled speakers, representing the May and Spencer 
I 
29Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 (Quote); 
February 22, .1968, p. 3. 
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Schools, did not attend as a protest against the hearings which 
they felt should not have been held at all. The one Negro who did 
speak complained that when seventh and eighth grade students at 
the Spencer School had been transferred to the newly created Hay 
Upper Grade Center, the Board had not felt it necessary to hold 
public hearings. He saw the hearings as providing a platform for 
persons to "spew forth venom and racism disguised under community 
concern." He summarized his reasons for supporting the busing 
program when he stated, "We are sick and tired of seeing our 
children being led down the path of educational mediocrity. Inte-
gration is a secondary issue. May and Spencer are overcrowded, 
and we want those vacant classrooms filled. 11 30 
Other speakers chided the Board for having "so little respect 
for its own prerogatives'and legal responsibilities" that it felt 
it had to "ask permission of communities with underused schools to 
share public facilities that are paid for out of public dollars." 
Censures were directed toward legislators who had instigated the 
30Northwest Times (Chicago), February 29, 1968, p. 6. While 
public hearings had not been held in the months long efforts of the 
Board to reduce overcrowding at the Spencer, many meetings were 
held with community groups. Resistance from segments of the Austin 
community, especially in white areas contiguous to the racially 
changing are~ had resulted in the abandonment of numerous plans. 
Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3310-11, 3339. 
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hearings while being "mainly responsible for the financial crisis 
facing the Chicago Schools." The single speaker who opposed the 
busing plan called for the building of new schools in south Austin 
and West Garfield Park (an area due east of south Austin).31 
On February 14, the Board announced that two additional city-
wide meetings would be scheduled to meet at the Jones Commercial 
High School located near the city's downtown area. In contrast 
to the six hearings scheduled within areas directly concerned by 
the plan, these meetings were programed to allow organizations 
throughout the city to express their opinions on the busing plan. 
Friedman had objected to accepting speakers from community organi-
zations all over the city. He preferred that city-wide organi-
zations (which tended to be more favorable to the busing plans) 
be scheduled for these meetings.32 
If any Board members hoped to find greater support for the 
busing plans at the city-wide meetings, they must have been disap-
pointed. At the first meeting speakers opposed to the busing plans 
outnumbered the plans' proponents by over two to one. While the 
Chicago Region Parent-Te~chers Association representative spoke in 
31Northwest Times (Chicago), February 29, 1968, p. 6. 
32southeast Economist (Chicago), February 18, 1968, p. 2. 
Chicago Daily News, Februa~y 28, 1968, p. 6. 
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favor of the plans, representatives of seventeen local PI'A groups 
expressed their opposition and only two locals voiced some support 
for the plans. This split between the parent group and its locals 
reflected a debate at an earlier general regional meeting at which· 
efforts to have the regional PI'A take a stand against busing were 
defeated by a reported two to one margin. When the executive 
board of the PI'A announced its favorable stance regarding busing, 
the board was accused of adopting the policy without the approval 
of the membership of its locals. "Concerned parents" groups began 
to arise in opposition to the liberal stance of the larger PI'A 
body.33 
The second city-wide meeting was sparsely attended, but pro-
ponents from city-wide groups established a slight numerical edge 
over opponents of the plans. Speakers representing the American 
Friends Service Committee, the Chicago Youth Centers and the 
Chicago Urban League joined several other religious and civic 
groups in expressing support. They were joined by the United Auto 
Workers and the Chicago Teachers Union whose executive council had 
finally come out in support of the plans. Again, the opposition 
33chicago Sun-Times, 
February 27, 1968, p. 13. 
4, 1968, p. 2. 
February 27, 1968, p. 3. Chicago Tribune, 
Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 
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came from local PTA groups, taxpayers' groups and southwest com-
munity groups. Operation Crescent and the Kilbourn Organization, 
two avowedly anti-civil rights group~, also sent speakers to pro-
test the plans.34 
The attitude of poli~icians regarding the busing plan followed 
a predictable path. There were no signs of any elected officials 
risking the loss of votes by antagonizing their constituencies. 
Indeed, some men with political ambitions appear to have seized 
the occasion as an opportunity to further their careers. The 
leader of the suburban based Operation Crescent was accused of 
creating agitation in order to draw attention to himself and keep 
funds flowing in from contributors. He later ran for the office 
of governor of Illinois. A dissenter on the southeast side of 
Chicago later ran for a ward committeeman's office, and on the 
northwest side a barkeeper who achieved some prominence in his 
opposition to busing ran for local office.35 
Opponents of the busing program turned to politicians to help 
defeat the plans. One northwest side protestor proclaimed that 
34chicago Sun-Times, February 28, 1968, p. 9. Chicago Tribune, 
February 28, 1968, p. 2. 
35Editorial, Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 4, 1968, 
p. 4. 
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"every alderman voting for the busing plan should be defeated in 
the next election." The Chicago aldermen did not vote directly 
on Board of Education policies, but they did vote to accept the 
Public School budget. In general, local politicians had little 
reason to fear accusations that they favored civil rights actions. 
Thirty-five of the fifty aldermen were on record as opposing inte-
gration through the building of public housing projects in their 
wards. All the northwest side aldermen had expressed their oppo-
sition to the busing proposal. They endorsed the neighborhood 
scQ.ool policy, and one denounced the plan as "just something to 
appease those [Negro] people." Another said that the proposal was 
not fair to the children being bused, as it would be difficult for 
them to adjust to their new situation. The complaint was regis-
tered that "the residents are afraid Negroes are going to start 
buying houses around here," and "besides the racial aspect ... 
a number of northwest siders oppose busing on general grounds. 11 36 
The involvement of politicians brought back memories of the 
period when Chicago schools were deeply enmeshed in political 
scandals. Board member Carey cautioned) "Politics was taken out 
36chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 1967, p. 4. New World 
(Chicago), February 2, 1968, p. 1 (First quote). Northwest Times 
(Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1 (Latter quotes). 
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of the schools many years ago. It seems to me that this is an 
attempt to make a political football out of a very serious problem." 
The president of the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association reminded 
Chicagoans of the period when "teachers sought jobs through their 
aldermen; building and other contracts were awarded politically; 
principals were transferred on a moment's notice, without justifi-
cation:1137 
However, the involvement of the schools in a controversial 
social issue was bound to bring politicians into the melee. The 
mayor of the city might have ended some of the involvement of local 
politicians by openly endorsing the plan as a necessity to meet 
federal guidelines for desegregation. He could have reviewed the 
busing rationale in the public media in an attempt to win wider 
support for the plans. But the mayor had usually operated under a 
political maxim not to become involved in local controversies, and 
he chose not to risk his or his party's popularity by endorsing 
the plans. 
When asked about the busing proposals the mayor responded, 
"I don't know enough about these questions and ideas. All,! want 
37chicago's American, January 11, 1968, p. 4 (First quote). 
Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 1 (Second 
quote). Above pp. 17-20. 
250 
are the best schools." He contended that the Democratic party had 
no official view on busing and stated, "This would be political, 
and the children should never be subject to politics." Asked if 
he had discussed the subject with the school Board president, Daley 
replied, "I never interfere with their administration and won't as 
long as I'm mayor." Regarding public hearings, the mayor stated, 
"This is a matter for the Board of Education, but I feel very 
strongly that any program today should have maximum participation 
in the neighborhoods. If the majority of people do not want some-
thing, who in government has the right to set themselves above the 
majority." He elucidated, "I am a democrat with a small 'd' . 
it's up to the people to decide.finally, because these are the ones 
who make up our city." The Chicago Daily News saw the mayor's 
response as "the kiss of death" for any busing plans, and quoted 
an unidentified Board member as conunenting that the mayor's position 
"will get certain Board members who were not enthusiastic to begin 
with to vote against the plans. 11 38 
38chica o's American, January 11, 1968, p. 1 (First,·third, 
fifth quotes . Chicago Tribune, January 12, .1968, pp. 1-2 (Seco:i.d, 
fourth quotes). Chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1968, p. 16. 
Chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4 (Sixth quote). Word 
order and punctuation vary in the numerous newsp~per accounts of 
the mayor's interview but the quotes are in agreement on the sub-
stance of the statements. The mayor's involvement in School Board 
matters is discussed in chapter ii, especially pp. 21-24. 
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William J. Cullerton, a prominent Democratic northwest side 
politician, observed that in 1947 the city council had passed an 
ordinance prohibiting the interference of council members with 
Board of Education matters. However, he contended, "This is a 
matter concerning a community that has been one of the finest in 
the city. Our homeowners and taxpayers are proud of their homes, 
and I do not intend to permit anything to prevent the area from 
maintaining this high standard of living." At anti-busing rallies, 
where emotions ran high, politicians implored audiences to remain 
calm with entreaties such as, "Daley is working hard to make this 
'a beautiful city .... If you move to the suburbs, sooner or later 
you will be faced with the same thing there. Don't leave, don't 
leave. You must stay. 1139 
Some politicians did more than implore; they threatened to 
use their positions against the Board. Edwin Fifielski, an alder-
man on the city finance committee, told how he voted in committee 
against releasing a tax levy ordinance for the Board and would work 
against the referendum for school funds proposed for the following 
June. This threat could not carry much weight as the northwest 
and southwest sides had voted against prior school referendums. 
However, the schools were continually seeking more financial aid 
39No~thwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 6. 
252 
from the state. The Bette~ Schools Committee, consisting of the 
city's top businessmen, was working with the Board's president to 
raise 174 million dollars in 1968. One member pointed out, "Sooner 
or later we will need the assistance of the legislature." A 
southwest side state senator on the appropriations committee had 
stated, "I intend to take whatever action is necessary to guarentee 
that state funds will not be used for busing. 11 40 The weight of 
such combined threats could not be taken lightly by Board members. 
The Republicans in the city could not have been oblivious to 
the possibility of obtaining the white backlash vote in the 
November, 1968, elections. The Cook County Republican Central 
Committee Chairman issued a statement opposed to busing. Most of 
the Republican senators and representatives in Chicago formed a 
group of about twenty to "develop a positive legislative program 
to strengthen neighborhood schools in the city." Their program 
included: restricting funds so that state money would not be used 
for busing for the purpose of curing racial imbalance; creation of 
an elective non-partisan, non-political school board to give the 
people a voice in school board matters; provision of funds to 
provide improved police protection on school premises and around 
40Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. Chicago 
Economist Tribune, January 18, 1968, p. 1 (First quote). Southwest 
~~~~~~~~~~(Chicago)·, January 4, 1968, p. 2 (Second quote). 
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school grounds.41 
It was obvious that many legislators were expressing their 
own values rather than merely reflecting their constituencies' 
opinions. Henry Hyde, a northwest side representative who later 
served as speaker of the house in the state legislature, said he 
would oppose the busing plans "with every drop of blood in my body." 
He argued that children should not be used as pawns because of 
"what eggheads at the University of Chicago think is desirable." 
He attacked the composition of the Board of Education as it "is 
appointed on reconnnendation of a nominating connnittee which is 
'hundreds of miles out to the left and chooses its nominees to 
agree with it. The people have no voice. The Board should be 
elected by the people from specific geographic area.s. 1142 
Peter J. Miller, another northwest side representative, was 
critical of the city administration's role in the busing issue. 
He criticized the mayor for not acting to quell the busing pro-
posals. ·Referring to the mayor's intervention to end a Chicago 
41chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, p. 4. Northwest Times 
(Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). Chicago Tribune, 
January 16, 1968, p. 2. 
42Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6. The 
role of the Connnission on School Board Nominations is reviewed in 
chapter ii, pp. 19-22. 
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teachers' strike in early January, he said, "If he [Daley] can 
stick his nose into the business of teachers' strikes, why doesn't 
he stick his nose into this and stop this ill-advised program." 
In what he saw as the absence of leadership from downtown poli-
ticians, the representative recommended that protestors join the 
Greater Northwest Civic Association, which had been formed to 
fight against the busing proposals. It was also suggested that 
representatives from the Greater Northwest Civic Association attend 
meetings of the more liberal Organization of Northwest Communities 
to make their protest known.43 
Opponents of busing came from both political parties and the 
most outspoken came from area~ marked for receiving schools. A 
northwest side Democratic leader, Parke J. Cullerton, supplied 
buses to take groups from the eight northwest receiving schools 
to protest at a Board meeting. When members of the Greater North-
west Civic Association talked of the secession of their area from 
the city, local politicians disowned the idea, although suburban 
politicians expressed their guarded favor. The Association 
demanded that Redmond be fired; a northwest side woman be appointed 
to the Board; the Redmond Plan be rejected with a reaffirmation of 
43Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1. 
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the neighborhood policy; and future plans be submitted to the 
people for their prior consent.44 While Mayor Daley dismissed the 
threat of secession as the emotional reaction of a few individuals, 
the Chicago Sun-Times had carried the secession announcement on its 
first page. The incident served as one more reminder that the 
educational issues in busing would not be separated from political 
issues in the minds of many Chicagoans. 45 
The politician who became one of the most articulate spokesman 
for the opposition from the northwest side was Roman Pucinski, U.S. 
Representative and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education. 
At a meeting held during the beginning of the busing controversy, 
Pucinski had been hissed, apparently because of his identification 
with liberal civil rights legislation. However, he soon proved 
that he did not consider busing to be a solution for Chicago's 
school integration difficulties. Pucinski contended that federal 
guidelines did not require integration and expressly forbade the 
use of federal funds for busing. He pointed out that court 
decisions had not compelled school systems to integrate their 
44Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1. 
45Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6; February 
22, 1968, p. 3; February 29, 1968, p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times, 
February 26, 1968, pp. 1, 24; February 27, 1968, p. 18. 
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schools by busing in cases where segregation was de facto. He 
argued that the busing program gave no assurance that the sending 
schools would not be crowded again in the future. He pointed out 
that federal aid was available for the May and Spencer Schools to 
combat overcrowding and criticized the Board for not having found 
ways other than busing to solve the problems at the sending 
schools. 46 
Pucinski argued that the children to be bused were being used 
as pawns by "those so committed to the idea of total integration 
that they will use any means to get it." He felt the bused chil-
dren would suffer from the loss of federally funded remedial pro-
grams which would not be available at the receiving schools which 
were not in areas eligible for federal aid under the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act. He contended that quality education 
would suffer in the receiving schools as the bused children would 
be unable to keep up with the academic pace of their. white class-
mates, and the entire class would have to slow down.47 
Pucinski also expressed the fears of white residents of the 
46Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6; editorial, 
January 18, 1968, p. 6. 
47Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 8. The 
validity of these arguments is considered in detail below in 
chapters vii and viii. 
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northwest side that the busing program would lead to the racial 
change-over of their schools and neighborhoods. The transition of 
the May School from a predominantly _white to an almost totally 
black student body was attributed to a Board decision four years 
earlier to allow permissi~e transfers to attend the May School. 
This contention ignored the social dynamics of the expanding 
Negro ghetto on the city's west side and disregarded a salient 
feature of the non-contiguous plan, which was to relocate black 
students in an area that was not experiencing racial change. 
However, it did reflect the fear of white residents that the imple-
mentation of the plan would result in a diminished number of white 
buyers who would consider purchasing homes in the area.48 
The Chicago Tribune in its opposition to busing did not see 
racism as an issue. Rather, it 'pointed out that the bused children 
would lose time in traveling to and from the receiving school. 
The trip in itself represented safety problems and the distance 
of a child from his home would make it difficult to act in situ-
ations when the child's health was impaired. The newspaper also 
observed the fear of busing opponents that the plans represente<l 
only the first step in a more extensive program with a loss of the 
48rbid., January 22, 1968, p. 3. 
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parents' right to send their children to a school in their 
neighborhood.49 
The preliminary report on population projections and school 
enrollment prepared by the Real Estate Research Corporation was 
used by the Tribune to discredit stabilization as an attainable 
goal through busing. The report had observed that stabilization 
of some neighborhoods would only serve to divert the expanding 
black population into other parts of the city. The newspaper em-
phasized that only a policy which diverted Negro expansion into 
suburban areas would further over-all racial stabilization in the 
entire city.SO 
When the Board met on Fe~ru~r:.Y 28, 1968, to consider the fate 
of the busing proposals, there could be little doubt that numerous 
factions had presented their opinions. There could also be little 
doubt that the decision would rest with the Board itself and not 
the school system staff. It was perhaps only symbolic, but cer-
tainly pertinent, that at the height of the controversy the school 
superintendent had left the city with his assistant superintendents 
499hicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, p. 2. 
SOEditorial, Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1~68, p. 28. The 
pertinent findings of the Real Estate Research Corporation are 
discussed above in chapter iv, pp. 123-150, passim. 
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of school planning and integration to attend an educational con-
ference. One Board member had complained that the administration 
had only presented one set of plans _for consideration, but the 
Board was free to accept, alter, or reject the plans as it saw 
fit. 51 
When the hearings committee reported back to the Board as a 
whole, it made no recommendations. Friedman pointed out that, 
while he felt a recommendation should have been made, he soon 
realized that the four subcommittee members would not be able to 
agree among themselves. Thus, the report listed the dates of the 
eight public hearings and noted the positions of the speakers. 
Opponents of the plans numbered 106 organizations. Another 47 
organizations favored the plans, and 11 groups wished refinements. 
It was noted that the South Shore plan had few advocates. Mrs. 
Malis observed that the number of members in the organizations 
varied widely, and that some groups had overlapping memberships. 
Mrs. Wild observed that she did not "think we heard anything 
different from what we had expected before the hearings." She 
stated that the animosities encountered had made the hearings 
"somewhat more difficult," and expressed surprise that the school 
51southeast Economist (Chicago), February 22, 1968, p. 3; 
February 29, 1968, p. 7. 
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staff had not prepared the communities for the idea of busing.52 
An estimated 1500 people packed the Board meeting room and 
corridors. The overwhelming majority were opposed to busing. 
They would return home that evening with an ambiguous victory. 
The South Shore plan was returned to the school staff with the 
recommendation to "work with people in the connnunity both on 
preparation and revision." The vote was nine to one in favor of 
returning the plan. Mrs. Green cast her singular vote, not 
because she supported the original plan, but because she felt the 
plans in general discriminated against the majority of Negro stu-
· dents. She saw the great body of Negro students being "buried and 
forgotten" as the receiving schools obtained all the advantages 
and only a few Negroes were to be provided for by utilizing the 
quota system--a system which stigmatized the black children by 
labeling and numbering them. Mrs. Malis may well have saved the 
remnants of a future plan by stipulating that a revision must be 
presented no later than September, 1968.53 
52Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1533. Chicago Daily News, 
February 28, 1968, pp. 1, 6. Southeast Economist (Chicago), 
February 29, 1968, p. 7 (Quote). 
53Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1533 (First quote), 1534. 
Chicago Daily News, February 18, 1968, pp. 1, 6. Chicago Daily 
Defender, February 29, 1968, pp. 3, 28 (Second quote). 
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The Board was deadlocked on the disposition of the Austin 
plan. Friedman, Bacon, Malis, Carey, and Oliver voted for accept-
ance. Green, Murray, Wild, Adams, and Whiston voted against the 
report. Scheffler was absent during these final meetings but his 
opposition to the busing plans was well known. Some Board members 
made reference to the neighborhood school policy and the obvious 
opposition of numerous Chicagoans. Murray stated, "I have been 
consistently opposed to busing only because I hate to see the last 
vestige of the neighborhood school completely disappear." He felt, 
"Recent weeks prove the extent to which the public can be aroused 
· over this question. 11 54 
Busing supporters viewed the community opposition in another 
way. Oliver saw it as "flak ... based on one single thing--they 
don't want black children in their schools." He felt, "The Board 
has no right ·acceding to that kind of demand." Carey reminded the 
Board of the 1954 Supreme Court decision that publi~ education 
"must be·made available to all on equal terms and that segregated 
education is unequal education." He recalled the 1964 Chicago 
Board policy statement on stabilization. He reminded his colleagues 
that when the Redmond Plan was submitted to the Board during the 
54Proceedings, February 28, 1968, pp. 1533-34. 
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previous summer, he considered it to be "the finest document 
dealing with the Chicago education problem that had been placed 
in my hands since my appointment to this Board." While not a 
member of the hearings committee, Carey attempted "to listen to 
many voices on this proposal, vehement voices against, moral voices 
that cry for justice and equality, and muted voices that represent 
the silent and inarticulate. 11 55 
The busing proposal represented the first attempt to implement 
the Redmond Plan. Carey equated the adoption of the busing pro-
posals with his responsibility to provide quality education for all 
· the children of Chicago. He viewed "with regret those political 
voices that lack the courage of leadership," and applauded, "those 
political voices who would lean in the face of adversity." Bacon 
was more critical of the Board members themselves as the final 
arbiters of the fate of the busing plans. He stated, "The Board 
did not ·have faith in its commitment, so piously made, to adopt 
any reasonable plan. All the pious utterings by the people who 
voted against do not hide the fact that this Board does not have 
the will, the resolve, the commitm~nt, to make the necessary 
55Ibid. 
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changes. 1156 
The Board's lack of resolution met criticism on all sides. 
The Chicago Daily Defender, noting that the South Shore plan was 
expected to fail, expressed surprise that the Austin plan did not 
pass. A Chicago Sun-Times editorial was almost irate, pointing 
out that the Board's "resolve melted before opposition fueled by 
demagoguery." The editorial pointed out that in both plans the 
Board "passed the buck back to School Superintendent Redmond 
without assuring him that any new suggestions would draw more 
courageous response. 11 57 
On the other hand, Philip Hauser saw the five to five split 
on the Board as sign of improvement in comparison to the period 
during the tenure of Willis. He stated, "It is beginning to 
acquire a spine." However, Hauser criticized the Board as still 
being unable to recognize "that the hysteria of first- and second-
generation immigrants being Americanized is not to be confused 
with a majority of opinion in Chicago." Some politicians who had 
opposed the busing plans expressed their concern that the decision 
56rbid., (First quote). Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, 
p. 4 (Second quote). 
57chicago Daily Defender, February 29, 1968, p. 3. Editorial, 
Chicago Sun-Times, March 1, 1968. 
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"wasn't a clear-cut victory" which would end the possibility of 
busing once and for all. Indeed, Redmond did not see the decision 
as final and stated that the "Board has not cut off all my options 
and plans. I will proceed immediately to make future plans. This 
was not a defeat for the plan. 11 58 
It was evident even to some Board members who had voted 
against implementing the Redmond busing plan that some action 
regarding integration was imperative if the Chicago Board wished 
to avoid federal intervention. Adams expressed his concern with 
this problem. While he had reservations about the busing plans, 
Adams apprehended the position of the Board regarding its inte-
gration policies. The boundary policies of the Board had been 
under attack, and the good faith of the Board might be established 
in deference to the initiation of a busing program. Adams 
expressed a rationale for accepting a busing plan when he said, 
Rather than go over boundary lines that were drawn to preserve 
segr~gation, we decided to accept proposals for busing children 
from overcrowded, mostly Negro schools to white neighborhoods. 
If the busing element of the Redmond Plan is now abandoned, we 
would have to go into the question of those illegal boundaries, 
58chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, pp. 3, 42 (Fi~st and 
second quotes). Chicago Daily Defender, February 29, 1968, p. 3 
(Third quote). 
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for which our evidence is substantial.59 
As early as a week before the February 28, 1968, Board 
~e_t_ing, J:her.e: w~re rumors of a compromise plan being proposed by 
~dams"..:.:..:· While the South Shore plan was definitely to be abandoned, 
\the Austin-plan could:_be modified to allow parents of transfer 
students ·.the. option of taking their children out of the program. 
AJ:.:.. the_: time_ the. compromise was first leaked, it was denied by 
almost all the Board members interviewed. Mrs. Malis commented, 
f';l _think it's· very unfortunate that a report like this would come 
out at .this time [when] North side hearings are not completed yet, 
,and the_ citywide hearings haven't even begun." Friedman denied any 
knowledge of_ a compromise and contended that the information re-
ferred to nothing more than a conversation between Wild and Adams.60 
:..'--J.Ip:w~v~;r,_wh~n t.he compromise was introduced at the Fepruary 
28 meeting, it_ could not have been a surprise to any Board member. 
Besides recommending that parents have the option to take their 
children-out of the program, Adams also requested that the plan be 
revised to prohibit "the transferring of children with a poor 
59chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 4. The Board's 
policies on integration are considered in detail in chapter iii 
above. 
60southeast Economist (Chicago), February 22, 1968, p. 3. 
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disciplinary record or who are E[ducable] M [entally] H [andicapped], 
T [rainableJ M[entally] H[andicapped] or emotionally disturbed." 
He urged these changes mainly, "to cut down the flak from the 
receiving schools" and assure white parents that their children 
would not be bused against their will. 1161 
Adams' motion was deadlocked by the same five to five vote 
with which the entire Austin Plan was sent back to Redmond. Adams 
and Wild expressed surprise that the busing supporters would not 
agree to the compromise. For her part, Mrs. Malis thought the 
compromise was "appeasement" and, "making it optional won't quiet 
the protesters either." She felt a moral obligation was involved 
as the "parents- of students at May and Spencer Schools want the 
Board's moral support. If we make it optional, we would be putting 
the onus on them for sending their children to those Northwest Side 
schools." Mrs. Malis continued, "I personally don't think busing 
is earthshakingly important. But if the Board is going to go ahead 
with a busing program, it should be a good one, not a compromise. 1162 
However, if there was going to be any busing program, it 
appeared a compromise would be necessary. The pivotal votes of 
61Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1534 (First quote). 
Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, p. 3 (Second quote). 
62chicago Sun-Times, -February 29, 1968, pp. 3-4. 
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Adams and Wild were tied to the voluntary program. A discussion 
on working out the compromise followed immediately after the 
Wednesday session. The next day, Austin community leaders conferred 
with Redmond and expressed willingness to accept the compromise. A 
special meeting was called for Monday, March 4, 1968.63 
When the Board assembled, Redmond took the occasion to con-
sider some problems in the superintendent-board relationship. 
Observing that groups from the May and Spencer Schools had been 
bitter when discussing the fate of the busing plan, Redmond stated: 
The criticism of me has been that I have not used my leadership 
role to influence your opinions and decisions. There is not 
one of us who could do anything in those days but question 
his own conscience as a board member, as superintendent, and 
as an American citizen. It was no easier for you to act than 
it was for me to recommend. I firmly believe that the issue 
before us points up most clearly the necessity for the division 
of responsibility: me to recommend and you after deliberation 
to establish policy. I have no right to ask you to change your 
mind on policy any more than you have the right to ask me to 
change my mind on recommendations.64 
Regarding the racial issue, Redmond stated: 
But above and beyond our personal feelings is an issue that 
has been brought forth so forcefully in the Kerner Committee 
report. As this report pointed out the issue is the assim-
ilation of the black and white in an America which belongs to 
both of us by no merit of either one of us. However, it is 
63chicago's American, March 1, 1968, p. 3; March 2, 1968, p. l; 
March 4, 1968, p. 11. 
64Proceedings, March~' 1968, p. 1538. 
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more than the issue of black and white which is our concern. 
It is our responsibility to all children--the Indian, the 
Japanese, the Chinese, the Puerto Rican and every other con-
ceivable child of a minority group. 
Let no one forget this and let us not forget to say it, 
lest we be misunderstood in this day when everything is mis-
understood because of lack of communication. 
I do not believe that the Board report before us will 
resolve the massive urban problems which face us. I do believe 
that it does recognize your commitment and mine to the dignity 
of every child in our school system.65 
The amended proposal was accepted by an eight to one vote. 
Scheffler and Carey were absent. Scheffler had announced his 
intention of resigning and Carey was in Springfield to ask the 
state legislature to approve a raise in the tax rate being submitted 
to the voters in a bond issue. Mrs. Green cast the opposing vote. 
Again, it was the quota system which she found to be anathema to 
her principles. She observed: 
Now when we look at the facts, as we face them this day of 
our Lord, 1968, we already have an elementary Negro propon-
derance. If we bused in all directions right now, we would 
end up this evening with every elementary school in Chicago 
having more Negro children or black or Afro-Americans, than 
white children. So this means that we are setting up a system, 
a quota system, which not only discriminates against these 
Negro, black, Afro-Americans, but also imposes segregation 
because of a 15% quota [which] is going to mean that all of 
those children who are over there, not only the 85%, but all 
of them are going to.have to be in segregated schools. So 
this system not only means discrimination, it means 
65 rbid. 
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segregation.66 
Mrs. Wild stated that as far as she and other Board members 
were concerned, the main issue was overcrowded rooms. The Board 
could no longer tolerate overcrowding at one school while there 
were empty seats in another. ·The Board's decision was not a 
capitulation to "black power" but a question of doing what was 
morally right.67 
In accepting the compromise proposal Bacon asked for clarifi-
cation of several points. Under the amended plan the number of 
students to be bused was to be kept near the 563 originally pro-
posed. In order to compensate for parents who would refuse the 
transfer of their children, the motion authorized the superinten-
dent to select additional sending areas in the May and Spencer 
School districts. Once students were bused under the plan, they 
would continue to attend the receiving school until they graduated. 
Bacon also asked Redmond to watch for any signs of staff sabotage 
in which school employees might slow down implementation of the 
plan or discourage parents from taking advantage of the busing. 
66Proceedings, March 4, 1968, pp. 1538-39 (Quote). Northwest 
Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1. Chicago's American, March 4, 
1968, p. 11; March 5, 1968, p. 3. 
67Northwest Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1. 
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Redmond emphasized his intention to do so.68 
As the school staff commenced working to achieve an implemen-
tation date set between March 11, 1968, and March 18, 1968, oppo-
sition in the communities began to organize. Parents at the eight· 
northwest side schools called for a one-day boycott to keep their 
children home. In Springfield politicians called for a ten member 
joint committee to begin an investigation of Chicago protestors to 
Springfield. Bills were being introduced to prevent the Board from 
using state funds for busing to promote integration. The threat 
of demonstrations and violence at the receiving schools was a 
definite factor that the school staff would have to consider in 
implementing the plan.69 
In the midst of all the emotional turmoil, it was too easy to 
miss the few voices on the northwest side which supported the 
busing plan.· As one resident observed in a letter to the editor: 
How can we the minority be heard--or dare we be heard? I'm 
almost afraid when I see so much emotionalism and so little 
rational thinking. This thing is at high pitch, and I'm 
afraid to disagree.out loud.70 
68rbid. 
69chicago's American, March 4, 1968, pp. l; editorial, p. 7; 
March 5, 1968, p. 3. Northwest Times (Chicago), March 7, 1968, p. 1. 
70chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, p. 5. Northwest 
Times (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 1 (Quote). 
CHAPTER VII 
INVOCATION, APPLICATION, APPRAISAL 
AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS: 
THE PLA.N IN OPERATION 
On March 11, 1968,, one week after the Board made its busing 
decision, 249 students boarded buses to attend classes in the des-
ignated eight receiving schools. The children arrived at their 
new schools to face jeers, placards and ominous silence from white 
pickets assembled in groups estimated to consist of from 25 to 200 
persons at each of the buildings. Seventy-five policemen were 
assigned to the receiving schools to insure the safety of the 
bused students. One school had been firebombed earlier in the day, 
but the damage was slight, and no further violence was encountered. 
The parents of 323 students had accepted the assignment of their 
children to the new schools. The absence of a large number of the 
students to be bused was attributed to parents' fear for the safety 
of their children. On March 12, 1968, 290 children boarded the 
buses.l 
The speed with which the plan was implemented was 
lchicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, ·p. 3; March 12, 
1968, pp. 3, 4, 5. Chicago Daily News, March 11, 1968, p. 8. 
271 
272 
commendable. Physical alterations such as the addition of class-
room seats were completed before the new students arrived. Some 
staff members did complain of the short time allowed to prepare 
for the change of classes, the lack of clear cut definitions of 
responsibilities, confusion of time tables, and ,the sparsity of 
special personnel and human relations people. The administrators 
in the sending schools had been informed of the plans prior to 
those in the receiving schools.2 While staff at the sending 
schools did not complain of the lack of time involved, the task 
of convincing parents that they should allow their children to 
participate was a major problem. 
The busing plan set 573 as the number of pupils to be bused 
from the May and Spencer Schools. Pupils in grades one to six who 
resided in selected geographic areas which were predominantly 
Negro and at the greatest walking distance from the sending schools 
were eligible for transfer. Eighteen of these areas were origi-
nally selected in which over 578 students resided. Children were 
.
2stanley Ptak, Past Principal of the May School, private 
taped interview held in .his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 
1972. George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, 
"Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. 
An Evaluation" (report presented to the General Committee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968), 
pp. 4, 8, 18, 22. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as 
D.E., 1968. 
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screened to exclude mentally handicapped and emotionally disturbed 
students. Notes were sent home with the children in the selected 
areas telling the parents their children would be bused. If 
parents returned the approval form indicating they did not wish 
their child to participate, the child was exempted. The May-
Spencer United Corrnnittee sent representatives to visit parents 
urging them to allow their children to participate. Meetings were 
held to explain the plan and encourage acceptance. Emphasis was 
placed upon the chance for a better education in less crowded 
schools rather than upon integration.3 
Despite these efforts, only 330 students received parental 
approval. It was necessary to add 13 supplementary blocks which 
made a total of 1157 students eligible for busing. By April 8, 
1968 only 519 students had been recruited when the Board approved 
a recommendation that the transfer program be closed for the year 
to allow the sending and receiving schools to stabilize their 
classes for the remaining school year. Parents of the 638 students 
who did not participate were surveyed to find out why they chose 
3n.E., 1968, pp. 1, 2. Ptak, August 14, 1972. Chicago's 
American, March 6, 1968, p. l; March 9, 1968, p. 1. Board of 
Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings: Board of Education, City 
of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education, April 10, 1968), 
p. 1731. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings, date of meeting, 
page number. 
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not to have their children bused. A "Surrnnary of 'No' Responses" 
prepared by the area staff is reproduced on the following page.4 
The large percentage (26. 8 percent) of parents who gave no 
reason for refusing to send their children precludes any pretense 
to accuracy in determining anything but a general impression of 
the attitudes of those parents who refused. Preference for the 
neighborhood school was the most frequently given response. When 
coupled with objections to the distance their children would have 
to travel, worry that children were too young to go on the bus, 
not knowing what to do if children became sick, and pronouncements 
that they did not believe in busing, 35.4 percent of the 426 par-
ents who responded could be classified as objecting to some aspect 
of busing. Another 8.6 percent either expressed fear that their 
children would be harmed or worried about the prejudice their chil-
dren would face. Most of the remaining responses could be classi-
fied under problems originating at home such as conflicting work 
schedules of the parents, medical reasons and intentions to move. 
Eighteen parents (4.2 percent) objected to the time of year the 
plan was being initiated and one parent had a mistaken idea of the 
monetary cost of the plan to the parent. These objections 
4n.E., 1968, pp. 2, 3, 4. Proceedings, April 10, 1968, 
p. 1731; November 13, 1968, p. 800. 
TABLE 5 
WHY SOME PARENTS CHOSE NOT TO HAVE THEIR CHILDREN BUSEDa 
Reason Given 
No reason given 
Prefer neighborhood school 
Children needed at home to 
assist with younger ones 
Fear of harm to children; 
lack of protection 
Parents work; schedule 
prevents meeting or 
preparing children 
Family moving soon 
Distance too far from home 
Not at this time; wrong 
time of year 
Too young to go on bus; want 
child in neighborhood 
Prejudice facing children 
Too many transfers 
Personal reasons 
Medical reason; under 
doctor's care 
Cannot buy lunch 
No need to go; don't 
believe in busing 
Undecided (at this time) 
Don't know what to do if 
child gets sick 
Mistaken-idea on cost 
Child doesn't want to go 
Total 
May School 
Phase Phase 
I II 
39 
23 
12 
13 
3 
7 
10 
0 
4 
0 
0 
5 
5 
7 
0 
5 
3 
1 . 
1 
138 
48 
15 
8 
4 
8 
12 
2 
8 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
113 
Spencer School 
Phase Phase Total 
I II 
15 
44 
9 
8 
7 
0 
2 
7 
0 
6 
5 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
110 
12 
17 
0 
2 
7 
5 
4 
3 
6 
4 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6s 
114 
99 
29 
27 
25 
24 
18 
18 
12 
10 
10 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
5 
1 
1 
426 
Per 
Cent 
26.8 
23.2 
6.8 
6.3 
5.9 
5.6 
4.2 
4.2 
2.8 
2.3 
2.3 
1. 7 
1. 7 
1. 7 
1. 7 
1. 2 
1.2 
0.2 
0.2 
100.0 
Phase I--first 18 blocks Phase II--additional 13 blocks 
aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin 
Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Eval-
uation" (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago 
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968), pp. 3-4. 
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reflected problems in the execution of .the plan. The one parent 
was informed that transportation was free, but the inappropriate 
date for beginning the program had its origin in the decision-
making process of the Board.5 
Despite the fact that parents of 55.2 percent of the chil-
dren eligible for the busing program had denied their permission, 
waiting lists occurred in some areas. The number of students 
designated for a receiving school was determined by the quota 
system which governed the number of available seats in the re-
ceiving school. The total number of pupils transferring was not 
to exceed 11 perce~t of the total enrollment of the receiving 
school in the first year. As the seventh and eighth grades came 
to be included in the plan over the next two years a 15 percent 
quota limit was to be required. While it was the quota which 
determined the number of students who could attend the receiving 
school, the plan called for areas to be chosen to fill these 
seats, not students. Thus, if not enough parents accepted the 
transfer of their children from a certain area, the quota was not 
filled. If too many parents in a designated area accepted the 
transfer of their children, a waiting list occurred.6 
5 D.E., 1968, pp. 3-4. 6Ptak, August 14, 1972. 
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Orientation of the bused children included numerous factors. 
The children were to be at designated pick-up points at 8:15 A.M. 
and were to board the bus at 8:20 A.M. The bus ride was estimated 
at twenty to thirty minutes. A child welfare attendant with an 
attendance list rode along on the bus and remained at the receiving 
school as an aide for the day. As some schools had no facilities 
for providing lunches, students were instructed to bring their 
food. If a student became sick while at school, he was to be sent 
home in a cab with an adult, after notification of the parent. 
Stand-by buses were kept at the Burbank School to provide for any 
unexpected early closing of a school.7 
When the children arrived at their new schools, they were 
assigned to classrooms according to their grade level. Receiving 
school teachers had attended a series of in-service meetings to 
prepare for the transferring students. In most cases the required 
new textbooks had been ordered during the week of the March 4 
decision~ and some texts were already delivered by March 11, 1968. 
Seventeen new classroom teachers were assigned to the receiving 
schools. While a local newspaper complained that they were all 
7Ibid. Chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, p. 3. 
Robert Bell, Retired Superintendent of District Four, containing 
the Austin community, private interview at Schurz High Schools, 
Chicago, .Illinois, June 22, 1972. 
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substitutes and not assigned teachers, the teacher-student ratio 
in all but two schools decreased. At the Bridge and Lyon Schools 
the ratio rose from 31.5 to 32.6 and from 32.9 to 33.2, respec-
tively. All the schools received additional teacher aides, and 
two schools were given full-time adjustment teachers instead of 
their previous half-time teach~rs.8 
However, the Area C staff evaluation recognized that "many 
legitimate complaints by parents might have been prevented" if 
further auxiliary services had been increased. Lack of funds was 
given as the reason for not appointing full-time physical education, 
library and adjustment teachers in all the receiving schools.9 
Representative Pucinski had pointed out that these schools on the 
northwest side were not in poverty areas as designated under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and thus the new students 
did not bring in federal funds. 
The cost of the busing program compared to a.building pro-
gram is not easily determined. During the sixty-five school day 
period between March and June, the twelve buses cost $24,960.00 to 
rent. The salaries for the busing attendants and teacher aides 
8n.E., 1968, pp. 4, 8. Julian Lewitt, Principal of the 
Sayre Ele;entary School, telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois, 
August 12, 1972. Northwest Times (Chicago), March 14, 1968, p. 1. 
9 . D.E., 1968, p. 4. 
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amounted to $4,512.00 and $5,012.00 respectively for the two cate-
gories. Another $29,609.15 and $1,779.20 were required for watch-
men and security guards. The latter two costs were necessitated 
due to the fear that the children would be harmed. In the fol-
lowing full school year only $200.00 was spent for security. The 
total cost for the 1968-1969 school year was $132,424.00. The 
busing· enrollment during this year varied between a high of 621 in 
November which declined to 570 by June due to pupil transiency and 
decisions to return to the home school. Assuming a 600 student 
average, the cost per pupil was about $220.00. These costs, 
however, excluded teachers' salaries, textbooks, supplies and 
educational equipment--the operating expenses of a school excluding 
its physical plant.10 
Thus, the cost of the busing plan should be compared to the 
capital investment required to build a 600 pupil elementary school. 
The Board was involved in constructing a 600 student facility at 
102nd Street and Cottage Grove Avenue in 1968. The total estimated 
lOibid., p. 19. Robert M. Bell, District Superintendent, 
District Four, "Austin-Area Project: The Busing Program ~n District 
Four: A Second Report" (report presented to the General CoIImlittee 
of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 
1969), pp. 4, 30. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 
1969. Proceedings, November 13, 1968, p. 800. 
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cost for construction, site and development, equipment and archi-
tectural fees was $1,495,000. An equipment cost of $100,000 is 
retained in the total cost figure on the assumption that equipping 
a new school would entail considerably more expense than preparing 
an existing building for additional students. The average cost 
per pupil for the entire facility was $2,491.0o.ll When compared 
to the-$220.00 per pupil cost for busing, the cost of the new 
facility would be paid in about eleven years--assuming that the 
cost of busing would not increase during this period. But the cost 
of busing per pupil had increased each year. Taking the maximum 
·number of students bused during a school year as the divisor, the 
cost per pupil for busing in 1969-1970 was about $285 and during 
1970-1971 the cost was about $30o.12 Thus, it seems apparent that 
11Proceedings, November 13, 1968, p. 812. The 102nd Street 
and Cottage Grove Avenue facility was later expanded to accommodate 
1000 students at a cost per pupil of $1,985.00. The Orr School, 
being built for 485 students, was estimated to cost $1,294,000 
about $2,668 per pupil. See Proceedings, June 11, 1969, pp. 3046-47. 
12George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Third Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September 30, 1970), 
p. 30. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1970. 
Joseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-
Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth 
Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago 
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1970), p. 31. 
(Typewritten.) Hereinafte~ referred to as D.E., 1971. The cost 
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the cost of the busing program would pay for a schooi building 
over a decade. 
However, numerous other factors must be considered. The 
.Board building program operates on borrowed money. The interest 
charges on the borrowed sum would have to be added to the cost of 
the building or subtracted from the yearly cost of busing if the 
building cost was not incurred. To simplify the computations it 
could be assumed that the Board has the $1,495,000 in cash. Rather 
than building a plant, it invests the sum at 5 percent simple 
interest and uses the interest to operate the busing program. 
·This would provide $74,750 yearly, considerably less than the 
$132,424 required to operate the program during its least expensive 
year, but a factor in reducing the actual busing costs. The cost 
of the program to the Board is further reduced by the availability 
of state funds to defray transportation costs. In 1969-1970 this 
amounted to $43,185.28, but in 1970-1971 the amount.dropped to 
in 1969-1970 was $156,314.56 with a maximum of 575 bused students. 
In 1970-1971 the cost was $165,800 with a maximum of 532 bused 
students. As the number of students bused in the program fell 
below 600, the cost per pupil was used as a constant in computing 
the cost of the program compared to a 600 pupil facility., 
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$8,162.os.13 
The cost of the busing program can also be questioned in 
terms of the relative costs of operating a new plant compared to 
the expanded use of existing facilities. Thus, the cost of heating 
and a portion of the maintenance services at the receiving schools 
represent fixed costs which would increase only slightly with the 
increase in enrollment. These fixed costs would have to be en-
tirely duplicated at a new facility. An approximation of the 
saving in heating and maintenance expenditures can be made by 
examining the costs in the Lyon and Smyser Schools for the budget 
years January, 1967, through January, 1970. At the Lyon School, 
where the enrollment hovered around 650 during these years, there 
was no appreciable difference in operations costs between the two 
years budgeted without busing and the two years budgeted with the 
busing program. Indeed, a minor readjustment in the scheduling of 
janitors for the building resulted in a $5,720.25 reduction in 
operation staff salaries from $36,963.25 in the 1968 budget to 
$31,243.00 in the 1969 budget. An increase in salaries accounted 
for the only,rise in operation expenditures from 1969 to 1970. 
13n.E., 1970, p. 30. D.E., 1971, p. 31. Capital loss 
through inflation can be ignored in the example as the Board 
building program operates on borrowed funds. The 5% interest may 
be conservative but is not unrealistic for the years involved. 
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The situation did not change considerably at the Smyser 
School, where the enrollment hovered around 600 students during 
the period. Again, a change in scheduling of custodial staff 
resulted in a reduction of salary costs from $36,484.80 in the last 
pre-busing budget to $30,964.00 in the 1969 budget. At both 
schools the heating and electricity costs did not indicate any 
appreciable differences between the period when the busing plan 
was in operation and prior periods. The effects of weather and 
sunlight are more apparent than the increase in student enrollment. 
Maintenance costs at both schools showed absolutely no relationship 
to the number of students in attendance.14 
In light of this data it is appropriate to consider the 
costs of providing heating, lighting and custodial staff as fixed 
costs. These fixed costs do not fluctuate considerably with minor 
changes in the size of the student body such as were introduced 
by the busing plan. However, if a new building were. erected to 
acconnnodate the total student body being bused, these fixed costs 
would arise in the new structure in addition to similar fixed costs 
in the existing buildings. Taking the lowest figures for the four 
year period considered among the two schools, we can compute a 
14Proceedings, January 13, 1967, pp. 1923, 2195; January 10, 
1968, pp. 2019, 2291; January 11, 1969, pp. 2045-46, 2331-32; 
January 15, 1970, pp. 2215-16, 2502-03. 
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reasonably accurate minimum operational cost for a new building. 
This would be: $30,964 for custodial salaries; $1,908 for elec-
tricity; $1,766 for fuel--a total of $34,638 for minimal fixed 
costs. When the $74,750 interest cost on the capital investment 
is added to the fixed cost, the sum totals $109,338. This figure 
approaches the $132,424 required to operate the busing plan. When 
state aid for busing programs is added, the true monetary cost of 
the busing program compared to a building program becomes insig-
nificant. 
The psychological cost of busing to the egos of the trans-
ported students is another factor to consider. The hostility in 
the receiving communities was overt in the beginning a.nd.only 
veiled as time passed. Of course, not all residents in the re-
ceiving communities were opposed to the busing plan. Some residents 
of the northwest side organized to express their favorable attitudes 
toward integration. Local school administrators reported a few 
letters of support and one even received a check to help the bused 
children. Some white children invited bused students to their 
homes for lunch. Even the anti-busing organizations disavowed 
threats of violence. 
While no harm came to any of the bused children, their 
reception in the receiving~community was hostile. Besides the 
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pickets stationed at the receiving schools; white parents had 
organized ,a boycott keeping their children out of classes. These 
boycotts were relatively effective, keeping about 700 students out 
of school on the first day of busing. Nor did they diminish in 
effectiveness during the first months of busing. Late in March a 
cycling boycott between the receiving schools was reported to have 
kept 217 of 546 students out of the Smyser School. Another, two 
days later, at the Locke School resulted in 455 absences while 390 
students were present. In May, a united boycott involving the 
northwest, southeast and southwest sides of the city raised the 
city-wide absence rate from a normal 8 percent to 10.6 percent. 
As late as 1972, a local administrator, while judging community 
activity toyave diminished, requested that parents in the area 
not be interviewed in fear that hostility might be awakened.15 
Besides the boycotts, anti-busing adherents had called for 
the defeat of a pending bond issue, an elected rather than ap-
pointed school board, moving from affected communities, use of 
alternate schools, legislative intervention, court orders to 
15chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, pp. 3, 5; March 
12, 1968, pp. 3, 4, 5. Bell, June 22, 1972. Lewitt, August 12, 
1972. Chicago's American, March 4, 1968, p. l; March 5, 1968, 
p. 3; March 6, 1968, p. 4; March 9, 1968, p. 1. Northwest Times 
(Chicago), March 14, 1968, p. l; March 25, 1968, p. l; May 8, 
1968, p. 1. 
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prohibit busing. In none of these areas were they particularly 
successful. 
In June, 1968, the bond referendum for the schools passed 
with a 52 percent majority compared to the acceptance of a bond 
issue the year before by 62.6 percent of the voters. Heavy major-
ities in Negto wards offset the negative votes of residents of the 
predominantly white northwest and southwest sides. An estimat~d 
80 percent to 92 percent of voters in inner-city wards voted for 
the referendum. In all the northwest side wards the negative vote 
varied between 53 percent and 77 percent. In the west side ward 
affected by the busing plan 94 percent of the votes cast were 
affirmative. In the two northwest side wards affected by the 
busing plan 79 percent and 84 percent of the votes cast were 
negative.16 
Anti-busing forces were also not able to convince a major-
ity of the voters in the city that an elected school board would 
be advantageous. In June, 1971, city voters, by a three to one 
ratio, rejected a school referendum to elect members from fifteen 
neighborhood districts. The referendum was even defeated on the 
northwest and southwest sides where sentiment for it originated. 
16chicago Daily News, June 12, 1968, pp. 1, 6. 
J 
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The fear that elected members would become too enmeshed in politics 
was considered to be a dominant factor in the electorate's decision. 
Apparently, the electorate also agreed with Wild's observation 
that "if we all [Board members] represented a different area . 
no decision would ever be reached. 11 17 
The mayor had not been immediately responsive to the demands 
of residents in the western periphery of the city that Board members 
be appointed to represent their areas. Within weeks following the 
busing decision Daley announced that he would attempt to appoint 
members to represent a more equitable geographical cr.oss-section 
of the city. He also expressed the desire to appoint members who 
would be sensitive to the feelings of the "average man in the 
neighborhoods." However, it became apparent that these were not 
his only considerations in making appointments. The retirement of 
Scheffler soon opened a position on the Board. At the same time 
the terms of Whiston and Murray expired. When liber~l members of 
the nominating committee were able to exclude the names of the 
president and vice-president of the Board from the list of nominees, 
Daley appointed them without the recommendation. To balance the 
17"Feminine Angle Magazine," Chicago Sun-Times, June 6, 
1971, pp. 1, 28; June 9, 1971, p. l; editorial, June 10, 1971; 
June 11, 1971, p. 2. Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 29, 
1968, p. 7 (Quote). Chicago Tribune, June 7, 1971, p. 5. 
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appointment of the two conservative Board members Daley chose Mrs. 
Carey Preston, a Negro from the southeast Hyde Park area of the 
city. The western areas of the city remained without represen-
tation.18 
The overriding importance of keeping a man of his choice in 
the Board presidency was again apparent in the mayor's choices in 
1968 and 1970. Bacon, an outspoken critic of Board policies, was 
challenging Whiston for the presidency. The appointment of Jack 
Witkowsky to replace Oliver on the Board resulted in a six to five 
vote for Whiston. Two years later, Wi~kowsky was ready to join 
with the minority of five to elect Bacon rather than Whiston. 
Despite the fact that he was renominated for his position Witkowsky 
was passed over by Daley and Gerald Sbarbaro was appointed to the 
Board. The significance of Sbarbaro's residency in the west side 
Austin area is clouded by the importance of his critical vote in 
reelecting Whiston.19 
In 1969 two more vacancies occurred with the retirement of 
Adams and Green. Daley's choices for their replacement were both 
l8chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). This 
topic is also discussed above in chapter ii, pp. 21-24. 
19Jack Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," 
Saturday Review, LIV (November 20, 1971), 90-92. Chicago Sun-
Times, March 22, 1971, pp., 14, 42. 
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representatives of minority groups who lived in the southeast area 
of the city. Mrs. David Gerta was of Latin-American origin and 
lived in Calumet Heights-which contained three elementary schools 
which had been designated as receiving schools in the defunct 
South Shore plan. Alvin J. Boutte, from Chatham to the west of 
Avalon Park, was the third Negro on the Board. Northwest and 
southwest side organizations opposed the appointment of these two 
new Board members on the grounds that they would not represent 
the views of the white communities. 20 
When Whiston died, Mrs. Catherine Rohter was appointed to 
the Board. The first member to be appointed from the northwest 
side, she cast her crucial vote for Carey in his contest with 
Bacon for the Board presidency. Later in 1971, Murray died, and 
Daley appointed Thomas J. Nayder to fill the vacancy. While Nayder 
came from the southwest side, he stated he intended to represent 
the viewpoint of organized labor rather than his neighborhood. 
Nayder had succeeded Murray as president of the Chicago Building 
Trades Council and was also an officer of the Chicago Plan which 
was created to find construction jobs for minority groups-~a 
20chicago Daily News, July 29, 1969, p. 16. 
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project which was not particularly successful in Chicago.21 
In the spring of 1971 Carey had announced that he was not 
seeking reappointment to the Board. The problem of finding a new 
candidate for the presidency who would represent organized labor 
interests seems to have been the major incentive for the mayor's 
next action. In June, Carey announced that civic leaders had 
convinced him to seek another term. Without waiting for the nomi-· 
nation of his screening committee, Daley reappointed Carey. The 
mayor argued that Carey had been approved by the screening commit-
tee when he was first appointed, and stated, "After a man has once 
been approved by the citizens' committee, it is up to the mayor of 
Chicago to decide whether he has served well. 11 22 Busing supporters 
certainly could not have interpreted the mayor's action to be 
hostile, as Carey had been one of the most outspoken supporter3 of 
the busing plan. 
The mayor had no cause for alarm in the threats of angry 
whites that they would move from the city. Talk of the secession 
of the northwest communities never passed the formulative stage. 
Threats that white residents would move from the receiving 
21Chicago Sun-Times, March 22, 1971, pp. 1, 4; June 11, 
1971, p. 2. 
22chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1971, p. 2; June 25, 1971, 
p. 4 (Quote). 
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communities never materialized as fact. Reference to Table 6-on 
the following page shows the enrollment of white students in the 
first three years of the busing program to be almost steadily 
increasing in numbers in four receiving schools, the enrollment to 
remain stable in two schools, and only two schools that experience 
the loss of more than thirty-five students. If 1967 is used as a 
base year for computing percentage of increase or decrease by 1972, 
then five schools experienced a decrease in enrollment between 2.1 
percent and 9.8 percent while three schools experienced an increase 
of between 1.3 percent and 15.2 percent. 
However, if the total enrollment in the eight schools in 
1967 is compared to the total enrollment in 1972 then there is an 
actual percentage increase in white enrollment of about 0.4 percent. 
If the Bridge School is dropped from the calculations because of 
its.sudden increase in enrollment in 1969 (explained below), the 
total enrollment over five years dropped only 1.03 percent. The 
stability of white enroliment is all the more significant in light 
of the fact that the entire city lost a startling 35.7 percent 
of its non-Negro elementary school enrollment during this 
TABLE 6 
KINDERGARTEN THROUGH EIGHTH GRADE CAUCASIAN ENROLLMENT 
IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS: 1967--1972'1 
Percent 
Sept. Sept. Sept. Oct. Sept. Oct. Change, 5yr. 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Period 
Bridge 426 413 525 593 601 591 
Burbank 390 393 396 413 390 382 
Dever 854 826 850 846 827 806 
Locke 854 863 849 833 816 806 
Lyon 610 600 594 575 573 550 
Sayre 448 478 504 520 519 454 
Smyser 560 554 567 573 602 598 
O.A.Thorp 762 770 764 802 771 736 
Total 4904 4897 5049 5155 5099 4923 
Total Enrollment Without Bridge 
4478 4484 4524 4562 4498 4432 
City-wide Non~Negroid Elementary Schoul Enrollment 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
196' 152 _194' 125 190 ,440 187 '795 180' 908 126, 362 
15. 2 "' 
2.1 "' 
5.6 '1t 
5. 6 .v 
9. 8 .v 
1. 3 1' 
6. 8 1' 
3.4 ~ 
-o:4 1' 
1. 0 .Jt 
35.7 .it 
aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Obser-
vation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 
1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, District Four). Board of Education, 
City of Chicago, Open Enrollment: A Progress Report (Chicago: 
Board of Education, November, 1972), p. 17. 
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period.23 
The use of alternative schools in which white students could 
escape integration was never a viable plan for northwest side resi-
dents. The cost of the necessary resources and personnel would 
have been beyond their lower-middle class means. The enrollment 
figures indicate they did not "escape" to suburban systems. The 
Catholic schools in the area could not accept a large increase in 
enrollment, and it was evident that they would not. The announced 
Catholic school busing plan, while totally voluntary on both sides 
in its final form, was nebulous enough in its early stages so that . 
no one was certain how it would be developed. Indeed, parishioners 
talked of withdrawing their children from the Catholic schools to 
enroll them in the receiving schools so that the empty·classrooms 
would be filled with neighborhood students. Again, the stable 
23chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, 
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 
1971, 1972, District Four). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. 
Board of Education, City of Chicago, Open Enrollment: A Progress 
Report (Chicago: Board of Education, November, 1972), p. 17. 
Hereinafter referred to as Open Enrollment Report. In 1970 
Mexicans were counted separately. Before this year they were in-
cluded in the Caucasian count. In compiling the statistics between 
1967 and 1972, taking the non-Negroid city-count compensates for 
the sudden drop in Caucasian enrollment that appears to occur in 
1970. As a cursory glance indicates the Mexican enrollment has 
increased since 1970, the actual decrease of Caucasian students may 
be greater than the percentage indicated in this paper. That is, 
the 35.7% drop in enrollment would represent the smallest possible 
drop in Caucasian enrollment. 
r 
294 
enrollment figures show this did not occur. The one apparent 
exception is the large jump in enrollment at Bridge School in 1969. 
Interviews with area parents indicate that this was caused by the 
withdrawal of students from the local Catholic school. However, 
opposition to busing was not a motive. In this year the local 
Catholic school increased its tuition greatly and dropped the 
kindergarten program. Many parents, especially those with large 
families, then enrolled their children in the public school. 24 
While overt opposition from parents in the receiving conunu-
nities declined, there were still lingering protests. Some state 
legislators initiated an investigation of the school system and 
prepared bills to prohibit school bo~rds from using state funds to 
promote integration. By June, 1968, it was apparent that two bills 
designed to outlaw school busing were faltering when not a single 
witness appeared at the hearing to urge their passage. On the 
other hand, the Chicago School Board president, the Chicago 
Teachers' Union president, the executive secretary of the Illinois 
24New World (Chicago), January 26, 1968, p. 1. Northwest 
Times (Chicago), March 21, 1968, p. l; March 28, 1968, p. 6. 
Mrs. Maureen Hickey, Bridge School parent, telephone interview, 
Chicago, Illinois, January 6, 1974. Mrs. Donna Nabors, Bridge 
School parent, telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois', January 6, 
1974. Ex-officer of the Bridge School Parent-Teachers Association, 
telephone interview, Chicago, Illinois, January 6, 1974. 
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Federation of Teachers, and a representative of the Illinois Edu-
cation Association testified against the bills. When the State 
Chicago School Board Study Commissiqn, dominated by opponents of 
busing, issued its report in June, 1970, it received little 
attention in the city.25 
But anti-busing sentiment has grown in the state and has 
certainly not died in the city. The busing program was challenged 
in the courts. While the Illinois Appellate Court did not uphold 
the protests, it did find the cases to be moot and dismissed them 
without prejudice in 1969. Thus, the Illinois courts have not shut 
the door to further legal ch~llenges to busing. Subsequent actions 
by the state's Office of the Superintendent of Public Inst.ruction 
outlining integration plans for Illinois raised the ire of numerous 
state legislators. In 197·3 two south suburban legislators intro-
duced an anti-busing amendment to the Illinois School Code which 
became law during the year. The legislation, which amends the 
sections defining powers of the Chicago and other boards of edu-
cation, states, "Nothing herein shall be construed to permit or 
empower the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to order, 
25chicago's American, March 4, 1968, pp .. 1, 7, 11. Chicago 
Sun-Times, June 15, 1968, p. 22; June 9, 1970, p. 4; June 10, 1970, 
p. 45. Chicago Daily News, June 14, 1968, p. 3. Northwest Times 
(Chicago), September 4, 1968, p. 4. 
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mandate or require busing or other transportation of pupils for the 
purpose of achieving racial balance in any school."26 
The Chicago Board of Education remained hesitant to expand 
its involvement in busing prog~ams. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the Austin busing program has not been expanded since the 
second year of its inception. In late 1968 parents of students in 
the Emmet· School, on the western edge of the city in Austin, asked 
the Board to approve a voluntary busing plan to relieve overcrowding 
in the school. Black and white spokesmen for the predominantly 
white school (73.8 percent in September, 1968) wanted a program 
that would carry their children into northwest side schools. Two 
Board members, Friedman and Witkowsky, indicated their approval. 
However, Witkowsky was reported to have said that funds were not 
available for further busing programs and the pro-busing forces on 
26 Illinois, Public Law 78-881 (passed September 19, 1973), 
amending chapter cxxii, section 10-22.5 and 34-18.7 of The School 
Code of Illinois. Section 10-22 deals with powers of boards of edu-
cation in the state. Section 34-18 deals with powers of the Chicago 
Board of Education. Telephone calls to offices of National Associ-
ation of Colored People and the Chicago Urban League, February 22, 
1974, indicated they had no plans to contest the state amendment. 
Indeed, the office staff had no knowledge that the legislation 
existed. One group indicated that the law had probably slipped 
by their lobbyist as they were now concentrating on obtaining 
positions for minority members in decision-making roles. 
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the Board "didn't have the votes" to push the program through.27 
In January, 1969, a busing proposal for the Emmet School 
suggested by Friedman was defeated in a nonrecorded vote. The 
Board continued with its policy of erecting semi-permanent "relo- · 
eatables" while the school operated on a double shift. In March, 
1971, the five branches of the Emmet School had 3,562 students com-
pared to its enrollment of 1,448 in September, 1968. A busing 
program was finally initiated. However, the Emmet plan differed 
considerably from the May and Spencer program. Students from the 
Emmet West School, then over 95 percent black, were not allowed to 
decline to participate in the plan. About 350 students, in eleven 
classrooms containing grades two through five, were chosen to be 
transferred as units to five elementary schools. One receiving 
school was on the west side about three miles from the Emmet West. 
The other four schools were located on the near north side, about 
nine miles from the sending school.28 
Two of the receiving schools had almost totally black student 
27chicago Daily News, October 23, 1968, p. 3. Chicago 
Tribune, November 13, 19·68, p. 6 (Quote). 
28Proceedings, January 22, 1969, p. 2509; March 1, 1971, pp. 
2755-57. Headcounts, 1968, 1969, 1970, District Four. Chicago 
Sun-Times, March 2, 1971, p. 14. See Table 8, p. 322 below for a 
summary of the phenominal growth of the Emmet student body. 
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bodies (95.2 percent and 99.1 percent in September, 1971). One 
receiving school was desegregated with about a 25 percent black 
student enrollment. The remaining two receiving schools had only 
a few black students enrolled (2.4 percent and 5.3 percent). 
Parents at the Lincoln Schools (5.3 percent Negro) had indicated 
to the school planning staff their willingness to participate in 
the program. When announced, the Emmet busing plan was scheduled 
only for the period from March until June, 1971. Furthermore, it 
was emphasized that the plan was not for purposes of desegregation. 
Board member Bacon was quoted as observing, "This is really no 
different from a boundary change to relieve overcrowding." Mrs. 
Malis remarked, "The fact that children will get there by bus is 
incidental. 11 29 
Despite the fact that the plan did not affect their areas, 
residents from the northwest and southwest sides of the city 
attended the Board meeting to protest the Board's decision. Repre-
sentatives of organizations from these areas expressed their con-
tinuing opposition to busing programs and their fear that their 
29Proceedings, March 1, 1971, pp. 2755-57. Headcounts, 1971, 
1972, Districts Seven, Eight. Chicago Sun-Times, March 2, 1971, 
p. 14 (Quotes). Francis B. McKeag, past Assistant Superintendent, 
School Planning, Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview 
held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971. 
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children would be bused at some future date. The hearings which 
preceded the Emmet busing decision had disturbed Mrs. Malis. She 
had encountered opposition to the plan not only from lay people 
but from some school staff members. This encounter provoked an 
attempt by Mrs. Malis to define the board-staff relationship. 
She said: 
I do not think that lay boards are supposed to be educators. 
I think that we pay educators, that we are here to set policy . 
. . . I think it is very, very difficult for those of us who 
know that in some instances policies of the Board of Education 
have been undermined by staff members at various levels, and 
when I use the word undermined, I mean that they are not always 
implemented according to the intent of the Board. When I read 
an editorial in a community newspaper that accuses the Board 
about poor planning, and, in fact, many times since I have been 
on this Board, we, as members, have also said this to staff 
... that you are not planning correctly, you are not pro-
jecting fast enough, you are not building fast enough, there 
are too many delays .... I take exception to the fact that 
Board members must take the brunt of this criticism since we 
must depend upon the information supplied to us by the staff. 
We, the members, have tried to respond to the needs of ou~· 
schools and when an editorial says that it has become apparent 
that the Board of Education, as now constituted, is inadequate, 
incompetent, and worse, not terribly concerned. [sic] You can 
understand, I think, why I am disturbed by a statement 
such as this .... Therefore, Dr. Redmond, I think that it is 
a very important thing for you to consider. I don't know how 
many other Board members will agree with me, but I think it is 
a very important thing for you to consider that it is time for 
our staff at all levels, from teacher on up, to understand 
that when this Board sets a policy it means for it to be 
implemented according to the intent of the Board.30 
30chicago Sun-Times, March 2, 1971, p. 14. Proceedings, March 
1, 1971, pp. 2755-57 (Quote). 
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Within a month after the implementation of this short-lived 
busing program, the staff submitted an interim evaluation of the 
Emmet West busing plan. This report emphasized that elements of 
the receiving communities were amenable to the program. Indeed, 
one community was "developing plans for the cooperative exchange 
of children" and "others wanted the bused children integrated into 
their own student body." All school staff members who were inter-
viewed were reported to have been enthusiastic about the plan.31 
The parents of the bused children who also had siblings in 
the sending school were reported to have noticed an "immediate and 
extensive improvement in both academic progress and social behavior 
in their children who remained at Emmet West and those who were 
bused." The sending school parents in all categories (those with 
children only at the sending school, only being bused, or a combi-
nation) were asked, "Would you prefer to have your child bused 
even after there is room for him at a neighborhood school?" The 
report found, "The overwhelming response was that they would prefer 
a neighborhood school that is uncrowded, with quality education. 11 32 
31Joseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, "Interim 
Evaluation of Emmet West Busing Program'' (report presented to the 
Ge.neral Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, April, 
1971), pp. 1, 2 (Quote), 3. (Typewritten.) · 
32
rbid .. , pp. 3 (Second, third quotes), 4 (First quote). 
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Criticisms of the program were that the bused children were 
isolated by being kept i11 the same class groups that they had 
attended in the sending school. Some teachers from the sending 
school were inexperienced. The most frequently mentioned complaint 
was that the staff and community councils at the receiving schools 
were not included in the planning stage. There was no reason for 
them to express their concern. The Emmet busing program was sched-
uled to end by September, 1971, when "demountable" semi-permanent 
structures were located in the overcrowded community. Despite the 
expressed desire of some parents of the Lincoln School, the program 
was not extended into the next year. It has been suggested that 
the excessive travel time, about forty minutes each way, and the 
availability of better facilities in their own neighborhood dampened 
a.ny interest among black parents in continuing the program.33 
Buildi°ng remained the major policy to relieve overcrowding 
in community schools under Redmond, as it had been under Willis. 
Mrs. Malis' comments on the Emmet School program indicate the 
emphasis placed upon this type of program. Every administrator 
interviewed made reference to the building program. Use of 
33Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 7. "Demountable" structures are prefab-
ricated units which may be assembled or disassembled rapidly at a 
site. A poured concrete slab on which the demountable is erected 
is considered the only permanent site cost. 
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temporary structures, additions to previous structures, the use of 
nearby buildings which could be adapted for classrooms, and the 
erection of entirely new schools have been the major means of com-
bating overcrowding.34 
A serious obstacle to building permanent structures, besides 
the non-availability of funds, has been disagreement about the 
location of sites. Construction of the Austin Middle School was 
delayed for years as black and white elements in the area fought 
over its placement which would have affected desegregation in the 
locality. Another problem associated with permanent structures 
has been the changing demographic equation. Desegregating neigh-
borhoods have first experienced a rapid increase in public school 
enrollment. However, as the neighborhood facilities are subjected 
to severe overuse, an area has tended to decay rapidly. Thus, the 
Board finds it has erected permanent structures to serve a popu-
lation which disappears.35 
These changes in population dispersion have also had reper-
cussions on the effectiveness of the permissive transfer or open 
enrollment program. The· open enrollment plan is bound to the 
34McKeag, August 30, 1971; Bell, June 22, 1972. (Above, 
chapter ii~ offers a more detailed analysis of these problems.) 
35rbid. 
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distribution of students throughout the schools. Iri the 1960's, 
the rapidly expanding black population of the city found its chil-
dren were often crowded into schools built to serve a smaller 
school-age clientele. The white population of the city, usually 
residing in stable neighborhoods, often had schools which became 
underutilized as children grew up but their parents remained in 
the area. During this period a permissive transfer program could 
have some effect on desegregation as black students could move from 
overutilized schools to the less crowded schools in predominantly 
white areas. However, by the 1970's, the school capacity trend 
has reversed itself. The movement of the white population to the 
periphery of the city has resulted in overcrowding in predominantly 
white schools. Many black neighborhoods, with facilities suffering 
from overutilization, have lost a considerable segment of their 
population and student bodies. Thus, the permissive transfer 
program is unlikely to result in any considerable desegregation as 
white students have not transferred to predominantly black schools 
very frequently.36 
Indeed, the black· students had not utilized the permissive 
transfer plan to any great extent. The high school program, begun 
36open Enrollment Report, pp. 19-23. Above: chapter iii, 
pp. 100-01, 116-17; chapter iv, pp. 123-26; chapter v, pp. 172-74. 
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in 1963, reached its maximum in 1966 when 1500 students participated. 
In 1967 the number fell to 957 and has almost steadily dropped to 
329 in 1972. When the number of students who were eligible to 
utilize this plan is compared to the number who have, the failure 
of the program becomes more evident. In 1968 the percentage of 
students approved for transfers was 10.4 percent of the number of 
students eligible to transfer from a sending school. In 1972 this 
percentage had dropped to 4.4 percent. It must also be remembered 
that not all the students receiving transfers were black. Further-
more, not all the students accepted for transfer chose finally to 
use the plan.37 
In 1972 a Chicago Schools work-study report examined the 
efficacy of the open enrollment program regarding desegregation. 
It recognized numerous factors which have operated to prevent the 
permissive transfer plan from becoming a viable factor in inte-
gration. The report observed that many minority students have not 
used the plan because of hostility in the receiving schools and the 
onus placed on students and parents to initiate the transfer them-
selves. The students who do choose to transfer often represent a 
group strongly interested in education whose absence from the 
37open Enrollment Report, pp. 20-22. Proceedings, August 28, 
1968, p. 240. 
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sending school may help to lower its morale and aspiration level. 
The transferring students are often faced with a long trip from 
their neighborhood to the school. They may discover that it is 
difficult to maintain strong bonds with peer groups both at the 
receiving school and in their own neighborhoods; that is, they may 
become disassociated from both groups. While all these factors may 
serve to discourage students from transferring, it is the demo-
graphic change which insures that there will be less utilization 
of the, transfer plan. The number of white schools designated as 
underutilized is becoming smaller.38 
The work study report stated to the Board that voluntary 
transfer plans are ineffective in achieving integration. The 
report suggested that the "obvious alternative is the use of man-
datory transfers in accordance with certain guidelines.'' These 
guidelines were those suggested in the Redmond Report of 1967. 
The Redmond Report had observed that voluntary "transfer programs 
have had largely symbolic effects, for few Negroes transfer," and 
the programs "do little or nothing to stem the flight of whites 
from the 'threatened' neighborhood." The work study report called 
attention to the short-term (transfer programs, boundary changes, 
38open Enrollment Report, pp. 7-9. 
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site selection and school pairing), the intermediate-term (magnet 
schools) and long-term (educational parks) suggestions of the 
Redmond Report. Issued in November,_ 1972, the work study report 
observed, five years after the Redmond Report and over four years 
after the Austin busing p~an, that the strategy of the Redmond 
Report "has not been implemented to date. 11 39 
Certainly, the educational park concept had progressed little 
beyond the initial study stage. The first feasibility study of a 
cultural park project had been made in February, 1968. This 
involved a rather grandiose scheme to build a complex of both 
educational and cultural plants at fifteen locations throughout the 
city. These centers would include facilities for educating children 
from pre-school through the secondary level. From 10,000 to 25,000 
people would utilize the facilities each day. The leading black 
Chicago newspaper and the Urban League had called for about thirty-
two such units in a series of articles which appeared to be a 
reaction to ex-Chicago School Superintendent Willis' neighborhood 
39Ibid., pp. 27 (Quotes), 28-31. Pertinent parts of the 
Redmond Rej?Ort are considered in chapter v, pp. 176·-82. 
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school policy.40 
By 1971, another study expanded upon the educational cluster 
concept. It continued to advocate several models adapted to 
Chicago's specific demographic problems. These clusters were to 
be more decentralized than the conventional educational park plans 
and allow for specialized interests at each center. The clusters 
would include: Schomes, which are neighborhood pre-school, cog-
natively oriented school-homes serving about 150 children between 
the ages of three to six and intimately associated with an elemen-
tary school; Elementary Centers, which emphasize individualized 
instruction; Middle Schools, which serve ages eleven through 
fourteen, paying special attention to the developmental needs of 
this age group; Modified Secondary Schools, which offer a diverse 
and flexible set of alternatives for the student; Planning Centers, 
which would offer diagnostic and preventive educational planning 
for students and staff as well as providing liaison .services 
between schools, communities and educational administrative 
40Donald J. Leu and I. Carl Candoli, A Feasibility Study of 
the "Cultural Educational Park" for Chicago, Report Presented to 
the Board of Education, City of Chicago, February, 1968 (Chicago: 
Bo_ard of Education, 1968). Chicago Daily Defender, December 12, 
14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 1967. Thomas S. Teraji, Past Director, Division 
of Attendance Area Studies, Chicago Public Schools, private taped 
interview held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, May 31, 1973. 
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agencies. These planning centers would also coordinate the efforts 
of the cultural-educational clusters with art and cultural centers, 
junior colleges, universities, parochial schools and the public 
magnet schools. An estimate of the construction costs of the long-
range program was set at about one and one-half billion dollars.41 
While the educational park concept is far from becoming a 
reality, the magnet school plan, suggested in the Redmond Report, 
has been set in motion. Three to seven magnet schools are contem-
plated. Each school would emphasize a special program such as 
performing arts, science, or business. A school would serve about 
1800 students equally divided into three age groups; three to six, 
seven to ten, and eleven to fourteen years of age. Th~ school is 
internally decentralized to minimize numbers and fear. Units 
housing about 200 students will be assigned teacher teams. Various 
groupings and individualized instruction will be emphasized. The 
magnet school is designed to develop willing integration among 
diverse economic and racial groups by offering a superior 
4lnonald J. Leu and I. Carl Candoli, Planning for the Future: 
A Recorrnnended Long-Range Educational and Facilities Plan for Chicago, 
Report Presented to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, August, 
1971 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1971), pp. 36-50, passim, 
62-63. 
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educational program. 42 
Thus far the Walt Disney Magnet School on the northeast side 
of the city is the only magnet school in operation. However, a 
"mini-magnet" school concept was the basis of the plan finally 
submitted to the Board as a substitute for the intra-community 
busing plan rejected for South Shore. Two facilities, one located 
in the Black School and another in a Hebrew school, both in South 
Shore, were designated as receiving schools. Three hundred pupils 
in grades one through six were to be culled from twenty elementary 
schools in Districts Seventeen, Twenty-two and Twenty-seven. 
Attendance at the receiving schools was on a voluntary basis. The 
racial balance of the student body was deliberately managed by 
choosing among the volunteers so that the student body was equally 
divided among black and white students. The plan was "to offer a 
quality, integrated program of education superior to those now 
offered at any school in the area so that parents will voluntarily 
seek to enroll their children in the facilities. 1143 
The plan was accepted unanimously by the members of the 
Board. The South East Community Organization approved the program. 
42Ibid., pp.40-43. 
43Proceedings, July 10, 1968, pp. 49 (Quote), 50-52; 
September 25, 1968, p. 44.4. 
Only a few dissenters appeared at the meeting to predict that there 
would be no volunteers from the schools which had almost totally 
white student bodies. Of over 1600 students who applied for 
admission about 300 volunteers were white. The students were 
chosen by factor of grade, sex, race, home school and then picked 
by lottery. In the first group 152 were white and 148 were black 
while there were an equal number of boys and girls. In 1971 the 
program was operating with 400 students. Reading scores were seven 
months above the national average. As the area has become 
increasingly resegregated black, it has become more difficult to 
recruit white students and the sending area has been expanded. The 
program still remains one of the most promising in Chicago.44 
The mini-magnet plan was not designed to stabilize the South 
Shore area. Stabilization did not occur. In September, 1968, the 
total percentage of whites enrolled in the public schools of South 
Shore District Twenty-two was 30.7 percent. Two years later only 
7.2 percent of the total enrollment in the district was Caucasian. 
By 1974 it was estimated that 80 percent of the residents in South 
Shore were black people.· But if it were to be argued that the 
44Proceedings, October 9, 1968, p. 684. Chicago Sun-Times, 
July 11, 1968, p. 10; July 14, 1968, p. 11. Chicago Daily News, 
September 27, 1971, p. 12. T. Teraji, May 31, 1973. 
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implementation of the busing program would have hastened the exodus 
of whites from the designated receiving schools to the south of 
South Shore, it should be noted what happened in those schools 
when the busing program was not initiated. The Burnham School, 
0.0% black in 1967, was 73.4% black in 1970. The Anthony School, 
0.4% black in 1967 was 49.4% black in 1970. The Goldsmith School, 
0.0% black in 1967 was 37.3% black in 1970. The Hoyne School, 1.3% 
black in 1967 was 89.1% black in 1970. The Luella School, 3.2% 
black in 1967, was 64.7% black in 1970. The Warren School, 3.1% 
black in 1967, was 58.6% black in 1970. The Buckingham School, 
· 0.0% black in 1967, was 36.7% black in 1970. The Cole School, 6.1% 
black in 1967, was 74.1% black in 1970.45 Obviously, other forces 
than those which could be exerted by the Board of Education were 
working in the southeast communities. If the South Shore plan had 
been implemented, how much faster could these schools have changed? 
Would the Board's integration policy then have been blamed for the 
rapid changeover almost totally accomplished by 1972? 
Stabilization remains a major policy of the Board of Edu-
cation. The numerous failures of this policy encountered through-
out this entire study indicate that the Board has chosen an 
45Headcounts, 1968, 1969, 1970, Districts Seventeen, 
Twenty-two. Chicago Tribune, January 31, 1974, Section 4, p. 1. 
TABLE 7 
DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION OF EIGHT ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
IN SOUTHEAST CHICAGO WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNATED 
AS RECEIVING SCHOOLS IN THE REJECTED 
INTRA-COMMUNITY BUSING PROPOSALa 
September, 1967 
School % Negro 
Anthony 0.4 
Buckingham 0.0 
Burnham 0.0 
Cole 6.1 
Goldsmith 0.0 
Hoyne 1.3 
Luella 3.2 
Warren 3.1 
October, 1970 
% Negro 
49.4 
36.7 
73.4 
74.1 
37.3 
89.1 
64.7 
58.6 
September, 1972 
% Negro 
92.6 
84.4 
94. 9 
89.4 
85.6 
98.5 
95.0 
96.8 
aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher 
Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, 
Chicago, 1967, 1970, 1972, Districts Seventeen and Twenty-
two). . 
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impotent method of dealing with desegregation problems. The Real 
Estate Research Corporation had argued that "stabilization of white 
population . . . would probably just divert non-white population 
growth to one or more other parts of the city .... For non-white 
population expansion must, occur somewhere." The corporation had 
suggested that the Board's educational policy "must be directed in 
part at shifting future non-white population growth to the 
suburbs. 1146 
The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association recognized 
that numerous factors which influence integration are outside of 
the jurisdiction of the Board of Education. While it suggested 
many methods of helping to stabilize desegregating schools, the 
association also recommended that the Board take actions which 
would influence the total community on integration. One such 
action would be to support the passage of a strong open housing-
law. But the enforcement of the law is not a function of the Board. 4 7 
46Real Estate Research Corporation, Report Prepared for the 
Board of Education, City of Chicago, December, 1967, Preliminary 
Findings and Projections of Population and School Enrollments for 
Chicago, Illinois: 1970-1980 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1967), 
pp. 12 (Second quote), 13 (First quote). Above, chapter iv, 
PP.· 134-39. 
47
rllinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago Region, 
"A Study of Stabilization of Integrated Schools," Chicago, April 6, 
1967, pp. 1-9. (Mimeographed.) 
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Philip Hauser, in his report, had observed that the schools 
alone could not overcome the forces of segregation. It would 
"require the active participation of religious institutions, 
business and labor organizations, civic and community groups, and 
social and fraternal societies as well as of all agencies of 
government." Robert Havighurst agreed that the schools should 
become 1nvolved in the communities and become agents of social 
change. While these men had elaborate plans for achieving their 
goals, they could not give a formula to end the fear and prejudice 
of numberous whites in changing neighborhoods. As Board member 
Scheffler observed of Havighurst's report, "He's trying to do a lot 
of things that are impractical .... The difficulty is he's trying 
to take care of school matters from a sociological point of view 
instead of a practical point of view. 1148 
The stabilization policy has also been questioned by a 
growing number of blacks who view it as based in a subtle white 
racism. Most stabilization programs have manipulated the movement 
48Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Inte-
gration of the Public Schools--Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, ~hairman, 
Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964 
(Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), p. 12. Robert J. Havighurst, 
The Public Schools of Chicago: A Survey for the Board of Education 
of the City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964). 
Chicago Daily News, November 13, 1964, p. 5 (Quote). Above, 
. chapter iii, pp. 81, 84-92; 96-105. 
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of black children. Certainly, the busing program has been one-sided. 
Black parents have begun to see stabilization as the responsibility 
of the whole community--a responsibility which "should not be 
placed as a burden on the backs of Negroes." During the busing 
controversy one black mother had exclaimed, "We will not allow our 
children to become helpless pawns in a desperate scheme to forstall 
the inevitable exodus of whites . . . nor do we particularly care 
to stem that exodus." Al Raby, a leading civil rights worker, had 
attacked the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro children and implying 
"that a black Chicago would be undesirable and that Negroes will 
always be underpaid. 1149 
Of course, one may ask, "Who speaks for the community?" 
Even acknowledged leaders are recognized to have taken positions 
which are later proven not to have been supported by a majority of 
the group for whom they assumed they were speaking. Thus, during 
the busing controversy, one speaker could exclaim that his acquaint-
ances "take issue with certain organizations which are purporting 
to represent this area, when in actuality, their intentions, phi-
losophies, and programs do not represent the true feelings of the 
49southeast Economist (Chicago), February 8, 1968, p. 2. 
Chicago Daily Defender, February 7, 1968, p. 24 (First quote); 
February 15, 1968, p. 1 (Second quote). Chicago Daily News, 
September 11, 1967 (Third quote). Above, chapter vi, p. 237. 
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majority of area residents and taxpayers. 11 50 Perhaps the only 
question that should be asked is, "Who speaks for this group?" 
To help determine who is speaking for a school community and 
to open a dialogue between the Board and the communities, advisory 
councils were organized i9 1971. These councils were designed to 
permit parents to share in the process of arriving at decisions. 
In establishing these councils the Board developed a more direct 
line of communication with the communities and, to some extent, 
by-passed its traditional reliance upon the school staff as a 
source of information. Principals at all of the city's public 
schools were required to hold well publicized meetings to set up 
the councils, but their participation in the councils was limited.51 
The guidelines, as they evolved for the councils, were 
designed to keep control of the organizations in the hands of 
parents of the local pupils. Only parents and teachers could vote 
at the first meeting in which the council was organized. It was 
required that the chairman of the council be a parent. While the 
school principal was required to attend meetings, he was later 
disqualified from holding an office. Council members were to be 
50
southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 1. 
51Proceedings, December 9, 1970, December 9, 1970, pp. 1036-
37. Chicago Daily News, March 5, 1971, p. 46. 
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residents in the school attendance district or representatives of 
institutions in the district. A minimum of 60 percent of the mem-
bership was to consist of parents of children in the school. All 
officers were to be parents.52 
The Board granted the council the power to select a princi-
pal when a vacancy existed. They could also make recommendations 
regarding discipline, vandalism, pupil conduct, curriculum, safety, 
physical condition of buildings, community problems, school policies 
and procedures, selection of textbooks, and lunchroom problems. 
While their powers were not limited to this list, the councils 
were cautioned that the Board retained the responsibility for 
fiscal policies, salaries of personnel, purchases and contracts, 
real estate transactions and construction of buildings, certifi-
cation and tenure of personnel and negotiations with employee 
organizations. The school principal was expected to comply with 
council requests, but the councils were to recognize that a 
principal might not have the administrative power to comply with 
every resolution.53 
The .possibility that these councils may obstruct the 
52Proceedings, July 28, 1971, pp. 11-13; November 24, 1971, 
pp. 1067; October 25, 1972, pp. 1044-45. 
53Proceedings, October 25, 1972, pp. 1044-45. 
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operation of local schools in attempts to obtain parochial objec-
tives is a real danger. One of the receiving schools has been 
without a principal for over a year, as the council has blocked 
eligible applicants who apparently did not share their ideological 
views. In another community, representatives of an ethnic group 
were influential in bringing about the resignation of a principal. 
Their objective is obviously to choose a replacement from their 
own ethnic group. In Austin, a district council rejected a report 
from one of its own committees calling for racial balance in west 
and northwest side schools. It was observed that young blacks 
joined with whites to defeat the recommendation. The blacks 
preferred neighborhood control of the schools. One member of the 
council, who favored desegregation, lamented, "We feel this 
[creation of councils] is a move to shift the burden of responsi-
bility from the Board to community people who have no power."54 
The problems the Board faces seem to be mount~ng. There 
exists a diversity of agencies within the city which are not 
coordinated in any attempt to bring the races together. The 
evidence indicates that there is a polarization of the races. Sta-
bilization, a mainstay of the Board's integration policy, has an 
54chicago Tribune, January 9, 1972, Section 10, p. 10 
(Quote). Chicago Sun-Times, May 21, 1972, p. 76. 
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almost incredible record of failures. But, in fact, the Board has 
no policy, except inaction, to substitute for the stabilization 
concept. As factions vie for power.within the city, the Board, 
perhaps reflecting the traditional response of public decision-
making bodies, mirrors the lack of unity which characterizes 
this period. 
While the Austin busing plan did not help stabilize the 
south Austin community, it did not disrupt the receiving school 
areas on the northwest side of the city. The Redmond Report was 
correct in predicting that an area not contiguous to the expanding 
black ghetto would not be subject to the panic and flight asso-
ciated with contiguous areas. On the southeast side, where the 
intra-community plan was not initiated, the designated receiving 
schools experienced rapid change as they rested in the path of the 
expanding Negro community. It appears that the decisions and 
policies of the Chicago Board of Education are only a minor factor 
in the politico-socio-economic forces which are shaping the city. 
CHAPTER VIII 
APPRAISAL AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS: 
FOUR GOALS OF THE BUSING 
POLICY APPRAISED 
This evaluation of ~he Chicago Austin busing program utilizes 
the rationale offered by the Board in its "Fact" sheets issued 
during the public hearings. The four goals were: to relieve 
serious overcrowding at the May and Spencer Schools; to promote 
stabilization throughout the Austin Area; to increase desegregation 
in District Four; to improve educational experiences for all chil-
dren. While the attainment of these four goals becomes the cri-
teria for judging the success of the implementation of the Board's 
decision, it should not be considered as a judgem~nt on busing for 
integration as a policy in any other circumstances. It is only the 
fourth goal which reaches the essential principles outlined by the 
Supreme Court in 1954. 
The'Board's first expressed purpose for the busing program 
was to relieve overcrowding in the May and Spence·r Schools. 
Obviously, the transfer of about 600 students from two schools 
·would serve to alleviate some pressure upon their facilities. The 
question becomes, "Was the number involved in the plan sufficient 
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in magnitude to offer permanent relief to the schools?" Evidence 
indicates that the plan was not large enough in scope to stem the 
rising enrollment for one-half a year. Furthermore, the plan was 
not sufficiently elastic to allow for the channelling of adequate 
numbers out of the sending schools to relieve overcrowding at a 
later date. 
in September, 1967, the enrollment at May School was 1559 
students. The following year, after the busing plan was in effect, 
the enrollment was 1586. In 1969, a branch was opened, but the 
enrollment at the main building was 1692. At the Spencer School, 
the 1967 enrollment was 1325. In 1968, it rose to 1624 and in 1969 
it rose again to 2076. The enrollment at both schools has continued 
to increase each year through 1971 as may be seen by the chart on 
the following page. To mitigate the overcrowding the Board built 
modular units, added mobiles and remodeled rooms. Construction was 
begun on the Austin Middle School to draw off the upper grades. 
In September, 1967, seventh and eighth grade pupils at the Spencer 
School were transferred under a mandatory program to the newly 
created Hay Upper Grade Center. With the completion of a fourteen 
room addition to the Spencer School in 1968, the program was soon 
ended. The withdrawal of the Spencer students from the Hay Upper 
Grade Center helped to stabilize the white 'enrollment at the latter 
TABLE 8 I 
ENROLLMENT FIGURES FOR TWENTIETH DAY: 
SOUTH AUSTIN SCHOOLS, 1967-1971 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- % Enroll- % 
School ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro ment Negro 
Byford 573 0.3 589 1.0 641 0.5 679 1.5 724 3.6 
Emmet ll86 1.1 1448 20.3 1288 67.0 1371 97.4 1012 99.7 
Emmet N.Br. 476 70.2 450 97.6 351 98.3 
Emmet S.Br. 494 78.1 368 95.9 416 98.3 
Emmet s. 495 98.8 324 98.5 
Emmet W. 565 92.5 
Emmet N. 691 99.3 
Hay 437 0.0 410 0.0 387 o.o 450 0.0 557 1.8 
Hay U.G.C. 404 58.9 474 73.6 257 65.0 236 45.4 293 53.9 
Howe 583 0.2 589 0.5 618 5.7 761 17.5 1081 54.7 
Key 508 0.0 514 0.8 551 8.0 410 20.1 651 50.8 
Key Br. 102 6.9 106 8.5 99 4.0 122 4.9 131 5.3 
Lewis 671 0.3 665 1.1 715 0.8 786 0.8 821 0.7 
May 1559 83.9 1586 95.9 1692 99.1 1934 99.7 2336 99.8 
May Br. 388 97.9 347 100 
Nash 993 1.2 990 1.3 1001 2.1 1088 8.0 1259 37.7 
Spencer 1325 82.4 1624 90.8 2076 97.1 2132 98.8 2282 99.3 
Young 845 13.3 874 13.0 865 12.0 890 10.1 996 9.0 
Total 
Enrollment 9186 9869 11548 13084 13925 
1) Overcrowding or segregation were not relieved at the May or Spencer Schools. 
2) Continuing racial change may be seen in the above achoo.ls. 
Data compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount 
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1~69, 1970, 1971, District 
Four). 
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school, but in September, 1969, Mrs. Malis was complaining about 
the severe overcrowding at the May, Spencer and Emmet Schools 
in Austin.l 
Two flaws existed in the busing plan which prevented it from 
relieving overcrowding at the sending schools. First, the 15 
percent maximum quota limited the number of students who could be 
transferred to a fraction of the residential enrollment at the 
receiving schools. Second, the permissive feature in the transfer 
program created problems in establishing exact numbers as many 
parents had refused the transfer of their children. Furthermore, 
these flaws are magnified by the inability of the school staff to 
establish a program which would continue to draw off a maximum 
number of students from the sending schools. 
In establishing the basis for the quota system the original 
lchic~go Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (hand 
tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, District Four.) 
Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. Joseph J. Connery, District 
Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project. The Pupil 
Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth Report: (report pre-
sented to the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, 
Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971), pp. 7-8. (Typewritten.) 
Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1971. Board of Education, City 
of Chicago, Proceedings: Board of Education, City of Chic'ago, 
(Chicago: Board of Education, August 28, 1968), p. 237; (October 
23, 1968), p. 763. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings, date 
of meeting, page number. Austin News (Chicago), December 11, 1968, 
p. 1. Chicago Sun-Times, September 25, 1969, p. 3. 
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proposal adopted by the Board stated: 
• • . that initially the percentage of pupils received will 
not exceed 11% of the total enrollment of the receiving school. 
As grades 7 and 8 are added this figure should not exceed 15%.2 
Numerous factors are involved in setting the quota. First,· 
a base of enrollment for the receiving school must be established. 
When the plan was initiated, a special count was taken in each 
school to determine the number of students in the building. In 
the following two years, the teacher observation headcount, taken 
on the twentieth school day served as the base for the enrollment 
in the school. Second, a question centers on interpretation of 
"total enrollment" in the Board directive. In the initial plan, 
total enrollment was computed as the sum of the residential mern-
bership in the kindergarten through eighth grades, plus any special 
education class enrollment, ·plus the number of bused students. 
This sum, which represented virtually every student in the building, 
was then divided into the number of bused (Negro) students to 
obtain the percent of integration in the school. This method of 
computing the percent of racial integration was used in the first 
two district evaluation -reports for the school years 196 7-68 and 
L968-69. It is alluded to in the third report also, although the 
2Proceedings, January 10, 1968, p. 2431. Underlining 
inserted by author. 
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basis for calculations in this report is vague.3 Before the 
question of the interpretation of "total enrollment" is considered 
further, it is important to apply the total residential enrollment 
criterion to establish the maximum allowable number of students 
which could be bused in accord with the original directive. 
If we use the twentieth day teacher observation headcount 
figures as a basis, we may establish the maximum number of students 
which could be bused based on the established quotas. This would 
follow the formula: 
Z11 = llx f 89 for the 11% quota; 
and 
Z15 = 3x + 17 for the 15% quota. 
Where: z = number to be bused in order to establish a total stu-
dent body of which the Negro bused group would be at the percentile 
quota established; and x = number of the total residential student 
3Ibid., p. 2433. George W. Connelly, Associate Superinten-
dent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in 
District Four. An Evaluation" (report presented to the General 
Connnittee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, 
July 24, 1968), pp. 5-6. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to 
as D.E., -1968. Robert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District 
Four:-"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District 
Four. A Second Report" "(report presented to the General Connnittee 
of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 
1969), pp. 4a, 8. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 
1969. George W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Third Report" (report presented to the General Connnittee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September, 30, 1970), 
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body in kindergarten through eight plus special education students.4 
The formula will yield a maximum number of students that 
could be bused based on the calculations which were used when the 
busing plan was established. That is, the number of the total 
student body including bused students is taken as the divisor and 
the number of bused students is the dividend. 
The first set of figures in Table 9 records the total resi-
dential enrollment (kindergarten through eighth plus special edu-
cation classes) of the receiving schools based on the twentieth 
day headcount. The stability of the residential enrollment in the 
receiving schools may be seen by comparing the twentieth day 
September, 1967, figures to the April, 1968, figures which were 
reported when the busing program was begun. The second set of 
figures records the number of students being bused during the 
particular month of the year that the busing program reached its 
optimum. This period of busing of the maximum number of students 
occurred after the twentieth day headcounts were taken. Thus, the 
percent of desegregation recorded by the headcount was inaccurate 
pp. 5, 6, 8. (Typewritten.) Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 
1970. Headcounts, 1969, District Four. 
4The formulas were derived by establishing z11 = .11 (x+Z) 
and Z15 = .15 (x+Z) and solving. 
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in establishing the most favorable ratio of black to white students. 
The figures on the chart establish the optimum operation of the 
plan. 
By applying the quota formulas to the total residential 
enrollment (x in the formula), the maximum number of students which 
could be bused to achieve an 11 percent and a 15 percent quota is 
shown on lines Z11 = llx f 89 and Z15 = 3x f 17. The chart assumes 
an 11 percent quota for the period ending in June, 1969. When all 
eight grades were being bused, beginning in September, 1969, the 
15 percent quota is applicable. In comparing the maximum number 
of pupils actually bused to the maximum number allowable under the 
quota, it may be seen that the actual percent of desegregation has 
reached 10 percent during only the first twc years of full oper-
ation. During the 1969-70 school year the number of students was 
318 less than the possible maximum. In the 1970-71 school year 
the number of students being bused was 385 less than. the possible 
maximum, and in the 1971-72 year the deficiency was 349 students. 
The drop below 10 percent would negate the desegregation 
aspect of the busing program by the lowest established criterion. 
Beginning in 1971 the district evaluations adopted a method of 
computing total enrollment and percent of desegregation which 
differed from the original-method of calculation. Residential 
TABLE 9 
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACTUALLY BUSED 
TO NUMBER OF STUDENTS REQUIRED TO REACH 
LIMITS OF QUOTA PLAN 
Total Residential Enrollment (Kg--8 + Special Educ. Classes) 
Based on Twentieth Day Headcount 
Sept. Apr. Sept. Sept. Oct. 
School 1967a 1968b 1968a 1969a 197oa 
Bridge 428 419 413 525 593 
Burbank 393 391 393 396 425 
Dever 857 846 827 850 850 
Locke 856 858 865 851 837 
Lyon 616 616 606 599 584 
Sayre 448 456 479 505 525 
Smyser 564 560 558 570 576 
O.A. Thorp 765 782 774 772 808 
Total Resi-
dential 
Enrollment (x) 4927 4928 4915 5068 5198 
Maximum Number 
z11 = llx f 89 
llio Quota 
of Students Required to Reach Limits of Quota 
Z15 = 3x f 17 
15% Quota 
(608) 608 607 
867 
x = Total Enrollment of Receiving Schools 
893 
Z = Quota Based on Receiving School Enrollment 
917 
Sept. 
197la 
601 
397 
834 
823 
577 
523 
616 
784 
5155 
9J9 
aChicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, 
(hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 
1971, District Four). 
bGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, 
"Austin-Area Project: A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An 
Evaluation" (report presented to the General Connnittee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 1968), p. 5. 
(Typewritten.) 
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TABLE 9--Continued 
Maximum Number of Students Being Bused in Austin Plan 
School Apr.1968b Nov.1968C Nov.1969d Oct.1970e Oct.197lf 
Bridge 45 51 56 53 55 
Burbank 47 56 54 53 51 
Dever 86 99 87 73 80 
Locke 84 106 101 93 100 
Lyon 72 78 73 59 57 
Sayre 52 65 60 69 59 
Smyser 58 74 64 57 61 
O.A. Thorp 75 92 80 75 97 
Total Bused 519 621 575 532 560 
Quota Limit 608 607/867 893 917 909 
Actual Percent of Desegregation Achieved by Busing Students 
9.4 11.2 10.2 9.3 9.8 
CRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. 
A Second Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the 
Chicago Board of ·Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 1969), 
pp. 4, 6. (Typewritten.) 
dGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, 
"Austin-Area Project: ·The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. 
A Third Repoit" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September, 1970), 
pp. 5, 6. (Typewritten.) 
eJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971), 
pp. 5, 12. (Typewritten.) 
fJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Fifth Report" (report presented to the General Corrnnittee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1972), 
pp. 4, 13. (Typewritten.) 
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enrollment for grades one through eight rather than kindergarten 
through eight was used as the base for computing the ratio. This 
was explained on the grounds that the busing program did not 
involve kindergarten children. A second change occurred in that 
the residential membership of grades one through eight, rather than 
the sum of the residential membership and the bused membership, 
was used as the divisor.5 
Thus, in computing the percent of desegregation under the 
new method of calculation, the number 4286, representing the resi-
dential students in grades one through eight in April, 1971, would 
become the divisor, and the number; 496, representing the number 
of bused students in April, 1971, becomes the dividend. The new 
formula yields (496 + 4286)·(100) = 11.57 as the percent of deseg-
regation. If the total enrollment in grades one through eight was 
used as the divisor, the formula yields [496 + (4286 + 496)] · 100 
=10.37 as the percent of desegregation. If one returns to the 
original method of calculation the figures for April, 1971, are 
not available, but the September, 1970, residential enrollment 
would be relatively accurate. We would obtain [496 + (5198 + 496)] 
· 100. = 8.71 as the percent of desegregation. It may be seen that 
5n.E., 1971, pp. 4-5. 
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the new method of calculating the percent of desegregation results 
in a substantial and important alteration of the statistical data 
derived. 6 
This data imposes definite qualifications upon an assessment 
that the school system was successful in achieving its stated goals 
of relieving overcrowding and increasing desegregation. Undoubt-
edly, the busing of over five hundred students each school year 
must have relieved overcrowding at the sending schools to the 
extent that the bused students were no longer adding to the con-
gestion in their neighborhood facilities. However, the over-
crowding could have been relieved to a considerably greater extent 
if the plan had operated at its optimum figures rather than the 
greatly reduced numbers actually involved. Certainly, desegre-
gation was furthered to the extent that black children were at-
tending previously all-white schools which would not have had any 
black students if the busing program did not exist. ·But it is 
evident that the desegregation remained so minimal that it was 
necessary to change the method of calculating the percent of inte-
gration in order to conform with the lowest statistical criterion 
for desegregation. 
6rbid. Headcount, 1970, District Four. 
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An analysis of the community pressures to which the Board 
has been subjected helps explain the slackened pace of the busing 
program. While the busing plan was being initiated, emphasis in 
the black communities was shifting from integration to black self-
determination. Over 55 percent of the parents of students eligible 
for busing refused permission for their children to participate. 
School-administrators emphasized smaller class sizes and educational 
opportunities, rather than integration, when explaining the plan to 
black parents. Thus, as facilities and programs have been expanded 
in the south Austin area, there has been less motivation for 
parents to involve their childrea in the busing program. Dr. 
Redmond, in considering the limitations of the permissive transfer 
program, has observed " a decreased interest in integration as a 
result of the black consciousness movement."7 
In contrast, the residents of the receiving community and a 
large segment of the white population in general, have remained 
opposed to busing as a means of integration. The American Insti-
tute of Public Opinion in late 1971 found 79 percent of the white 
7stanley Ptak, Past Principal of the May School, private taped 
interview held in his office, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1972. 
Francis B. McKeag, Past Assistant Superintendent, School Planning, 
Chicago Public Schools, private taped interview held in his office, 
Chicago, Illinois, August 30, 1971. D.E., 1968, p. 2. Chicago 
Tribune, January 11, 1972; p. 3 (Quote). 
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population surveyed to be against busing. The plurality of sur-
veyed blacks, 47 percent, also expressed opposition, although 45 
percent of the Negroes questioned indicated their favor. The 
ambiguity in the black response was matched by the performance of 
the national government after the 1968 elections. While the fed-
eral courts have continued to press for desegregation, the federal 
administration has equivocated and disavowed ambitious busing 
proposals. In Chicago no court action designating that busing be 
utilized for integration has been initiated. The attention of 
federal authorities has turned to the integration of school facul-
ties. There has been no pressure to expand the busing program and 
covert pressure to keep from expanding it.8 
A third goal of the busing program had been "to promote 
stabilization throughout the Austin Area." When the plan was 
initially implemented, the percentage of white students at the 
May and Spencer Schools rose from 13 percent to 17.2 percent and 
from 11.9 percent to 16.4 percent respectively. For the few months 
left in the 1967-68 school year, and using the 15 percent quota 
guidelines, both schools· had been reintegrated. But this increase 
Bchicago Sun-Times, November 1, 1971, p. 8. Ivor Kraft, 
"1970-The Year of the Big Sellout on_ Integration," Phi Delta 
Kappan, LI (June, 1970), 523-26. Chicago Tribune, August 4, 1971, 
p. 4; August 15, 1971, p. ·s, January 11, 1972, p. 3. 
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in percentage represented the drop in black enrollment rather than 
any influx of white students. The schools were well beyond the 
tipping point at which the white enrollment historically had 
rapidly declined. The following September, 1968, only 45 white 
students, representing 2.8 percent of May's enrollment, and 120 
' 
white students, representing 7.4 percent of Spencer's enrollment, 
attended the two schools. By 1971 only 11 white students were 
counted in attendance at the two schools.9 
Indeed, the dramatic changeover of the Austin community raced 
ahead of the predictions made by the Real Estate Research Corpo-
ration. The white enrollment at Austin High School dropped from 
58 percent in.1967 to 49 percent in 1968 aqd 25 percent in 1969. 
Only 7.4 percent of the school's enrollment was Caucasian in 1970. 
By the end of 1969 it was evident that the block by block white-to-
black change had reached the western edge of the city as the Emmet 
School changed from 20.3 percent Negro to 67 percent· Negro in one 
year.10 
The district evaluations of the busing program recognized 
9Proceedings, April 10, 1968, p. 1730. Headcounts, 1968, 
1971, District Four. 
lOHeadcounts, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, District Four. Chicago 
Daily News, November 17, 1969, pp. 1, 10. The dynamics of the 
community change is considered in chapter iv of this study. 
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that "it is possible that stabilization of the Austin Area, as a 
goal, should not have been an original consideration of the Austin 
busing plan because, historically, stabilization has occurred 
infrequently." The studies did observe that families of bused 
Negro students may not have moved as frequently as other families 
which did not have their children involved in the busing program. 
This hypothesis was based on the fact that most of the families 
of the bused children remained in the May and Spencer School 
neighborhoods. 11 The search for the reason that the families of 
bused students were more stable introduces one of the unresolved 
problems in analyzing the busing program. As the decision to 
allow children to be bused was an option of the parents, to what 
extent did this freedom of choice serve to separate out a group of 
students with backgrounds which would be more stable and, indeed, 
more academically motivated? 
The fourth stated purpose of the busing plan was to "improve 
the educational experiences of all children." Improving educa-
tional experiences must be viewed not only in terms of providing 
optimal conditions for academic achievement, but also in terms of 
providing optima.! conditions for social adjustment. The United 
11 D.E., 1969, p. 35. D.E., 1971, pp. 9, 10, 11 (Quote), 12. 
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States Supreme Court had succinctly stated the case for integration 
when it observed of Negro children, "To separate them from others 
of similar age and qualifications salely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect th~ir hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone. 11 12 
Two factors separate the Chicago busing plan from Brown Case 
rationale: the segregation the Board had moved to correct was not 
de jure; the major motive black parents had in accepting the plan 
was escape from the overcrowded conditions in their local schools. 
Indeed, one could question whether the psychological factors 
involved in the Brown decision would not really work to the detri-
ment of the children's hearts and minds. While desegregation was 
being achieved to the extent that Negro children were attending 
previously all-white schools, what would be the reaction of these 
children to the hostile reception members of the white community 
had extended? In terms of academic achievement the evidence indi-
cates that the black children being bused would perform better than 
their counterparts who remained in the sending schools. · 
The scholastic achievement of the bused students has been 
12Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1959). 
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evaluated through four sources; parents, teachers, principals and 
comparative test scores. The parents of the bused students were 
asked to evaluate the scholastic prqgress and study habits of their 
children. The number of responses was considerable--461 survey 
questionnaires, represen~ing 80 percent of the total number distrib-
uted, were returned in 1969, and 340 questionnaires, representing 
64 percent of those distributed, were returned in 1970. Comments 
were tabulated according to categories of; Satisfied, In-Between, 
and Not-Satisfied. The high degree of satisfaction expressed by 
parents can be examined in Table 10 which follows this page. Some 
parents comments were: "We are for the busing program 100 percent. 
My son's interest in learning bas been stimulated by a fine teacher 
and more desirable surroundings." "I think my son is getting a 
good education at 
---
School. 11 "She has taken more interest in 
her school work." "She is doing a lot better than when she 
started. 11 13 
Parents of students residing in the immediate area of the 
receiving schools were asked the same questions. In 1969, 2628 of 
the questionnaires were returned representing 65 percent of those 
13n.E., 1968, pp. 10-12, 23, 24. D.E., 1969, pp. 11-13, 20, 
21 (First quote). D.E., 1970, pp. 10-12:-ZO, 21 (Second, third, 
fourth quotes). --
TABLE 10 
, 
TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF BUSED PUPILS: 
1968--1969--1970 
1968a 
Question Satisfied In-Between Not-Satisfied 
No. % No. % No. % 
Scholastic Progress 256 88 20 10 11 2 
Study Habits 251 88 22 10 10 2 
Social Relationships 245 88 26 9 8 3 
Comments 197 87 21 10 9 3 
1969b 
Scholastic Progress 358 92.5 16 4.1 13 3.4 
Study Habits 362 89.3 25 6.1 18 3.4 
Social Relationships 299 88.4 23 7.0 16 4.6 
Comments 294 90.l 18 5.5 14 4.4 
1970c 
Scholastic Progress 242 92.4 15 5.7 5 1.9 
Study Habits 242 88.3 27 9.8 5 1.8 
Social Relationships 235 91.8 18 7.0 3 1.1 
Comments 207 95.4 8 3.7 2 .9 
aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: 
A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Evaluation" (report presented to the 
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 
1968), p. 12. {Typewritten.) 
bRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to 
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 
15, 1969), p. 13. (Typewritten.) · 
CGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Third Report" (report presented to the 
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September, 
1970), p. 12. (Typewritten). 
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sent out. In 1970, 2102 questionnaires, representing 45 percent of 
those sent out, were returned. Table 11 on the following page 
indicates the responses. The 1969 response is interesting in that 
well over one-half of the responders expressed satisfaction with 
the academic progress of their children, but in their open-ended 
comments they expressed great dissatisfaction with the program. 
In 1970, the number of responses indicating satisfaction with the 
scholastic progress of the children fell considerably. The movement 
to an "In-Between" position indicates the continuing apprehension 
white parents had about the busing program. The vast majority of 
comments on busing were opposed for social or administrative 
reasons, but some expressed academic objections such as "Enlarged 
class size is detrimental. 11 14 As will be shown later, there was 
no evidence to support any fears that the academic advancement of 
white children suffered as a result of the busing program. 
Teachers were asked to evaluate the bused students' academic 
progress. The standards of the receiving school served as the 
criteria for an appraisal of progress as: Good, Fair, or None. 
Beginning with the 1969-70 school year, "Poor" was substituted for 
"None." It can be seen in Table 12 that this change of nomenclature 
14 D.E., 1969, pp. 14~16, 21, 22. D.E., 1970, pp. 13-15, 
23 (Quote), 24. 
TABLE 11 
TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF PUPILS 
IN RECEIVING AREA 
1969--1970 
Question Satisfied 
No. % 
Scholastic Progress 890 56.2 
Study Ha.bits 972 60.9 
Social Relationships 696 48.8 
Comments 241 13.5 
197ob 
Scholastic Progress 185 15.0 
Study Habits 179 15.3 
Social Relationships 202 17.1 
Comments 159 11.0 
In-Between 
No. 
95 
72 
62 
125 
541 
519 
461 
275 
% 
6.0 
4.5 
4.3 
7.0 
44.0 
44.5 
39.0 
19.1 
Not-Satisfied 
No. 
601 
552 
667 
1410 
503 
468 
517 
1005 
% 
37.9 
34.5 
46.8 
79.3 
40.9 
40.1 
43.8 
69.8 
aRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. 
A Second Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 15, 1969), 
p. 16. (typewritten.) 
bGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, ''Austin-
Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third 
Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the yhicago 
Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, September 1970), p. 15. 
(Ty/itten.) 
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was accompanied by an increased use of the "Poor" classification. 
The chart does not show the wide variation in teachers' responses 
from school to school. While over 41 percent of the students at 
five schools were classified in 1968 as "Good" in Academic Progress, 
only 20 percent were classified as "Good" at one school. Under 
"Study Habits" six schools classified between 30 percent and 50 
percent of the bused students as "Good," but only 17 percent of 
the students at one school and no students at another school were 
classified as "Good. 11 15 
This deviation in range closed somewhat in the next two 
years. In 1969 between 29 percent and 48 percent were classified 
as "Good" in "Academic Progress" and between 35 percent and 61 
percent were classified as "Good" in "Study Habits." In 1970 the 
variation in "Academic Progress" was ten points between 32 percent 
and 42 percent, while the percent classified as "Good" in "Study 
Habits" varied between 29 percent and 50 percent. This variation 
reflects the subjective criteria used by the teachers. However, 
over the four year period the total percentage evaluated in "Aca-
demic Progress" as "Goodl' in any year has varied only four points--
between 36.5 perzent and 40.5 percent. 
/ 
15n.E., 1968, pp. 13-16. 
Only in 1970 did the 
TABLE 12 
TEACHER RESPONSES: EVALUATION OF BUSED STUDENTS 
1968--1969--·1970--1971 
Question Good Fair 
No. % No. % No. 
1968a 
Academic Progress 156 38' 181 44 75 
Social Progress 171 41 170 41 71 
Study Habits 145 35 155 37 112 
Connnents 106 37 132 46 52 
1969b 
Academic Progre~s 226 40.0 276 48.8 63 
Social Progress 313 55.3 175 30.9 78 
Study Habits 298 53.3 173 30.9 88 
Comments 76 56.2 29 21.5 30 
1970C 
Academic Progress 186 36.5 172 33.8 151 
Social Progress 260 51.4 129 25.5 117 
Study Habits 184 37.3 115 23.3 194 
Comments 114 34.7 85 26.0 129 
1971d 
Academic Progress 200 40.5 215 43.6 78 
Social Progress 256 52.3 145 21.4 88 
Study Habits 189 38.4 145 29.5 157 
Connnents 134 37.5 132 36.9 91 
None 
% 
18 
18 
28 
17 
11.2 
13.8 
15.8 
22.3 
29.7 
23.1 
39.3 
39.3 
15.8 
17.9 
31. 9 
25.4 
aGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: 
A Pupil Busing Program in District Four. An Evaluation" (repor~ presented to the 
General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, July 24, 
1968), p. 16. ('l:ypewritten.) 
bRobert M. Bell, District Supe~intendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to 
the General Conrrnittee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 
15, 1969), p. 19. (Typewritten.) 
cGeorge W. C~nnelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third Report" (report presented to 
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, 
September, 1970), p. 19. (Typewritten.) 
dJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area 
Project: The Pupil Busing~ogram in District Four: A Fourth Report" (report 
presented to the Genera 1 Co i ttee of the Chicago Board of Education, ,Chicago, 
Illinois, August, 1971), p. 9. (Typewritten.) . 
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percent of students evaluated below "Fair" rise above the 20th 
percentile. Teacher evaluation of "Study Habits" of the bused 
students, however, indicates that this area has consistently repre-
sented a major concern for the teachers. In only one year were 
less than one-fourth of tpe bused students ranked in the lowest 
category.16 
The number of bused students that have been retained in the 
same grade for another year has been small. To some extent the 
policy of allowing bused pupils to return to their sending school 
at the request of parents may have influenced the number of non-
promotions. Several returns were based on the appraisal of parents 
that their children could not~eep up with their studies in the 
receiving schools. Table 13 in\iicates the failure rates in the 
receiving schools. In the year ending in June, 1968, ten of the 
thirty students not promoted came from the busing program. However, 
when the percentage of non-promotions is computed for each 
receiving school, no pattern may be discerned between the rates 
before and after the busing program. When the failure rate for the 
combined enrollment of the receiving schools is computed, no jump 
in- the percent of failures occurs until the end of the second full 
16 D.E., 1969, pp. 10, 17-19, 24. D.E., 1970, pp. 16-19, 22. 
D.E., 1971, pp. 27-29. 
TABLE 13 
COMPARISON OF FAILURE RATES IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS: 
JUNE, 1967--JUNE, 1972 
Total Enrollment and Failure Comparisona 
Receiving Schools 
Total Enrollment Number Failed % of Failure 
Sept, 1966 
April, 1968 
Sept-Nov, 1968 
Sept-Nov, 1969 
Sept-Oct, 1970 
Sept-Oct, 1971 
4750 
5447 
5546 
5609 
5730 
5715 
June, 1967 
June, 1968 
June, 1969 
June, 1970 
June, 1971 
June, 1972 
28b 
31 
31 
56 
37 
24 
Failure Rates at Individual Receiving Schools 
0.57 
0.57 
0.56 
1.00 
0.65 
0.42 
School 
Jun,1967 Jun,1968 Jun,1969 Jun,1970 Jun,1971 Jun,1972 
% No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. 
Bridge 
Burbank 
Dever 
Locke 
Lyon 
Sayre 
Smyser 
Thorpe 
.00 (O) 
.85 (3) 
. 11 ( 1) 
.00 (O) 
1.10 (6) 
.00 (O) 
1. 95 (10) 
1.00 (8) 
.00 (O) 
.45 (2) 
. 53 (5) 
.21 (2) 
1.20 (8) 
.30 (2) 
1. 10 (7) 
.60 (5) 
.65 (3) 
.69 (3) 
.78 (7) 
.20 (2) 
.75 (5) 
1.48 (8) 
.32 (2) 
.11 (1) 
.17 (3) 
2.60(12) 
.43 (4) 
2.13(20) 
1.51(10) 
.34 (2) 
.16 (1) 
.47 (4) 
.76 (5) 
.45 (2) 
1. 51(14) 
1. 39 (9) 
.68 (4) 
. 32 {2) 
.11 (1) 
.30 (2) 
.67 (3) 
1.10(10) 
.33 (3) 
.84 (5) 
.00 (O) 
.00 (O) 
.11 (1) 
aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-_Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Fifth Report" {report presented to the General Committee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1972), 
appendix. 
bChicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount 
(Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1966, District Four). 
Estimate based upon using reported percentage of failure for each 
school, and multiplying this by enrollment reported in September, 
1966. The whole number was ta1n as the true number failed and 
fractions were dismissed on the assumption that the June, 1967, 
enrollment would be lower' than he initial enrollment. . 
. 344 
345 
year of busing, but the rate drops below the pre-busing percentage 
by the end of the fourth year.17 
When the bused students are compared academically to the 
resident students at the receiving schools, they do not fare well. 
The median reading scores,for the sixth and eighth grade bused 
students fall a.lmost consistently within the lowest quartile of 
reading scores computed for the entire tested student body of the 
receiving school. Furthermore, the rate of progress between the 
sixth and eighth grade is considerably lower for the bused students 
than for the resident students of the receiving schools. The drop 
in the rate of progress for bused students graduating in 1971 i.s 
indicated in Table 14. An initial drop in the progress of students 
was also observed in a Berkeley study at the beginning of their 
desegregation plan. A retesting of the sixth grade class later 
indicated that the loss was, however, almost entirely recovered 
within six months. Studies of desegregation projects in Berkeley, 
California, and Hartford, Connecticut, indicate that gains in 
17D.E., 1968, p. 17. D.E., 1969, pp. 28-29. D.E., 1970, p. 
29. D.E:-:-T971, p. 24~seph J. Connery, District Superintendent, 
District Four, "Austin-Area Project: The Pupil Busing Program in 
District Four: A Fifth Report" (report presented to the General 
Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, 
August, 1972), appendix. Hereinafter referred to as D.E., 1972. 
Headcounts, 1967, 1968, 1969, District Four. Data compiled in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
TABLE 14 
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1971 
GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL, 
SENDING, AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS 
IN SAME YEAR AND GRADEa 
Reading Score 8.0 
7.0 
6.0 
5.0 
4.0 
3.03 4 5 6 
1965-66 1967-68 1968-69 
test before busing test 
busing begun 3/68 
National Median Scores 
Bused Students Scores 
Sending Sch~ Scores 
Receiving Sc ool Scores 
Including Bu ed Students 
7 
3rd 
3.5 
3.3b 
3.3b 
3.9b 
8 
1970-71 
test 
6th 
6.7 
5.4 
4.5 
6.8 
Grade 
and 
Year 
8th 
8.1 
6.2 
5.1 
8.3 
aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project. The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Committee of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971), 
pp. 19, 20, 22. 
bApproximation made from interpreting graphs and data supplied. 
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achievement for the upper elementary grades noticeably depreciate. 
This tendency, evident in the Chicago 1971 bused graduate group, 
may very well reflect the fact that students in the lower quartile 
achievement group tend to continue to slip at an accelerating rate 
behind their peers who are in the higher quartiles. However, there 
is no evidence that the resident students are regressing. Table 14, 
showing reading scores for the 1971 receiving school graduating 
classes, indicates a close parallel to national median increases 
in achievement.18 
A comparison of the reading scores of the bused students to 
those of the students at the sending schools reveals that the bused 
students did better than their neighbors who attended the sending 
schools. As may be seen in Table 15, for the 1971 sixth grade, 
there was little difference between the median scores of the bused 
pupils and those of the students who remained at the sending 
schools at the third grade lever:---Rowever, by the sixth grade 
level the bused students have progressed about one-half grade 
18chicago Public Schools, Report of the 1968-69 City-Wide 
Testing Program (Chicago·: Board of Education, 1969), pp. 48, 55, 
121, 286, 292, 421, 445, 475. D.E., 1970, p. 32. D.E., 1971, pp. 
18-23. Arthur Satz and Martin Hoffman, Project Concern: Hartford 
Connecticut (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1971), pp. 30-
35. Keith Melville, School Desegregation Plan: Berkeley, Cali-
fornia (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1970), pp. 59-64. 
TABLE 15 
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1973 
GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL AND 
SENDING SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SAME YEAR AND GRADE 
Reading Score 7.0 
6.0 
3.0 
2.0 Grade 
' 3 4 5 6 and 
1967-68 1970-71 Year 
test just 
prior to 
beginning busing 
Key 3rd 6th 
National Median Scores 3.5 7)-:J 
Bused Student Scores 2.8 5.2 
Sending School Scores 2.9 4.6 
aJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, 
"Austin-Area Project. The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: 
A Fourth Report" (report presented to the General Committe~ of the 
Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1971), 
p. 21. 
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beyond the level of the sending school pupils. This was the case 
for the graduating classes of both 1971 and 1973. The bused 
students in the eighth grade class ~f 1971 had outdistanced the 
students at the sending schools by almost a full grade.19 
The significance of, these observations is clouded by numerous 
factors. The permissive aspect of the busing plan may have served 
to select a group of students whose parents would be more likely 
to encourage them to achieve. One of the most common observations 
made by principals of the receiving schools was that "those bused 
children who achieved in the receiving school would have achieved 
anyway. 11 20 This observation is not supported by the test data for 
the 1967-68 third grade class (Table 15). These students had just 
been tested before the busing program was begun. As has already 
been established, there was only a small difference in the test 
scores of those students who were recruited into the busing program 
and those students who remained at the sending schools. Indeed, 
19n.E., 1971, pp. 20-21. 
20Ibid., p. 26. Studies of parental motives for declining 
to allow their children to be bused have indicated that the 
refusers value education for their children as much, or more, than 
those who opted for busing. See Laurence T. Cagle and Jerome Beker, 
"Social Characteristics and Education Aspirations of Northern Lower-
Class, Predominantly Negro Parents Who Accepted and Declined a 
School Integration Opportunity," Journal of Negro Education, XXXVII 
(Fall, 1968),·406-17, passim. 
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the median scores of the bused students in 'the class of 1973 were 
a bit lower than the scores of the remaining students. 
However, due to the turnover of students in the south Austin 
. 
area it may well be that the characteristics of the student body 
at the sending schools were changing. Certainly, the third grade 
classes at May and Spencer Schools, recorded in Table 14 for 
1965-66, did not consist of the same students as the eighth grade 
classes of those schools in 1970-71. In 1965 no Negro students 
attended May and only 103 students, representing 10.1 percent of 
the student body attended the Spencer School. However, by 1967-68, 
when our data for comparison is becoming more significant, only 
12 percent of the combined student bodies of the two schools con-
sisted of Caucasians. In 1968-69 the percentage of whites at the 
two schools had dropped to 5 percent. By 1971, the enrollment of 
May School ir.creased by 777 students, about 50 percent over its 
1967 enrollment. The Spencer School experienced an increase of 
\ 
857 students, about 65 percent over its 1967 enrollment.21 
Thus, the bused student$ of the class of 1971 were about 
equal in reading achievement with a student body at May and Spencer 
Schools in 1965-66 which was on a par with the national median. 
By 1968-69 the student bodies of the May-Spencer. Schools had fallen 
2lneadcounts, 1965, 1967, 1971, District Four. 
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considerably below the national median and so had the bused stu-
dents. While the scores of the bused students remained higher 
than the changing student body of the sending schools, the scores 
of the bused students showed no significant gain in comparison to 
what might have been predicted to be their progress. However, the 
nature of the 1971 bused graduating class was also experiencing 
some change. The retention rate among the bused students at the 
receiving schools was 61.6 percent in 1968-69 and 89.9 percent in 
i969-7o. 22 
While the student bodies being compared were obviously in 
great flux, the fact that the bused students were residents of the 
area from which the sanding schools drew their student bodies 
indicates a common social environmental background. Thus, the 
data in the graphs may be significant. but there is room to question 
whether the student body being compared is sufficiently homogeneous 
in character to allow comparisons. Some conclusions are warranted. 
The 1971 graduating class, according to the data in the 
District Evaluation, showed less progress than should be expected 
between third and sixth grade. However, as the majority 0£ this 
period was spent at the sending school, theiinfluence of the busing 
22 D.E., 1969, p. 7. D.E., 1970, p. 7. 
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program must have been minimal. Between sixth and eighth grade 
the bused students' reading level reached 6.2 as compared to 5.1 
for the sending school students. However, the spread between the 
reading scores increased from 0.9 to 1.1 during the two year period. 
This represents a difference of only 0.2 between the median scores 
of the bused students and the students in the sending schools in 
the two year period, 1968-69 to 1970-71. This difference between 
the scores of the two groups is not large enough to justify any 
speculation on the effect of the busing program. 
Data on the 1973 graduating class requires different con-
clusions. The classes were tested just prior to the beginning of 
the busing program. The group of students which began busing in 
third grade scored just slightly lower than the student bodies of 
the sending schools (2.8 compared to 2.9). Three years later when 
the students were tested again, the bused students scored 5.2 on 
the reading test compared to 4.6 for the students in' the sending 
schools. This difference indicates that the bused students of the 
1973 graduating class have progressed at a more rapid rate than 
their counterparts in the sending schools. While the evidence is 
conflicting, there are good reasons for considering the 1973 
graduating class data to be more valid than the data for the 1971 
graduating class. Students in the 1973 class began busing at an 
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earlier age when they would be more impressionable. The three 
year period between tests of the 1973 class was spent in the re-
ceiving schools compared to only a two year period for the 1971 
eighth grade class. The student body at the sending school in 
1968 was more homogeneous in comparison to the 1973 class than 
was the 1965 sending school body to the 1971 class. 
Data concerning the attendance of the bused students also 
lends itself to contention that the busing program has been aca-
demically advantageous to the bused students. When the transfer 
program was being proposed, an argument against busing contended 
that the attendance of the bused students would suffer due to the 
inconveniences of the time consumed by the transportation. In 
analyzing Table 16 it can be seen that the attendance of the bused 
students in school year 1968-69 was better than the attendance of 
the students in the sending schools in seven months of the year. 
The attendance of the receiving school students, however, was 
noticeably better than the attendance of the bused students. 
In the 1969-70 school year the attendance of the bused stu-
dents has improved as compared to the attendance of a year earlier. 
However, the attendance of the students at the sending schools has 
declined from the previous year. The bused students' attendance 
is consistently higher thah the attendance of the sending school 
1968-69a 
TABLE 16 
PERCENT ATTENDANCE OF BUSED STUDENTS COMPARED TO 
SENDING AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS: 
SEPTEMBER, 1968--JU~E, 1971 
Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
M.P. 91.47 90.92 90.36 89.18 88.35 88.10 86.89 86.71 86.88 87.12 
S.P. 93.47 92.76 92.61 9'1.17 90 .. 15 89.29 88.21 88.02 88.00 88.34 
B.P. 88.68 93.21 92.29 88.75 89.78 92.51 91.35 92.43 92.33 92.84 
R.S.P. 96.05 95.88 91.90 94.45 94.19 93.94 92.39 92.84 93.29 93.79 
1969-70b 
M.P. 89.41 86.86 87.72 87.84 79.17 85.04 85.27 85.71 85.98 86.83 
S.P. 86.12 89.50 87.94 86.50 76.00 85.31 85.33 85.30 85.71 87.30 
B.P. 94.61 94.21 95.36 94.48 86.75 90.11 88.48 92.08 92.73 93.37 
R.S.P. 96.39 94.91 94.41 94.21 91.43 92.15 92.46 93.98 95.33 94.75 
1970-71C 
M.P. 93.14 92.03 90.77 90.03 88.89 87.74 87.92 88.36 88.50 88.46 
S.P. 93.28 91.81 90.67 89.77 88.63 88.29 88.26 ·88.49 88.67 88.90 
B.P. 96.38 96.24 95.15 93.30 94.88 95.02 95.80 93.80 96.73 95.10 
R.S.P. 96.55 96.22 95.53 95.17 94.82 93.95 93.88 94.43 94.48 94.69 
Key 
M.P.--May Pupils 
S.P.--Spencer Pupils 
B.P.--Bused Pupils 
R.S.P.--Receiving School Pupils 
aRobert M. Bell, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Second Report" (report presented to 
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, August 
15, 1969), p. 27. (Typewritten.) 
hGeorge W. Connelly, Associate Superintendent, Area C, "Austin-Area Project: 
The Pupil Busing Program in District Four. A Third Report" (report presented to 
the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, Illinois, 
September, 1970), p.28. (Typewritten.) 
CJoseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, District Four, "Austin-Area 
Project: The Pupil Busing Program in District Four: A Fourth Report" (report 
presented to the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, 
Illinois, August, ~971), p. 14, (Typewritten.) 
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pupils, and it is in closer accord with the attendance of the 
receiving school. In 1970-71 while attendance at the sending 
schools has improved, the attendance of the bused students has 
increased so that it is not only consistently higher than the 
percent attendance of the sending schools, but has also surpassed 
the attendance rate of the receiving schools during six months of 
the ten month year. 
These figures show that although the bused students as a 
group were usually better in attendance than the students in the 
sending schools, the bused students' attendance continued to 
improve and drew closer to the attendance rate of the receiving 
schools. It is indicated that the bused students were developing 
attendance habits similar to the students in the receiving schools. 
As attendance at school is an important element in obtaining a 
quality education, this factor must be considered as a possible 
bonus in this particular busing plan. 
Certainly, the social aspects of the educational experiences 
of all the students involved are an important goal in education. 
For the vast majority of the parents of the bused children the 
improvement of social relationships was clear. Table lO(page 338) 
shows the overwhelming percentage of parents who expressed satis-
faction regarding the social relationships of their children. 
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Comments regarding this relationship were, "He has gained new 
strength and knowledge of people of other races." "Her school has 
a lot of extra curricular activities." "There were some hard times, 
but they have passed. 11 23 
The parents of stud~nts living in the receiving area did not 
perceive the social relationships of their children to be improved. 
Table 11 ~ndicates that a majority of parents were less than 
satisfied with the social relationship aspect of their children's 
education. Their open end comments espressed even more dissatis-
faction. Some parents expressed concern about the expansion of 
the program in such comments as, "Continued influx of busing 
students will eventually overcrowd our neighborhood schools to the 
point where we shall have to transport our neighborhood children 
to another school, long distances, and without busing privileges." 
"I will try to change schools or move anywhere where there is not 
so much tension since this last year. 1124 
Other parents felt the racial encounters were detrimental to 
their children. They observed: "They [Negro children] are very 
arrogant and seems they like to bully the children at recess, or 
23n.E., 1969, pp. 12-13, 21 (Quote). D.E., 1970, pp. 13, 
20-21. -
24n.E., -1969, pp. 14.;.16, 22-23 (Quotes). 
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in line, or in the washroom." "I do not approve of the four 
letter words and worse that are used by the bused children. It 
has been necessary at least once a week to explain the meaning of 
foul language and signs and why they should be ignored and not 
used." "It can be seen very clearly that these children have no 
respect for adults or their schoolmates." Some parents felt no 
social interaction was occurring and expressed this belief with 
comments such as: "My child plays only with white boys and doesn't 
mingle with the black children. From my own observations, they 
stay in their own group showing their own partiality." "Busing 
has not achieved integration." Some parents expressed a neu-
trality with such comments as, "My son has no complaint." "The 
busing program has not affected my daughter in any way that is 
evident· to me. My daughter has never complained or felt that it 
affected her in any situation." It was an unusual parent who 
commented, "We are most grateful that our daughter has attended the 
School for more reasons than one--but I know of no better 
reason than the wholesome experience she gained as a result of the 
busing program. 11 25 
25Ibid., pp. 22-23 (First, second, fourth, seventh, eighth 
quotes). D.E., 1970, pp. 13-15, 23-24 (Third, fifth, sixth quotes). 
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There was a wide variability among the evaluations of indi-
vidual teachers. When their reports are tallied in Table 12 
(page 342) it may be seen that they ranked the bused students 
highest in social progress in every year. In only one year were 
more than 18 percent of the students placed in the lowest category 
and in only one year did less than 51 percent rank in the highest 
category. Teachers also indicated that generally they received 
support from the parents of the bused pupils. However, they did 
express a desire that the program be designed to better screen the 
students being sent. In the 1968-69 school year twenty-four 
students were returned for reasons other than transfers from the 
sending district, In the 1969-70 year twenty-nine were returned. 
While these students were not returned for disciplinary reasons, 
the existence of the possibility of returning must have served to 
alleviate some of the most serious social problems.26 
When the conduct grades assigned by teachers in the receiving 
schools are compared with the conduct grades received by the same 
students when attending the sending schools, an interesting dis-
parity can be noted. Of forty- eight bused graduates in 1970, 
twenty-four had been graded "Excellent," fourteen received "Good," 
26 D.E., 1969, pp. 4, 4a, 24. D.E., 1970, pp. 4-5. D.E., 
1971, p.12.'" 
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eight were marked "Fair" and two were considered "Unsatisfactory." 
In 1967 when these forty-eight were graded as students at the 
Spencer or May Schools, only fourteen students were graded 
"Excellent," twenty-seven received "Good," five were marked "Fair" 
and two were considered "Unsatisfactory." This improvement in 
deportment grades is evident again when the 1971 bused graduates 
are studied.27 
Two interpretations may be put forth to explain this dis-
crepancy. The teachers at the receiving schools may have used a 
double standard in evaluating the bused students. They may have 
expected less acceptable behavior and therefore graded the bused 
students higher when they performed "normally." On the other hand, 
the change in environment may have resulted in an actual improvement 
in overt behavior on the part of many students. As the focus of 
a good deal more attention at the receiving school than at the 
sending school, the students may have had a greater incentive to 
conform to normally acceptable school behavior. The latter inter-
pretation finds support in the observation of receiving school 
principals that "since most of the upper grade bused pupils have 
been in the school for three years, their behavior conforms more 
27 D.E., 1970, pp. 33, 37. D.E., 1971, pp. 23, 25. 
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to that of the residential pupils. 11 28 
The choice of high schools may indicate some perceptions of 
the bused students regarding their social and academic adjustment. 
The program allowed bused students to choose between their home 
high school or Steinmetz High School which served the receiving 
schools. Classes of bused students began graduating from the 
receiving schools in 1970. As the chart on the next page shows 
there has been a steady increase in the number of students who 
have chosen to attend the receiving area school over the period 
1970-72. This increase is rather significant, the percentage of 
students choosing to attend Steinmetz jumping from 45 percent to 
84 percent within two years. The most obvious explanation is that, 
as students have attended the receiving schools for longer periods 
of time, they tend to prefer going on to the receiving area school 
with their classmates. Whether the peer group influencing them 
is black or white is not evident. One effect of this choice is 
that Steinmetz High School, which had only four Negro students in 
1967, was 3.2 percent desegregated in 1972.29· 
28D.E., 1971, p. 26. 
29 2 D.E., 1970, p. 31. D.E., 1971, p. 30. D.E., 197 , pp. 10-
11, 15. J'.ie'adcounts, 1970, 1971, 1972. 
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TABLE 17 
CHOICE OF HIGH SCHOOLS BY BUSED STUDENTS: 1970-1972 
Year Austin Steinmetz . Lane 
(Home Area (Receiving (Academic- Vocational Other 
School) Area School) Engineering) Type 
1970 21 22 5 1 
( 
1971 18 34 1 1 1 
1972 4 41 2 2 
The evaluations of the busing program by principals of the 
receiving schools tend to reflect the negative aspects of the plan 
that they have encountered. On the positive side, principals saw 
signs of academic improvement among the bused students, especially 
at the lower grade levels. They could see no signs that the 
achievement level of residential students was falling. They also 
found the parents of bused students to be cooperative when con-
tacted, although these parents seldom participated in school 
programs and activities.30 
Early principal evaluations emphasized the need for more 
services to cope with the new situation. Every year they have 
observed that the bused students are performing at a lower academic 
level than the majority of resident students. One of the most 
30 D.E., 1968, p. 18. D.E., 1969, pp. 25-26. D.E., 1970, 
pp. 25-2~n.E., 1971, pp. 25-26. D.E., 1972, p. 2-z;:--
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frequent observations made by all the principals has been that 
those children who achieved well in the receiving school would 
have achieved well in the sending school, and children who did not 
achieve well in the receiving school would not achieve well in 
the sending school. 
In social adjustment the principals observed that the trans-
portation schedules did limit the opportunity for bused students 
to participate in after school events. But one might question the 
number of events in which the children would stay to participate. 
The covert and sometimes overt opposition of the receiving com-
munity was mentioned in every report. While most black parents 
were reported to be pleased with the plan, there were numerous 
accusations of racism and prejudice .. The principals' concern with 
discipline problems was evident in that most continually called 
for better screening of the children chosen for busing and the 
establishment of a set of criteria for returning maladjusted 
children to their sending schools. Most of the discipline problems 
originated with a few children and usually during lunch or play 
periods. 
The principals noted that the children in the primary grades 
played together more freely than the older children. Polarization 
of the races became more promounced in the later grades. One 
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principal observed that this was especially true of the girls who 
reach puberty sooner than the boys. As the children moved up in 
the grades, discipline problems were reported to increase. How-
ever, it was generally concluded that these problems were more 
related to the difficulties of preadolescence than to race 
relations. 
In conclusion, it may be observed that the objectives set 
for the busing program by the Board of Education have either not 
been achieved or can not be verified by this study. Severe over-
crowding at the May and Spencer Schools was not immediately 
relieved by the initiation of the plan. Indeed, overcrowding was 
not alleviated until numerous other measures were taken to create 
more space for the rapidly expanding south Austin school popu-
lation. However, to the extent that between five and six hundred 
students were moved to schools with empty seats, the overcrowding 
problem was ameliorated. 
Stabilization of the Austin community and the May and Spencer 
Schools in particular was not accomplished by any but the most 
modest criterion. The s·outh Austin colllIIlunity experienced rapid 
desegregation and resegregation. The only stabilization that may 
have occurred rests in the possibility that some families of 
children in the busing program\may have chosen not to move in 
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order to remain in a sending area. On the other hand, the receiving 
neighborhoods remained stable despite the protests of many opponents 
of the plan that there would be a white exodus from the area. 
=---;-~ In considering desegregation as a goal, we must distinguish 
it __ .from integration. De.segregation may be considered to be an 
almost mechanical intermingling of people according to some pre-
scribed quota. In achieving the quota, which may be as low as 10 
percent, it is often assumed that certain positive educational and 
social effects will result from the proximity of the races. 
However, the achievement of desegregation as a goal does not 
require the attainment of the.educational and social goals. Deseg-
regation refers to the attainment of the prescribed quota. 
Even when we assume this limited definition of desegregation, 
the busing program has still fallen short of attaining the 15 
percent maximum designated in the original plan. Indeed, the 
administration has found it necessary to calculate the percent of 
desegregation on a different basis than in the original plan in 
order to obtain a minimal 10 percent quota figure. Three factors 
help to explain the stagnation of the busing program. Black 
parents originally saw the busing plan as an alternative to the 
overcrowded May and Spencer Schools. As new facilities and programs 
became available in south Austin, there has been less reason for 
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parents to turn to busing as a method of seeking quality education 
for their children. 
Furthermore, Negro leaders in Chicago have been inclining 
toward black power positions which placed less emphasis on inte-
gration. Thus, school officials have encountered little pressure 
from the black communities for an expansion of the busing program· 
On the other hand, there has been a continuing, if covert, oppo-
sition to busing in a large segment of the white community. Given 
the existing community sentiments, it would indeed be startling 
to discover the Board exerting pressure to expand the program. 
Finally, the goal of improving educational experiences for 
all children must be considered. The evidence remains moot for 
the residential students. Their test scores indicate no signifi-
cant improvement or decline since the initiation of the program. 
No tests have been given to evaluate their perception of ·themselves 
or their bused peers. A majority of their parents who have 
responded to questionnaires have indicated less than a satisfied 
attitude toward the social and academic aspects of their children's 
education. These negative attitudes must have an undesirable 
effect on their children's conceptions of the bused students. 
The effects of white prejudice have not been overt. Some 
parents of the bused students have complained of prejudice, but an 
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overwhelming majority of black parents have indicated that they are 
satisfied with the academic and social progress of their children. 
Their evaluation is supported by the teachers' reports for most 
of the students. Over two-thirds of the bused students have almost 
consistently scored fair or above in the teacher responses. The 
failure rate has been small among the bused pupils, although the 
bused students as a group remain academically at the bottom of 
the class. 
Certain decisions of the bused students indicate their 
growing adjustment to their situation. Their attendance rate has 
continued to improve over that of their peers in the sending 
schools and has reached and even surpassed the attendance patterns 
of the residential pupils in the receiving schools. It is unlikely 
that a discontented group of students would have such an excellent. 
attendance record. The improvement in the conduct grades of the 
bused students may indicate their adjustment to their receiving 
schools. This interpretation does fit in with the matrix of data 
indicating the social adjustment of the black pupils. The growing 
number of students choosing, Steinmetz High School with its segre-
gated white student body is further evidence of the social adjust-
ment of the bused students. 
The significance of the data regarding the reading scores of 
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the bused students is questionable. The data for the graduating 
class of 1971 is inconclusive as numerous factors cloud the 
validity of the comparisons which are made. However, the data 
indicates that the bused students in the 1973 graduating class made 
academic gains beyond the level achieved by their counterparts in 
the sending schools. There is no evidence to indicate that the 
rate of achievement of residential students in the receiving 
schools was affected positively or adversely by the busing program. 
Although the first three goals established for the busing 
plan were not achieved, there is evidence that educational expe-
riences have been improved for some children. This evidence is 
certainly sufficient to justify the continuance of the busing pro-
gram. There are other reasons for continuing the program. The 
threat of renewed concern on the part of federal authorities if the 
Chicago Board of Education reversed its action on busing is an 
obvious factor in the continuance of the program. But there is a 
more valid reason for integration. 
While a large segment of the Negro community may disdain 
busing for numerous reasons, a significant number of blacks are 
concerned with integration. Indeed, if we are to avoid the polar-
ization warned against in the Kerner Report, positive action toward 
integration is a necessity: The strength of black separatism rests 
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in white rejection of integration. The underlying premise of 
black separatism is, "If you are going to have an entirely black 
community, then black people ought to control their life in it."31 
School administrators and board members cannot use a lack of black 
interest in desegregation.as an excuse for inaction. It has been 
the failure to act which helped slacken the black interest. 
Within this context the Chicago busing plan nrust not fade away, 
although a realistic appraisal indicates it is unlikely that the 
Board of Education will expand the plan. 
31Benjamin E. Mays, "Integration as a Matter of Heart," The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1970, p. 11. The 1973 Gallup 
Poll found 58 percent of the nonwhite population responded that 
more should be done regarding school integration compared to the 
same response by only 26 percent of the white· population. See 
George H. Gallup, "Fifth Annual Gallup Poll of Public Attitudes 
Toward Education," Phi Delta Kappan, LV (September, 1973), 47. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY IN WHICH THE ANALYTIC QUESTIONS DEVELOPED 
IN THE LASSWELL DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
ARE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO 
THE 1968 BUSING DECISION 
In this concluding chapter the dissertation returns directly 
to the analytic questions presented in the seven functions des-
cribed by Harold Lasswell. A description of each function will 
be followed by the analytic questions it suggests and a brief 
answer to these questions. 
The intelligence function considers information, prediction, 
and planning. The first question asked is, "How is information 
that comes to the attention of the decision-makers gathered and 
processed?" A definite evolution of sources may be discerned in 
answer to this question. Under Benjamin Willis, the Superintendent 
of Schools was the major source of detailed information. However, 
this hegemony was challenged by the demands for special reports 
in which information was gathered by agents outside of the school 
administrative system~ The conflict over this power of exami-
nation was one of the factors which led to the retirement of the 
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superintendent. When the new superintendent took office, he found 
a Board which was more inclined than it had previously been to 
turn to other sources in seeking information. He did not chal-
lenge this propensity of the Board. Indeed, when he presented 
the busing plans, he recommended that the Board members defer 
consideration until they met the public. The introduction of 
community councils created a direct line of communication between 
spokesmen for local groups and the Board members.l 
The second intelligence question asks, "What studies, 
reports, laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known 
or available to the decision-makers?" This question expands on 
the first by drawing attention to the numerous sources outside 
the school administration which serve to influence Board members. 
In this dissertation a number of fedeial and state laws, court 
decisions, and reports are shown to have required that Board mem-
bers be informed of problems related to integration. Reports 
commissioned by the Board, directed by Hauser, Havighurst, and 
Redmond, provided considerable information. · Special studies by 
universities, the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association, and the 
Real Estate Research Corporation were available to Board m~mbers.2 
lAbove, pp. 40-64, 219, 316-18. 
2Above, pp. 67-117, 176-82. 
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The third intelligence question asks, "What formal or 
informal channels were being utilized in reaching the decision-
makers?" The influence of the press upon Board members is noted. 
The personal contacts of Board members with members of their own 
neighborhoods is not explored, but some factions in the city 
deduced from the positions taken by Board members that infor-
mation -gained from personal contacts may have influenced them. 
Residents of the northwest and southwest areas of the city felt 
that the number of Board members residing in the southeast section 
of the city was a factor in the decision not to implement the 
busing plan in South Shore. This study found other reasons for 
the negative decision. However, the demand by residents of the 
western periphery of the city that members of the Board be 
appointed from their.area indicated the conviction of these 
people that a Board member would be more informed about problems 
in his own neighborhood. The age of the Board members served 
as an indicator of their position on the busing program. All 
the members who were over seventy were opposed to the plan.3 
Other factors which affected the Board members in their 
decision-making have been considered. Conflicts between the 
3Above, pp. 25-40, 286-90. 
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mayor and his Commission on School Board Nominations regarding 
the appointment of Board members indicate the control the mayor 
has retained over the composition and character of the Board. 
No direct influence of the mayor on Board members was established 
in this dissertation. The indirect influence he exerted in 
public announcements was considered. The influence of other 
politicians was evident. Their pressure was directly responsible 
for the Board's decision to hold hearings on the busing proposals 
in various connnunities. These public hearings served to further 
the Board's knowledge that large segments of the public were 
bitterly opposed to the proposed plans.4 
The fourth intelligence question asks, "To what extent did 
the decision-making body control the source of its information?" 
The Board of Education had expanded its sources of information 
during its conflict with Willis. When the new superintendent 
took office, the area boundary committees were actively engaged 
in meetings with community representatives. Thus, when Redmond 
made a reconnnendation that the South Side Boundaries Committee 
reconsider a decision, he was rebuffed with a reminder that the-
connnittee had already gathered as much information as it deemed 
necessary. Prior to the introduction of the busing reconnnendation 
4Above, pp. 17-25, £17-62, 285-88. 
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the Board considered alternate plans for the South Shore and 
Austin areas and was in direct contact with connnunity organi-
zations in these areas.5 
The reconnnendation function considers promotion of policy 
alternatives. The first question asks, "How are recommendations 
made and promoted?" This function is considered in conjunction 
with "Whose duty is it to recommend?" The recommendation function 
has been definitely established as the prerogative of the Superin-
tendent of Schools. This power has been guarded by Redmond, who 
reminded the Board on numerous occasions that it is the superin-
tendent's duty to act as an adviser. The access of the superin-
tendent through his staff to details of the operation of schools 
must give considerable weight to his recommendations. However, 
the Boa:rd remains the prescribing body and may call upon the super-
intendent to supply further information or alternative recomrnen-
d . 6 ati.ons. 
The second recommendation question asks, "What alternative 
decisions were considered?" This dissertation studies numerous 
alternatives which were utilized or considered as alternatives 
to busing. The neighborhood school policy, the stabilization 
policy, the adjustment of boundaries, the selection of new school 
SAbove, pp. 39-64, 171-72. 6Above, pp. 64, 196, 263-64, 267. 
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sites, the voluntary permissive transfer program, the development 
of magnet schools, and the consideration of educational parks are 
noted. The development of a mini-m~gnet school in South Shore as 
an alternative to the intra-corrnnunity busing proposal is examined.7 
The third reconnnend,ation question asks, "Who advocated these 
alternatives?" Geographical, racial, and ethnic factors are 
considered in answering this question. The division of the black 
corrnnunities on the use of various alternatives is noted. The 
futility of singling out certain ethnic groups as being more 
resistant to change is discussed. The dissertation studies the 
positions that various city-wide and local organizations took 
regarding the alternatives. City-wide organizations tended to 
support the plan while local organizations in the receiving areas 
were often opposed.8 
The fourth reconnnendation question asks, "Why were they 
rejected, accepted or compromised?" The reasons for the rejection 
of the South Shore intra-connnunity busing plan are seen in the 
inability of the various factions to accept any compromise, the 
lack of facilities within the schools involved, and the rapid 
7Above, pp. 52, 66, 75-80, 131-37, 304-15 .. 
8Above, pp. 201-10, 228-58. 
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racial change already occurring in the areas concerned. The 
accepted plan for the Austin area was a compromise. Black parents 
residing in designated sending areas were no longer required to 
send their children but were required to decide whether or not 
their children should be bused. The compromise was a concession 
to fear of white parents that their children might be forced into 
a two-way busing program in the future. It also recognized the 
anger of a faction of black parents who felt their children 
should not be singled out to enforce an integration plan.9 
The fifth recommendation question asks, "What audiences were 
reached by the recommendations?" Prior to the announcement of the 
busing recommendations, the school administration had contacted as 
few groups as possible in order to minimize the development of 
resistance. The dissertation shows that the segments of the public 
which became concerned extended beyond those areas which were ::.m-
mediate ly involved in the plan. Some vocal opponents of the busing 
plan were members of organizations which had been created to defend 
segregationist positions in earlier conflicts. Many residents of 
the areas in which schools were designated to receive bused stu-
dents sought membership in community organizations for the first 
time. Organizations which opposed the busing plans sought out each 
9Above, pp. 237-47, 258-70. 
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other and these consolidated groups continued to remain united in 
their opposition to future recommendations regarding integration. 
Politicians from every level of government were called upon to 
represent the various factions. Church organizations became 
involved as the use of their schools became an issue in the 
debate. Newspapers took editorial positions on the issue. Only 
one city-wide newspaper opposed the busing plan.10 
The sixth question has been considered above in conjunction 
with the first recommendation question. 
The seventh recommendation question asks, "What values were 
considered in performing the function?" Undoubtedly, the United 
States Supreme Court in the Brown decisions provided the basic 
value requiring action. Another value must have operated to 
motivate Board members who wished to escape various forms of 
punishment the federal government could mete out if some action 
were not taken to indicate the good faith of the Board regarding 
integration policies. The Redmond Report considered many values. 
It expressed the democratic principle that people must understand 
and believe in policies which they are expected to support. It 
restated the positions taken by the Board of Education which 
10Above, pp. 339-58. 
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supported racial integration and stabilization as policies to be 
pursued by the Chicago School System.11 
Stabilization was a goal which reflected values. Inte-
gration could not be accomplished if white residents did not 
remain in a racially changing area. The tax base in the city 
would decline if middle-class whites continued to leave the city. 
A plan was offered to minimize white opposition and allay any 
fear which might result in whites fleeing from the city. A quota 
was established placing a fifteen percent limit upon the pro-
portion of black students who would be admitted to any receiving 
school. This plan would appeal to many citizens with a pragmatic 
view toward accomplishing desegregation. However,• many people 
considered it to be a violation of their principles to bus only 
black students and to guarantee whites that only a limited number 
of black people would be sent to "their" schools.12 
The eighth reconnnendation question asks, "To what extent 
did the information made available disclose threats or opportu-
nities pertinent to the present or potential value positions of 
the decision-makers?" The position of federal authorities repre-
sented a threat to those whose values opposed desegregation. For 
llAbove, pp. 176-83. 12Above, pp. 78, 95, 177-82. 
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.those whose values favored desegregation an opportunity appeared 
in a Real Estate Research Corporation study which indicated that 
the South Shore and south Austin co~unities were experiencing 
rapid racial change. Stabilization was a policy endorsed by the 
Board members. It was im.perative that action be taken immediately 
for any stabilization policy to succeed in these corrnnunities. 
The relief of overcrowding offered by the busing plan, when 
considered alone, offered an opportunity to achieve a value 
position held by all of the Board members. Indeed, this aspect 
of the plan was emphasized in presentations to the various con-
cerned parties. The busing plan goal, to improve the educational 
experiences of all children, was nebulous. As the dissertation 
establishes, quality education was defined in different ways by 
various individuals. Desegregation was a goal which struck most 
poignantly at the values held by the decision-makers. For those 
who advocated the neighborhood school policy, desegregation by 
busing was a violation of their values. For those who advocated 
integration, tbe desegregation goal was a welcome policy.13-
The ninth recorrnnendation question asks, "Did the information 
made available to those concerned with the decision alter their 
13 Above, pp. 52, 127-40. 
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views?" The Austin busing proposal was finally accepted by an 
eight to one vote with two members absent. There was no evidence 
to indicate that information gained from the hearings in the com-
munities had influenced the decisions of the Board members. The 
vote on the porposal had been deadlocked until a compromise was 
finally accepted. Value positions, rather than additional infor-
mation, were the crucial factors in the decision. When the final 
decision was made, it was emphasized that Board members saw the 
main issue to be the relief of overcrowding. The dissemination of 
information to the various factions of the public had little 
influence on their views. The public hearings and the continuing 
high percentage of opposition expressed in local public opinion 
polls make the lack of influence perfectly clear.14 
The tenth reconn:nendation question asks, "Did pressure groups 
demand a greater participation in the recommending function as a 
result of the decisions being considered?" The busing contro-
versy evoked numerous demands for greater participation in the 
decision~making process. Established organizations such as 
the South Shore Commission expressed definite demands for specific 
policies. Ad hoc groups also emerged to make their demands known. 
14 Above, pp. 201-06, 269. 
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These groups, once formed, remained active in their opposition 
to other proposals which might have affected integration policy.15 
The prescription function considers the enactment of general 
rules. The first question asl<s, "How are the rules prescribed?" 
This may be considered in conjunction with the fourth question 
which asks, "What group really made the final prescription?" 
Rules are prescribed by a majority of the members of the Board 
of Education. They are prescribed at the reconunendation of the 
Superintendent of Schools, although the Board may initiate a 
reconnnendati.on by requesting information and plans from the 
superintendent. The busing prescription was made in response to 
problems that arose in specific areas. These problems could be 
remedied by the application of four stated Board policies. These 
policies called for the relief of overcrowding in schools, the 
promotion of stabilization in neighborhoods, the increase of 
desegregation, and the improvement of educational experiences 
for all children. The decision was made by the members of the 
Board of Education. While many pressures were exerted on the 
Board, there is no doubt that the final decision was the r~spon­
sibility of elev.en individuals who finally resolved their 
lSAbove, pp. 83-84, 201-10, 232-38, 298. 
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differences although not the differences in the communities.16 
The second prescription question asks, "What was the final 
decision?" The busing prescription was part of a series of 
decisions made by the Board of Education. These decisions may 
be seen as a part of a continuing succession of choices which the 
Board members must make regarding the implementation of the four 
policies stated above. However, when the final decisions were 
made on the South Shore and Austin busing proposals, they were 
to reject the South Shore plan and accept a compromise version 
of the Austin plan.17 
The third prescription question.asks, ''What group or agency 
appears to be most favored by the decision?" The compromise 
proposal represented concessions to both the segregationist and 
0 
integrationist elements in the communities. Mrs. Malis saw the· 
compromise, allowing parents the option of taking their children 
out of the program, as an appeasement to anti-busing· opposition. 
No effective massive busing program could be implemented when 
parents were allowed the option of keeping their children in the 
neighborhood school. The busing of black children to schools 
with student bodies which were previously all-white may be 
16Above, pp. 224-28, 261-70. 17Above, pp. 260-70. 
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considered a victory for desegregationists. But the victory was 
tempered by a quota guaranteeing that only a limited number of 
children would be bused. Both blac~ and white citizens found 
objectionable features in the busing plan. Both segregationists 
and desegregationists found objectionable features in the plan. 
However, the prescription was most favorable to desegregationists.18 
The fourth prescription question has been considered in 
conjunction with the first question. 
The.fifth prescription question asks, "Did any groups in-
voived in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order 
to redress their,grievances as they saw them?" Alternative plans 
were e~pecially abundant in the South Shore district. The ina-
ability of the various pro-integration groups in the area to win 
wide-spread support for their alternative plans, when combined 
with their own incapacity to compromise_ their positions, left 
no one to support the Board's busing plan.19 
In the northwest side districts the busing proponents 
sought relief for overcrowding and were willing to accept a 
compromise. The opponents of busing offered no alternatives 
except a continuation of the building program and the establishment 
18Above, pp. 263-70. 19Above, pp. 235-40. 
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of quality education programs. These two prescriptions were not 
viable alternative solutions to the innnediate problem facing 
the Board.20 
The invocation function considers provisional characteri-
zations of conduct according to prescriptions. The first question 
asks, "In reference to whom is the prescription invoked?" The 
prescr1ption had been explicit that students would be bused only 
from the overcrowded May and Spencer Schools into seven under-
utilized schools. The neighborhoods selected from the attendance 
areas of the May and Spencer Schools contained only black resi-
dents. When parents of a large number of the children eligible 
for busing refused to allow their children to participate in the 
program, supplementary geographic blocks were added to make more 
black children available for busing. These preparations insured 
that the plan would operate with black children whose parents 
approved of the busing program.21 
The second invocation question asks, "Who was responsible 
fol;:' administering the decision?" ,The staff of the school system 
was directly responsible for administering the decision. Board 
member Bacon specifically asked School Superintendent Redmond to 
20Above, pp. 240-48. 21Above, pp. 272-77. 
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watch for.any signs of staff sabotage in implementing the plan. 
The administrative staffs of School District Four and the two 
sending schools were basically responsible for the selection and 
transportation of students who were to be bused. The administra-
tive staffs and faculties of the receiving schools were respon-
sible for establishing a professional and cordial environment for 
the new students. The compromise plan also created a responsi-
bility for many parents who were forced to decide whether they 
would allow their children to be bused.22 
The third invocation question asks, "Was the prescription 
invoked for all cases possible or only for selected cases?" The 
Austin busing program has remained unique in the Chicago School 
System. While students are conunonly bused within the system, 
only one other program has resulted in the desegregation of 
schools, and that program lasted only about four months. The 
substitute plan for the rejected South Shore busing proposal 
offered a mini-magnet school as an alternative rather than another 
form of a busing plan. The.Austin busing prescription called only 
for the involvement of the specified schools and the administration 
exempted none of those schools in implementing the plan. The 
22Above, pp. 269, 271-73, 299. 
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non-contiguous assignment program suggested in the Redmond Plan 
could have been implemented in other non-threatened white resi-
dential areas. The extension of this prescription to other areas 
has not been considered by the Board.23 
The fourth invocation question asks, "Was the decision 
challenged?" This may be considered in conjunction with the 
fifth question, which asks, "How was the decision challenged?" 
The dissertation considers the numerous forms that protesters 
used to challenge the busing decision. The development of new 
organizations and the increased participation in established 
groups such as the local Parent-Teachers Associations were noted. 
Picketing.and boycotting, challenges in the courts, threats to 
defeat a school bond referendum, and attempts to influence the 
legislature to terminate or limit busing were among the forms of 
challenges to the decision. Protesters also sought to change the 
nature of the Board of Education. They called for the election 
rather than the appointment of School Board members and demanded 
that Board members be chosen to represent geographical areas of 
the city. 24 
23Above, .pp. 296-301, 309-10. 
24Above, pp. 232-58, 284-96. 
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The application function considers the final characteri-
zation of conduct according to prescriptions. The first question 
asks, "How was the prescription applied?" This question may be 
considered with the second question which asks, "How were those 
affected reached and informed?" The plan was implemented within 
a week of the final decision by the Board. The specific details 
of the-plan were followed when the program was begun in March, 
1968, although the staff was unable to obtain a sufficient number 
of students for busing to meet the initial specifications. The 
dissertation considers the administrative problems involved in 
implementing the program. The method of informing parents of the 
students designated for busing and the staffs of the schools 
involved is examined.25 
The third application question asks, "Did any groups turn 
to other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the pre-
scriptions?" Some citizens who questioned the decision to imple-
ment the Austin busing plan turned to the courts and to legislatures 
in attempts to alter or negate the prescription. The courts 
refused to interfere with the prescription on technical grounds 
but made no precise comment on the status of busing programs or 
25Above, pp. 271-84. 
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the grounds on which the programs could be challenged. The state 
legislature has been less ambivalent, but not more effective, in 
challenging the busing prescription.. A cormnission established to 
investigate the Chicago School System received little attention 
in the city. It was not µntil 1973 that an anti-busing law passed 
the legislature, and this act merely restricted the power of the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction to require school sys-
tems to use busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance 
in any school. 26 
The fourth application question asks, "Was the prescription 
violated any individuals· or by the agency responsible for- the 
application of the prescription?" There was no evidence that any 
individual or agency involved in applying the function had 
attempted to violate the prescription. Indeed, in the face of 
hostility from some members of the cormnunities designated to 
receive the bused students, numerous agencies took steps to see 
that the plan was implemented in accordance with the prescription. 
As the program entered its second full year, the number of stu-
dents being bused did not reach the maximum number allowed under 
the quota system imposed by the plan. This aspect of the 
26Above, pp. 294-96. 
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application of the prescription is developed under the appraisal 
function below.27 
The fifth application question asks, "Did the prescribed 
policy lead to changes in values?" There is no evidence that 
opponents of the busing program altered their views as a result 
of application of the busing prescription. There is evidence 
that few parents altered their value system after the plan was 
in operation. Questionnaires were sent home with children who 
lived in the innnediate area of the receiving schools. The re-
turned responses, in 1969, indicated that 86.5 percent of the par-
ents were less than satisfied with the busing plan. In 1970, the 
percentage indicating a lack of satisfaction was 89.0 percent. 
In 1971, the opposition which arose in the northwest side when 
another busing plan was suggested for the Ennnet School in Chicago 
indicates th~t a considerable number of citizens remained opposed 
to busing.28 
A national polling agency in 1971 found 79 percent of white 
persons interviewed to be opposed to busing as a method of 
achieving integration. During the busing controversy over 95 
percent of the respondents to a local newspaper poll taken on the 
27 b 4 . A ove, pp. 271-8 , 323-31. 
28Above, pp. 296-301-, 337-39. 
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northwest side of Chicago indicated their opposition to busing. 
But there is no reason to suspect that the lower percentage figure 
established by the later national poll reflects a change in values. 
The national poll was not interviewing people who thought they 
were being directly involved in a busing plan. While the evidence 
is incomplete or indirect, it indicates that the operating busing 
plan had little or no influence on the values of most white 
citizens who were opposed to busing as a means of achieving 
integration.29 
There is reason to state that bused students as a group 
had experienced attitudinal changes. Questionnaires filled out 
by parents of bused students would r.eflect the parents' knowl-
edgeable views of their children's progress. The comments made 
by these parents indicated an increasing degree of satisfaction 
with almost every aspect of their children's development in the 
succeeding years, 1968, 1969, and 1970. If these comments were 
the only evidence of changes in the bused students' values, there 
would be reason to doubt the sufficiency of data ind1cating the 
validity of the conclusion, but there is more evidence.30 
An analysis of reading test scores indicates that students 
29Above, pp. 205-06, 339-40. 30Above, pp. 337-39. 
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who had been bused for a few years were performing at a higher 
level than their counter-parts who remained at the sending school. 
Further evidence of changed values is found in the steadily 
improving school attendance of bused students. At the third 
year of operation of the busing program the bused students' 
attendance had become considerably better than the attendance of 
students who remained at the sending school. Teachers at the 
receiving schools also assigned conduct grades to the bused stu-
dents which indicated an improvement in deportment when compared 
to conduct grades assigned to the bused students before they 
entered the program. The growing number of bused students who 
chose to attend the predominantly white high school over other 
alternatives indicated a changing set of values. Any one of these 
indicators was open to varying interpretations regarding the 
motive for changed behavior. However, when considered together 
they presented a matrix of evidence which strongly suggests that 
bused students were experiencing value reorientations which were 
more academically acceptable.31 
The appraisal function considers the assessment of the 
success and failure of policy. The first question asks, 11How is 
the working of prescriptions appraised?" The second question 
31Above, pp. 340-62~ 
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asks, ' 1Whose activities were appraised?" The third question asks, 
"Who did the appraising?" During each year of the operation of 
the plan either the district superintendent of District Four or 
the associate superintendent for Area C connnissioned a study of 
the busing program as a report to the Board of Education. Parents, 
teachers, and principals were asked to complete questi~nnaires for 
the first three reports. The performance of pupils was also eval-
uated. Later reports used the four goals for the busing program 
expressed by the Board as criteria for judging the success of the 
busing plan. The studies were usually lucid and factual. However, 
· as the reports were basically self-evaluations by the adminis-
tration of one of its duties, they are considered as biased infor--
mation in the development of the dissertation. Figures and data 
are accepted as being correctly recorded, but the .interpretation 
of the data is scrutinized and altered when evidence exists that 
other explanations appear possible. Thus, new interpretations 
or data are interposed throughout the analysis of the appraisals.32 
The fourth appraisal question asks, "How effectively and 
efficiently was the prescription executed?" The fifth que.stion 
asks, "Did the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or 
32Above, pp. 271-368 are primarily an analysis of the 
reports. 
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indifferent administration of the prescription?" The evidence 
indicates that the school administration during the opening stage 
of application was relatively efficient in executing the pre-
scription. No child was harmed. Damage to facilities was limited 
to the fire-bombing of one receiving school off ice and some 
broken windows. The major difficulty rested with obtaining 
enough students for busing to fill the prescription. Classroom 
reorganizations during the first months of the operation of the 
plan were disruptive, and recruitment of more students for busing 
was halted before the desired number of pupils was obtained.33 
In terms of achieving the four stated goals of the busing 
program, the school system was not particularly effective. Over-
crowding in the sending schools was not relieved as a result of 
the busing program. This failure reElected an unrealistic goal 
established in originally presenting the plan. The diversion of 
six hundred students from the overcrowded schools was unable to 
alleviate the crowding brought about by the rapid racial change 
occurring in the area. However, the busing plan, after the first 
full year of operation, was not operated to obtain the maximum 
number of students which was permitted under the quota plan. 
Indeed, the school administration resorted to using revised 
33Above, pp. 271-84~ 
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methods of computing the percentage of desegregation in order to 
meet a minimum desegregation standard. The failure to bus a 
sufficient number of students to achieve a desegregation goal was 
due both to the nature of the prescription and to the structure 
of the school agency. The decision to allow parents to deny per-
mission for their children to be bused increased the difficulty 
of obtaining a sufficient number of pupils to participate in the 
plan. The decision, however, reflected the nature of the Board 
of Education as a decision-making body which was responsive to 
the demands of many factions of the public. The lack of any action 
to increase the number of bused students to the maximum indicated 
by the original plan reflected the lack of pressures being exerted 
upon the Board to utilize busing for integration. While the 
pressures to increase the busing program hav:e been few, the P.res-
sures to refrain from further action have been many.34 
The goal of achieving stabilization was achieved neither 
in the south Austin sending schools nor in the COIImlUnity. Again, 
the goal was too ambitious, especially in light of the past lack 
of success of stabilization as a policy. The final goal, ~m­
proving educational experiences for all children, appeared to 
34Above, pp. 320-32, 364-66. 
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have been achieved with moderate success. This success did reflect 
an aspect of the structure of the school agency. Teachers and 
administrators applied the prescription with an even hand. While 
there were some complaints of prejudiced treatment, the over-
whelming majority of parents of bused students indicated satis-
faction with the program.' The $Chool staffs obviously performed 
in a truly professional manner.35 
The sixth appraisal question asks, "Did the admj.nistration 
of the prescription lead to significant changes in the adminis-
trative agency?" There were no changes in the administrative 
agency that could be traced to the application of the prescription. 
There was evidence that appointments to the Board of Education 
eventually reflected a broader geographical distribution through-
out the city. Demands that Board members be chosen from areas on 
the western perimeter of the city had been initiated during the 
busing controversy. However, in appointing a Board member, it was 
evide.nt that in the mayor's considerations other factors still 
took pre-eminence over the geographical residence of an appointee 
to the Board.36 
The termination function considers the final arrangements 
entered into within the framework of the prescr~ption. The first 
35Above, pp. 333-67.~ 36Above, pp. 243-46, 186-90. 
395 
question asks, "How was the prescription integrated into the 
framework of the organization?" The Austin busing plan has been 
operating continually since its inception in 1968. The number 
of students involved reached a maximum of 621 in its first full 
year of operation and then dropped to a number around 550 in 
the following years. The program appears to have become an inte-
gral part of the operations of District Four. While the plan has 
not been expanded to bus the possible maximum number of students, 
it has never been contracted to involve fewer students than were 
bused during the first months of operation.37 
The second termination question asks, "Did expectations 
change?" It is considered in conjunction with the third question 
which asks, "What aspects of the prescription, if any, were 
abandoned or revised?" Stabilization of schools and neighborhoods 
was not a factor in continuing the busing program. It became evi-
dent almost immediately that the plan would not stop the rapid 
racial change which occurred in the south Austin area. Relief 
of overcrowding continued to be a factor in the continuation of 
the program. No one could have contended that the busing program 
was relieving overcrowding in the sending schools, but the relief 
of overcrowding had been the major argument used by Board members 
37Abpve, pp. 320-31, 364-68. 
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to justify _the program. Consistency required that the program be 
continued as long as overcrowding was a reality in the sending 
schools of south Austin.38 
Opponents of the Austin busing program experienced changing 
expectations. Their challenges to the prescription had not ter-
minated its operation. Their threats of dire consequences had 
not materialized. The receiving area neighborhoods remained sta-
ble, and few programs of the busing opponents were successful. 
However, the expectations of many black people were changing. 
Integration through busing was no longer a primary goal of the 
black organizations. Government agencies also became less inter-
ested in busing for desegregation. Desegregation remained an 
expected result of the Austin program; however the degree of 
desegregation was minimized as the expectations changed regarding 
the necessity of desegregatiofi.39 
In conclusion, this smmnary establishes the validity of the 
hypothesis that Lasswell's seven categories of functional analysis 
yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the 
decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing 
38Above, pp. 320-31. 39Above, pp. 285-96, 301, 314. 
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decision of 1968. The analytic questions suggested by the 
seven functions direct research to pertinent and valuable obser-
vations. This dissertation has tried to establish the value of 
an analytic approach to the decision-making process which directs 
our scrutiny to the background of the decision and the myriad of 
repercussions to the decision, as well as the decision itself. 
It has, at least, indicated the need for more investigation of 
the decision-making process and of the use of busing to obtain 
quality education for all of our children. 
' 
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